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I. INTRODUCTION
This article reviews decisions by the Supreme Court of Florida in the
substantive area of criminal law issued between May 1, 2000 and May 1,
2002.' The time period begins where the last Criminal Law Survey created
for this Law Review ended.2 This article will follow the conventions in
selecting cases for discussion utilized in prior Criminal Law Survey articles.
* Professor of Law, Shepard Broad Law Center, Nova Southeastern University;
J.D., Indiana University, 1978; A.B., Indiana University, 1975. Professor Adams
acknowledges and thanks his Research Assistants, Veresa Jones Adams and Harris Nizel, for
their research assistance in preparation of this article.
1. The author has selected as the beginning and ending points of this article
decisions reported in volumes 761 through 803 of the Southern Second Reporter.
2. William E. Adams, Jr. & Mark M. Dobson, Criminal Law: 2000 Survey of
Florida Law, 25 NoVA L. REv. 1 (2000).
3. As in past criminal law surveys, this article will not address issues concerning
criminal procedure such as search and seizure. Although significant to the practitioner, those
4
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As in past surveys, this article will focus on significant cases decided by the
Supreme Court of Florida, but it will not address district courts of appeal
decisions that have not been appealed to the supreme court.
4
During this two-year period most of the cases selected have clarified
conflicts between the district courts of appeal concerning the interpretation
of a variety of criminal statutory provisions. For the most part, the supreme
court has taken a logical approach to the issues utilizing traditional statutory
interpretational doctrines. Although some splits have arisen over some of
the interpretations, this is reflective of the fact that some of the traditional
approaches will dictate contradictory results depending upon how ambigu-
ous the legislature has been in drafting the provision at issue.
One area where statutory interpretation has been particularly difficult is
discussed in Section II. As highlighted by the number of cases decided, the
court has struggled with outlining the appropriate parameters of burglary law
in the state, in part because the Florida Legislature seems determined to
expand the state's statutory definition of the crime beyond that of the
common law and most other contemporary approaches. The exact
parameters of the crime and how the court will deal with cases decided
during its alternative interpretation of the statute before its most recent
amendments probably will not be completely resolved until the court
addresses some of the lingering questions.
Similarly, in Section iMI, the court addresses a problem that has
perplexed courts through the ages: when does a touching of something
connected to a person constitute a battery? Section IV discusses problems
issues raise constitutional concerns that extend beyond the substantive focus of this
piece. Furthermore, consistent with past articles, this survey will not generally address the
complex and specialized areas of the death penalty and sentencing guidelines. The article will
address select sentencing and procedural cases that involve disputes about substantive crimes.
The Supreme Court of Florida did address important constitutional issues
concerning the validity of the death penalty during this time period. In Provenzo v. State, 761
So. 2d 1097, 1099 (Fla. 2000), the court held that execution by lethal injection is not cruel and
unusual punishment. Furthermore, in Farina v. State, 763 So. 2d 302, 303 (Fla. 2000), the
court held that the imposition of a death sentence upon a sixteen-year old did constitute cruel
and unusual punishment, citing its earlier decision of Brennan v. State, 754 So. 2d 1, 11 (Fla.
1999).
4. The article does not cover every decision issued by the Supreme Court of Florida
during this time period. As in past Criminal Law Survey articles, cases that simply apply
standard fact patterns to well-settled rules of law are not discussed. Instead, the survey
attempts to identify and discuss cases that have settled conflicts, interpreted statutes for the
first time or altered existing understandings of a statutory provision, or otherwise clarified or
changed the substantive criminal law in Florida.
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that have also troubled many courts. First, can the attempt doctrine be
applied to crimes that do not require a specific intent? Second, how far
should the doctrines of proximate cause and excusable homicide extend, and
what are the appropriate standards for lower courts to follow? Section V
deals with a case discussing the application of the complicity doctrine to the
Florida statute concerning crimes committed while wearing a mask. In
Section VI, the article discusses the court's attempt to explain the rationale
of two prior cases that attempt to establish the appropriate presumption to
apply in possession cases where the defendant denies knowledge of a critical
element.
Section VII reviews some of the constitutional challenges considered by
the Supreme Court of Florida during the time period of the survey. First, the
court discusses a familiar complaint about criminal statutes, vagueness. The
article next reviews a decision in which the court attempts to clarify earlier
decisions concerning double jeopardy where there is a dispute as to whether
the acts arose from a single criminal episode. Finally, the article discusses a
separation of powers challenge to a criminal sentencing statute. As can be
seen from this summary, the Supreme Court of Florida has considered a
number of challenges involving new statutory interpretation questions and
has also revisited some recurring issues.
I1. BURGLARY
A. Remaining in the Premises
A 4-3 decision by the Supreme Court of Florida in 2000 spawned a
response from the Florida Legislature repudiating the court's interpretation
of the state's burglary statute. In Delgado v. State,5 the court overturned the
defendant's murder convictions because it held that the grounds for the
predicate burglary were inadequate to support the felony murder
charges.6 In that case, the State prosecuted the defendant based upon the
factual premise that he entered the home with the victims' consent, but at
5. 776 So. 2d 233 (Fla. 2000). In a subsequent case, Jimenez v. State, 810 So. 2d
511, 513 (Fla. 2001), the court rejected a motion to apply this decision retroactively to the
defendant who had been convicted under the court's interpretation of the statute before it was
amended.
6. The relevant portion of the burglary statute at the time of this case stated,
"'[b]urglary' means entering or remaining in a structure or a conveyance with the intent to
commit an offense therein, unless the premises are at the time open to the public or the
defendant is licensed or invited to enter or remain." FLA. STAT. § 810.02(1) (1989).
20021
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some point before the killings, the consent was withdrawn.7 The court had
interpreted the consent part of the burglary statute to constitute an
affirmative defense. In construing that provision, the court referred to the
commentary of the Model Penal Code that explained that the crime of
burglary developed to compensate for perceived defects in the common
law's definition of attempt.9 It also noted that the Code's drafters limited its
definition of burglary to reflect that the primary objective of the crime is to
punish perpetrators who invade premises under circumstances likely to
terrorize its occupants.' 0 Furthermore, the Code comment urges states that
adopt the concept of "remaining in the premises" as an alternative to
"breaking and entering" attempt to limit the language to narrow circum-
stances involving suspects who surreptitiously remain." The court noted
that this limitation has been supported by several legal commentators.' 2 As
the court further noted, several states that include "remaining in" the
premises as part of burglary expressly include "surreptitiously" or similar
language in the statute itself.'3 It also noted that New York, which includes
"remaining in" language within its burglary statute, had refused to permit the
commission of a criminal act to convert a lawful entry into an unlawful
remaining that would support a burglary conviction.'
4
The court reviewed the reasoning of the Third District Court of Appeal
in Ray v. State, ' one of the cases to which the Florida Legislature referred
with approval.16 The third district had declined to interpret "remaining in" to
refer only to situations where the defendant surreptitiously remained as0 '7inappropriately injecting words into the statute. However, the supreme
court correctly noted that to interpret otherwise essentially eliminates the
clause "'unless ... the defendant is licensed or invited to enter.' 1 8
7. Delgado, 776 So. 2d at 236.
8. Id.
9. Id. (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1 cmt. 2 at 66 (1980)).
10. Id. (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1 cmt. 2 at 67 (1980)).
11. Delgado, 776 So. 2d at 237 (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1 cmt. 3(a) at 68-71
(1980)).
12. Id. (citing WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AusTnN W. ScoTt, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 8.13(b),
at 795 (2d ed. 1986); 3 CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW § 329, at 197-98
n.29 (14th ed. 1980)).
13. Delgado, 776 So. 2d at 240.
14. Id. at 237-38.
15. 522 So. 2d 963 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
16. Delgado, 776 So. 2d at 240.
17. Id.
18. Id.
.. [Vol. 27:1
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In an opinion joined by Justices Lewis and Quince, Chief Justice Wells
dissented from the majority opinion on the grounds of stare decisis and
statutory interpretation.' 9 In regard to the former, Wells noted that the court
had accepted the contrary interpretation of withdrawal of consent in three of
20the cases cited by the Florida Legislature. In regard to the latter, the Chief
Justice argued that the majority's insertion of the word "surreptitiously" into
the statute, when the legislature had not chosen to so amend the statute after
the court's prior interpretations, amounted to judicial lawmaking. El Wells
also argued that it was reasonable to permit circumstantial evidence of
criminal conduct to be considered by the jury as proof that consent had been
withdrawn.22
In response to the Delgado case, the Florida Legislature amended
23section 810.02 of the Florida Statutes. The legislature specifically found
that this case was decided contrary to legislative intent and prior case law
relating to burglary. 24 The findings further state that it is not necessary for
the licensee or invitee to remain surreptitiously in the dwelling, structure, or
25
conveyance, and that consent remains an affirmative defense to burglary.
19. Id. at 242 (Wells, C.J., dissenting).
20. Id. (Wells, C.J., dissenting) (citing Raleigh v. State, 705 So. 2d 1324, 1329 (Fla.
1997); Jimenez v. State, 703 So. 2d 437, 440 (Fla. 1997); and Robertson v. State, 699 So. 2d
1343, 1346-47 (Fla. 1997)).
21. Delgado, 776 So. 2d at 242 (Wells, C.J., dissenting).
22. Delgado, 776 So. 2d at 243 (Wells, C.J., dissenting).
23. The statutory amendment in pertinent part added:
(l)(b) For offenses committed after July 1, 2001, "'burglary"' means:
2. Notwithstanding a licensed or invited entry, remaining in a dwelling, structure, or
conveyance:
a. Surreptitiously, with the intent to commit an offense therein;
b. After permission to remain therein has been withdrawn, with the intent to commit
an offense therein; or
c. To commit or attempt to commit a forcible felony, as defined in s. 776.08.
FLA. STAT. § 810.02(1)(b), (1)(b)2a-c (2001).
24. Ch. 2001-58, § 1, 2001 Fla. Laws 404, 404 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
810.015).
25. The legislature directed that section 810.02(1)(a) of the Florida Statutes be
construed in conformity with Raleigh v. State, 705 So. 2d 1324 (Fla. 1997) (ample circum-
stantial evidence for jury to conclude that consent of victim withdrawn when defendant shot
several times and beat victim so viciously that gun bent, broken and bloody); Jimenez v. State,
703 So. 2d 437 (Fla. 1997) (ample circumstantial evidence to support withdrawal of consent
where victim brutally beaten and stabbed multiple times); Robertson v. State, 699 So. 2d 1343
(Fla. 1997) (jury could conclude that consent withdrawn when defendant bound and
blindfolded victim and stuffed brassiere down her throat); Routly v. State, 440 So. 2d 1257
(Fla. 1983) (burglary statute satisfied when defendant remains; unlawful entry not required);
20021
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Although it is the prerogative of the legislature to define crimes, and it
is somewhat troubling that the Supreme Court of Florida did not choose to
interpret the statute differently the first time it had the opportunity to do so,
the court certainly seems to have the more persuasive argument if one wants
coherency in the separation of crimes into logical and distinct categories.
The expansion of common law definitions of crimes is understandable in
light of the changing conditions of modem society, but to fundamentally
alter the definition of a crime can subvert its purposes. Understandably, the
terror caused by the forced entrance of an intruder who plans further
criminal mischief in the dwelling or structure that he has invaded warrants
severe criminal penalties to the act of intrusion. The legislature's new
definition of burglary now treats this act the same as one where a visitor
exceeds the scope of his visit by engaging in aggressive behavior. The latter
conduct is also worthy of criminal penalties, but it does not have to be
penalized by the evisceration of the definition of the crime of burglary. It
may also be important to more severely penalize the prior type of invasion
for the policy reasons given by the drafters of the Model Penal Code and
other legal commentators.
It is further troubling that the legislature seems to be exceeding its
authority by stating its intention that the ruling in Delgado be nulli-
fied.26 This attempt has caused further confusion in the courts as demon-
strated by a recent case from the Third District Court of Appeal, Braggs v.
27State. As the court of appeal correctly pointed out, only the court can
recede from its ruling and the appellate court ruled that it had not yet done
so. 28  The appellate court certified a question to the Supreme Court of
Florida to clarify whether it did plan to recede from its Delgado decision.29
Chief Judge Schwartz pointed out another fundamental problem with the
legislature's act, the ex post facto clause. 30 By seeking to overrule Delgado
and retroactively apply the statute to cases that were on appeal when it was
and Ray v. State, 522 So. 2d 963 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (victim's struggle with
defendant sufficient evidence of withdrawal of consent to remaining in premises). Ch. 2001-
58, § 1, 2001 Fla. Laws at 404.
26. Id.
27. 815 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
28. Id.
29. The court certified the following question: "WHETHER SECTION ONE OF
CHAPTER 2001-58, LAWS OF FLORIDA, HAS LEGISLATIVELY OVERRULED
DELGADO V. STATE, 776 So. 2d 233 (Fla. 2000), FOR CRIMES COMMITED ON OR
BEFORE JULY 1, 2001." Id. at 661.
30. Id. at 663. See also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
[Vol. 27:1
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decided, the legislature arguably seeks to retroactively apply the law in a
manner forbidden by the United States Constitution.3'
B. Open to the Public
In another opinion concerning the coverage of the burglary statute, the
Supreme Court of Florida resolved confusion about the application of some
of its prior cases in Johnson v. State.32 In that case, the defendant argued
that he was wrongly convicted of burglary of a convenience store because it
was open to the public when he entered. Although the court had previously
held, in Miller v. State,34 that it was a complete defense to the charge of
burglary where the premises entered were open to the public, it was unclear
whether this defense would also frustrate a burglary conviction where the
defendant entered a structure open to the public, and then further entered a
35part of those premises not open to the public. The court held that it was a
question of fact for the jury to decide if the area behind the counter of the
store was open to the public and, therefore, a burglary conviction could be
upheld even if the store was open.36 In Johnson, the question of whether the
area behind the counter was open to the public was properly left to the jury
to determine.
C. Burglary of a Conveyance
The court also resolved a conflict between the district courts of appeal
concerning the proper application of the burglary statute to the removal of
38hubcaps or tires from vehicles in Drew v. State. In Drew, the defendant
and his accomplice removed tires from a car parked at an auto sales
31. Id.
32. 786 So. 2d 1162 (Fla. 2001).
33. Id. at 1163.
34. 733 So. 2d 955 (Fla. 1998). For a further discussion of the impact of Miller,
warning that its extension should be limited so as to permit burglary convictions where part of
the premises are not open to the public, see William E. Adams, Jr., & Mark M. Dobson,
Criminal Law: 2000 Survey of Florida Law, 25 NOVA L. REV. 1, 2-6 (2000).
35. See State v. Butler, 735 So. 2d 481, 482 (Fla. 1999), and State v. Laster, 735 So.
2d 481, 481 (Fla. 1999) (rejecting State's argument that area behind counter not open to the
public).
36. Johnson, 786 So. 2d at 1164.
37. Id. at 1162-63.
38. 773 So. 2d 46 (Fla. 2000).
20021
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business. 39 They were charged with petit theft, possession of burglary tools,
and burglary.4° Drew filed a motion to dismiss the burglary and possession
charges, arguing that the undisputed facts failed to establish a prima facie
showing of guilt.4' As was noted in the above cases, Florida's burglary
42
statute is more expansive in its coverage than common law burglary. One
of its expansions, which is consistent with other contemporary American
jurisdictions, is coverage of burglary of a conveyance.43 Florida Statutes
define conveyance to include "an motor vehicle, ship, vessel, railroad car,
trailer, aircraft, or sleeping car,' and entry to include "taking apart any
portion of the conveyance.,
45
In a prior constitutional challenge for vagueness to this statutory
provision, the Supreme Court of Florida interpreted the burglary statute to
require that the removal of a part of the conveyance be executed in order to
facilitate the commission of an offense within the conveyance.46  In a
subsequent case concerning this issue, the court clarified that burglary of a
conveyance could be proven even when the underlying offense was stealing
the conveyance itself. 7 The court in Drew, however, refused to extend the
statute to cover thefts of hubcaps or tires attached to the outside of the car
without any entry into any enclosed portion of it.48 Acknowledging that its
prior decisions had accepted that taking apart any portion of a conveyance
constituted an entry, the court nevertheless required there also be 'proof of
the requisite statutory intent to commit a crime within the conveyance. 49 The
court additionally warned lower courts to not end the analysis once entry has
occurred because it is also necessary to find an intent to commit an offense
therein. 50 The supreme court noted that its holding was consistent with other
jurisdictions with statutes similar to Florida's.5
39. Id. at 47.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 48.
43. FLA. STAT. § 810.02(4) (1997).
44. § 810.011(3).
45. Id.
46. Van Edwards v. State, 377 So. 2d 684, 685 (Fla. 1979).
47. State v. Stephens, 601 So. 2d 1195, 1196-97 (Fla. 1992).
48. Drew v. State, 773 So. 2d 46, 50-51 (Fla. 2000).
49. Id. at 51.
50. Id. at 52.
51. Id.
[Vol. 27:1
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Justice Shaw concurred in the result, but did not issue a separate
opinion expressing his concern with the reasoning of the majority.52 Justice
Quince dissented in an opinion, joined by Chief Justice Wells, that briefly
cited the notion that entry into a conveyance includes taking apart any
portion of the conveyance. The failure of the dissent to address the need to
find a separate intent to commit an offense within the conveyance seems
particularly problematic with this offense. Not only was the intent to
commit a separate offense within a dwelling an essential element of the
common law crime of burglary, it seems even more appropriate for an
unoccupied automobile where there does not appear to be an intent to
actually enter the vehicle beyond the constructive entry recognized by the
court. As noted by the majority, a contrary interpretation turns what is
otherwise a larceny automatically into the crime of burglary.5
D. Unoccupied Dwellings
In yet another case clarifying the application of the state burglary
statute, the Supreme Court of Florida was called upon to consider its
application to unoccupied dwellings in State Y. Huggins. In a case
involving a certified conflict between the district courts of appeal, Huggins
sought clarification as to whether burglary of an unoccupied dwelling is an56
enumerated felony in the Prison Release Reoffender Act. Coverage by this
Act would have mandated a fifteen-year sentence for the defendant.57 The
court was asked to resolve whether "'occupied"' as used in this statutory
provision modifies only the word "'structure"' or both it and "'dwelling.'
'
The court rejected the arguments of both parties that the statute was
unambiguous, arguing that the two were arguing contrary interpretations of
the provision, both of which were plausible. 59 Noting that the Act requires
that its provisions be "strictly construed," and "when the language is
52. Id.
53. Drew, 773 So. 2d at 52-53 (Quince, J., dissenting).
54. Id.
55. 802 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 2001).
56. Id. at 276. Section 775.082(8)(a)(1) provides that "[p]rison releasee reoffender'
means any defendant who commits, or attempts to commit: ... (q) Burglary of an occupied
structure or dwelling; or... within three years of being released from a state correctional
facility operated by the Department of Corrections or a private vendor." FLA. STAT. §
775.082(8)(a)(1) (1997).
57. Huggins, 802 So. 2d at 277.
58. Id.
59. Id.
20021
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susceptible of differing constructions, it shall be construed most favorably to
the accused,"'6 the court deemed itself bound to construe the language most
favorably to the defendant and held that it did not apply to the defendant.
61
In light of the statute's own interpretational mandate, the court's conclusion
seems logical and persuasive.
M. BATTERY
The Supreme Court of Florida also resolved a conflict in the lower
courts concerning whether the touching of a vehicle can constitute a battery
in Clark v. State.62 Clark, the defendant, was discovered while removing
construction materials from a storage site with his truck.63 An employee of
the entity owning the site and his supervisor attempted to block Clark's exit
with their trucks,6 but "Clark intentionally crashed his truck into the [other]
,45
vehicles. The supervisor testified that his truck was struck and spun by
the defendant, who was found guilty of aggravated battery and felony
criminal mischief.66 In this case, the court first acknowledged that the
aggravated battery statute, section 784.045(l)(a) of the Florida Statutes,67
could be satisfied if the elements of simple battery were proven.
68
The defendant in Clark argued that the court should adopt a per se rule
that the intentional striking of an automobile could not constitute the
touching of the other vehicle's occupant so as to satisfy the requirements of
battery. 9 The court rejected the adoption of such a per se rule and instead
held "the circumstances of the case will determine whether a vehicle is
60. § 775.021(1).
61. Huggins, 802 So. 2d at 279. Chief Justice Wells and Justice Lewis dissented with
spirited arguments as to why the statute should be construed to apply to unoccupied dwellings,
but the arguments fall short of overcoming the interpretational presumption that the Act itself
requires. Id. at 279-81 (Wells, C.J., dissenting; Lewis, J., dissenting).
62. 783 So. 2d 967 (Fla. 2001).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 967-68.
66. Id. at 968. The defendant was found not guilty of aggravated battery on the
employee. Clark, 783 So. 2d at 968.
67. This statute states "[a] person commits aggravated battery who, in committing
battery: 1. Intentionally or knowingly causes great bodily harm, permanent disability, or
permanent disfigurement; or 2. Uses a deadly weapon." FLA. STAT. § 784.045(l)(a) (1999).
68. "The offense of battery occurs when a person: 1. Actually and intentionally
touches or strikes another person against the will of the other; or 2. Intentionally causes
bodily harm to another person." FLA. STAT. § 784.03(l)(a) (1999).
69. Clark. 783 So. 2d at 968.
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sufficiently closely connected to a person so that the striking of the vehicle
would constitute a battery on the person.,, 70 The court held that there was
sufficient evidence to support the jury's conclusion in this case where the
impact of the defendant's vehicle spun the occupant of the other truck .
Subsequent to this case, the court remanded another case, in light of this
opinion, where the defendant reversed his truck and rammed it into a police
72cruiser that had stopped him. This resolution appears to be a reasonable
standard and consistent with prevailing legal norms.
IV. HOMICIDE
A. Attempted Murder
The Supreme Court of Florida also answered a question from the Fifth
District Court of Appeal that asked if the crime of attempted second-degree
murder existed in Florida in Brown v. State.73 In a prior case, the court had
held that attempted second-degree murder does not require proof of the
specific intent to kill. 74 The court reaffirmed that the crime of attempted
second-degree murder exists in Florida and stated that the crime requires a
showing of an intentional act that would have resulted in death except that
someone prevented him or he otherwise failed to kill the victim, and the act
was imminently dangerous to another and demonstrated a depraved mind
without regard for human life. 75
Justice Harding dissented with an opinion criticizing the logical
inconsistencies inherent in recognizing this attempt crime. As noted by
Harding, second-degree murder is a general intent crime.77 He also noted
that the court had indicated in other cases that attempt crimes require a
78specific intent to commit a particular crime. He also noted that the courthad encountered difficulty in other instances where it tried to recognize an
70. Id. at 969.
71. Id. Justice Pariente entered a separate concurrence encouraging the legislature to
separately criminalize this type of conduct. Id. (Pariente, J., concurring).
72. Wingfield v. State, 799 So. 2d 1022, 1024 (Fla. 2001).
73. 790 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 2000).
74. Gentry v. State, 437 So. 2d 1097, 1099 (Fla. 1983).
75. Brown, 790 So. 2d at 390.
76. Id. (Harding, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 391 (Harding, J., dissenting).
78. Id. (Harding, J., dissenting) (citing Thomas v. State, 531 So. 2d 708, 710 (Fla.
1988); Gustine v. State, 97 So. 207, 208 (Fla. 1923)).
2002]
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attempt crime where the completed crime only required a general intent.79 In
supporting this argument, he points out that the court has inconsistently
stated that attempted sexual battery requires either a general intent or a
specific intent.8 Finally, he noted that Florida finally rejected the crime of
attempted felony murder, in part because it recognized that attempt crimes
require proof of the specific intent to commit the underlying crime. 8'
Justice Harding's dissent points out that the overwhelming majority of
jurisdictions hold that attempt crimes require a specific intent to commit the
completed crime. 83 These holdings are consistent with the common law
definition of attempt and the conclusions of most criminal law scholars. As
argued by noted criminal law scholars Professors LaFave and Scott,
attempted murder requires that the perpetrator specifically intend the result
of death.84 Such a result is not the intent of a person who acts with an intent
to do serious bodily injury or with reckless disregard of human life, the kind
of intent required for second-degree murder.
85
The confusion in Florida case law is not surprising in light of the
logical incoherency of saying that a person can apply a criminal concept that
normally requires a specific intent to a person who does not specifically
intend the result that would have occurred had the defendant been successful
in his actions. There are sound policy reasons for the common law's
requirement that persons have a specific intent to commit an attempt
crime. Attempt crimes, which can be satisfied by only minimal overt acts,
more ambiguously indicate the underlying intent of the perpetrator. The
requirement of proof of a higher level of intent protects innocent persons
from being convicted of attempt crimes when they have engaged in
ambiguous conduct whose underlying intent is unclear or who have not yet
reached a point in effectuating criminal inclinations to warrant criminal
punishment. This is particularly relevant when one notes that Florida's
attempt statute is satisfied when the defendant does "any act toward the
79. Id. (Harding, J., dissenting).
80. Brown, 790 So. 2d at 392 (Harding, J., dissenting) (citing Sochor v. State, 580 So.
2d 595, 601 (Fla. 1991), vacated on other grounds, 504 U.S. 227 (1992); Sochor v. State, 619
So. 2d 285, 290 (Fla. 1993)).
81. Id. (Harding, J., dissenting) (citing Gudinas v. State, 693 So. 2d 953, 962 (Fla.
1997); Rogers v. State, 660 So. 2d 237, 241 (Fla. 1995)).
82. Id. (Harding, J., dissenting) (citing State v. Gray, 654 So. 2d 552 (Fla. 1995)).
83. Id. at 392-93 (Harding, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
84. LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 12 § 6.2(c)(1), at 501.
85. Brown, 790 So. 2d at 397 (citing LAFAVE & SCowr, supra note 12 § 6.2(c)(1), at
501).
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commission of such offense." With such a lax actus reus requirement,
Florida should follow the majority of jurisdictions in rejecting the illogical
crime of attempted second-degree murder. As noted by Justice Harding,
such perpetrators can "still be [found] guilty of aggravated battery, a second-
degree felony."
87
B. Excusable Homicide
In Weir v. State, the Supreme Court of Florida further explored two
issues that have consistently plagued law students, legal commentators, and
courts throughout time-excusable homicide and proximate cause.8 9 Weir
was a houseguest of the sister of the victim, Michael Martin, who was also
staying with his sister.90 During an argument between Weir and his wife,
Martin intervened, telling Weir to calm down and go take a walk.9' Rather
than heed the advice, Weir punched Martin once between the eyes.92 Martin
fell, got up, staggered and collapsed.93 He was transported to the hospital,
where he died.9
Martin had suffered a head injury in an automobile accident years
earlier before the punch from Weir. The medical examiner found that
Martin died of a subdarachnoid and a subdural hemorrhage and found no
evidence of an aneurysm.96 It was her opinion that death was caused by the
blunt head trauma that resulted from the "'blow to the face."' 97  The
defendant's expert, a forensic neuropathologist, testified that the prior head
injury received in the automobile accident could have caused an aneurysm
and that ruptures of aneurysms are the most common cause of acute
hemorrhage at the base of the brain in younger persons.98 Weir was found
guilty of manslaughter by culpable negligence.
86. FLA. STAT. § 777.04(1) (2001).
87. Brown, 790 So. 2d at 398.
88. 777 So. 2d 1073 (Fla. 2001).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1074.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Weir, 777 So. 2d at 1074.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Weir, 777 So. 2d at 1074-75.
99. Id. at 1074.
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The defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that his acts
resulted in an excusable homicide."°° Florida Statutes include sudden
combat as a defense in its excusable homicide provisions.'0 ' As noted by the
court, the record supported the defendant's argument that the act producing
the fatal blow was but a single punch delivered during unarmed combat and
that the defendant and victim were of similar stature.' °2 However, after
reviewing other cases where sudden combat was raised as a defense, the
court rejected Weir's argument because the victim in this case did not
engage in any type of physical assault.'0 3 The court's conclusion appears
correct in viewing the totality of the circumstances of this case. As the
record indicated, the victim's hands were down by his side when Weir struck
him. "
The defendant also argued that he was not the cause of the victim's
death.'05 First, he argued that the victim's prior head injury may have made
him more susceptible to being killed by the punch.' °6 The court rejected this
argument, noting what every first-year law student learns in torts and
criminal law, that generally, one usually must take his victim as he finds him
and is not excused from liability or guilt by the frailty of the victim's
physical condition. °7
The court did not end its causation analysis on this note, however. It
recognized that it should address proximate cause issues even if cause in fact
100. Id. at 1075.
101. Manslaughter is defined as: "(1) The killing of a human being by the act,
procurement, or culpable negligence of another, without lawful justification... and in cases
in which such killing shall not be excusable homicide." FLA. STAT. § 782.07(1)
(2001). Excusable homicide is defined as homicide:
when committed by accident and misfortune in doing any lawful act by lawful means
with usual ordinary caution, and without any unlawful intent, or by accident and
misfortune in the heat of passion, upon any sudden and sufficient provocation, or upon
a sudden combat, without any dangerous weapon being used and not done in a cruel or
unusual manner.
§ 782.03.
102. Weir, 777 So. 2d at 1075.
103. Id. at 1076.
104. Id. at 1074.
105. Id. at 1076.
106. Id.
107. Weir, 777 So. 2d at 1077. In a related argument the court rejected the defendant's
objection to the judge's instruction on pre-existing injury which told the jury that
"[d]efendants take their victims as they find them." Id. at 1075, 1077.
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had been established.108 It noted that Florida courts had established the
following test for
Proximate cause: (1) whether the prohibited result of the defen-
dant's conduct is beyond the scope of any fair assessment of the
danger created by the defendant's conduct, and (2) whether it
would be otherwise unjust, based on fairness and policy considera-
tions, to hold the defendant criminally responsible for the prohib-
ited result.'19
On the first question, the court held that this requirement was satisfied
by the testimony of the medical examiner that a single punch could cause the
type of injury and death inflicted in this case." ° On the second question, the
court noted that the statutory definition of excusable homicide delineates
when a manslaughter conviction would be unjust, and this defendant's
conduct fell outside of its parameters." I Once again, the court's handling of
an issue that sometimes confuses courts seems to be a reasonable assessment
of the causation and policy issues present in this case.
V. COMPLICrrY
In addition to the issues discussed above, the Supreme Court of Florida
considered the question of whether an accomplice to a masked offense could
be convicted of enhanced charges in Wright v. State." 2 Wright was the
driver of a vehicle from which two masked cohorts emerged to rob another
driver of his cell phone and bag, and also unsuccessfully attempted to steal
his car. 13 Wright was convicted of "robbery with a mask and attempted
carjacking with a mask."'"14 Under Florida Statutes, a criminal offense can
be reclassified to the next higher degree if the offender wears a hood, mask,
or other device that conceals identity. 1 5 The State conceded that Wright
was not wearing a mask during the commission of the offenses.' 6 The court
rejected the State's argument that a defendant could have his offenses
108. Id. at 1076.
109. Id. (citing Eversley v. State, 748 So. 2d 963, 967 (Fla. 1999)).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. 810 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 2002).
113. Id. at 874.
114. Id.
115. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 775.0845 (1997)).
116. Wright, 810 So. 2d at 874.
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enhanced based upon the conduct of his codefendants.1 7 Justice Pariente
concurred in part and dissented in part, believing that double jeopardy barred
conviction on both robbery and attempted carjacking because the taking was
part of a single forceful transaction separated neither in time nor place.
18
Chief Justice Wells dissented, arguing that by use of the term "offender[],"
the legislature intended that the offense apply to accomplices." 9
VI. CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES
The Supreme Court of Florida rejected a claim about jury instructions
in a controlled substance case in Scott v. State.120 Scott was charged with
introduction or possession of contraband in a correctional facility.12' His
counsel asked that the jury be instructed that the element of knowledge
required that the defendant know the illicit nature of the substance
possessed. 22 In the case of State v. Medlin,123 the court had previously ruled
that possession of a controlled substance raises a rebuttable presumption that
the possessor was aware of the nature of the drug possessed. 124 In Chicone
v. State,125 the court had held that knowledge of both the substance and illicit
nature of the substance are essential elements of possession of an illegal
substance. 26 In trying to reconcile these two decisions, the court argued that
the presumption of knowledge only applies to cases of actual posses-
sion. In this case, the drugs were found in the defendant's locker in an
eyeglass case. 28 Therefore, the court held that the jury must be instructed
on the element of knowledge and when it may be inferred. 29 Chief Justice
117. Id.
118. Id. at 874-75 (Pariente, J., concurring).
119. Id. at 875-76 (Wells, C.J., dissenting).
120. 808 So. 2d 166 (Fla. 2002).
121. Id. at 168.
122. Id.
123. 273 So. 2d 394 (Fla. 1973).
124. Id. at 397.
125. 684 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 1996).
126. Id. at 737.
127. Scott, 808 So. 2d at 171.
128. Id. at 172.
129. Id.
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Wells argued in a dissent that lack of knowledge should be an affirmative
defense.
VII. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES
A. Vagueness
The Supreme Court of Florida reversed a vagueness challenge to the
statute criminalizing the unlawful luring of a child in State v. Brake.1
31
Brake was charged with violation of section 787.025 of the Florida Statutes,
which makes it illegal for a person convicted of certain specified sexual
offenses from "intentionally lur[ing] or entic[ing]... a child under 12 into a
structure, dwelling, -or conveyance for other than a lawful purpose."'
' 32
Brake, previously convicted of indecency with a child in Texas, approached
a ten-year-old girl and asked her to come to his house and get a toy. 33 While
inside his house, Brake hugged and kissed the girl and touched a mark on her
left inner thigh. 134 Brake filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the phrase
"other than a lawful purpose" was unconstitutionally vague.' 35  The trial
court denied the motion, but the Second District Court of Appeal reversed.
36
The court noted that the standard for vagueness was whether a statute
provides "adequate notice of the conduct it prohibits when measured by
common understanding and practice."'137  The court found that "the
dictionary definition of lawful"' provided adequate notice of the prohibited
conduct and upheld the statute. 118
130. Id. at 173 (Wells, C.J., dissenting). Justice Harding argued in dissent that the
issue was not properly reserved because the defendant's counsel did not submit the requested
jury instructions in writing. Id. at 173-75 (Harding, J., dissenting).
131. 796 So. 2d 522 (Fla. 2001).
132. The statute provides:
A person over the age of 18 who, having been previously convicted of a violation of
chapter 794 [sexual battery] or s. 800.04 [lewd or lascivious offenses with minors
under 16], or a violation of a similar law of another jurisdiction, intentionally lures or
entices, or attempts to lure or entice, a child under the age of 12 into a structure,
dwelling, or conveyance for other than a lawful purpose commits a felony of the third
degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
Id. at 525 n. 1 (FLA. STAT. § 787.025(2)(a) (1997)).
133. Brake, 796 So. 2d at 525-26.
134. Id. at 526.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 527.
138. Brake, 796 So. 2d at 529.
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The court also addressed the finding of the district court that the statute
created an unconstitutional mandatory rebuttable presumption in section
787.025 of the Florida Statutes, which provides that luring a child "without
the consent of the child's parent or legal guardian shall be prima facie
evidence of other than a lawful purpose." 39 "Mandatory presumptions [are]
violat[ive] of the Due Process Clause if they relieve the state from the
burden of persuasion on an element of the offense."'14 The court found this
part of the defendant's argument persuasive and found the presumption
unconstitutional.' 4' It held that, by permitting the State to prove "other than
a lawful purpose" by lack of parental consent, the trial court had approved an
impermissible presumption of unlawful intent.142 The court posited that a
neighbor could innocently invite a child into his house without parental
permission for innocent reasons.43
The Supreme Court of Florida also rejected a vagueness challenge to
the statute criminalizing the conduct of contributing to the delinquency of a
minor in State v. Fuchs. 44 The Fuchs case involved a report of an eleven-
year-old boy left alone with his four-year-old and five-year-old sis-
ters.' 45 Ms. Fuchs was charged with misdemeanor counts of contributing to
the delinquency or dependency of a child in violation of section 827.04(l)(a)
of the Florida Statutes.'46 Fuchs complained that the criminal statute did not
define "delinquent," "dependent," or "child in need of services."' 47 The
legislature arguably contributed to this dispute by deleting the words "as
defined under the laws of Florida" after the terms in question when it
amended the statute in 1996.148 The court noted that the terms in question
are defined in other parts of the Florida Statutes.49 Therefore, the court
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Brake, 796 So. 2d at 529.
144. 769 So. 2d 1006 (Fla. 2000).
145. Id. at 1007.
146. Id. at 1008. The statute provides "(1) Any person who commits: Commits any act
which causes, tends to cause, encourages, or contributes, to a child becoming a delinquent or
dependent child or a child in need of services.. .commits a misdemeanor of the first degree."
FLA. STAT. § 827.04 (2001).
147. Fuchs, 769 So. 2d at 1008.
148. Id. at 1009.
149. Id. at 1010.
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rejected the vagueness claim relying upon settled principles of statutory
construction. 150
B. Double Jeopardy
The Supreme Court of Florida resolved conflicts between the district
courts in two cases dealing with assertions by defendants of violations of the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States and Florida Constitutions.'51 In
Hayes v. State,152 the defendant was convicted of armed robbery, armed
burglary of a structure, and grand theft of a motor vehicle. 5 3 Hayes and two
cohorts entered a residence and stole a variety of items, including keys to the
victim's van.m After leaving the residence, the defendant and his cohorts
used the keys to steal the van parked outside the residence. 55 Hayes argued
that the court's prior decision in Sirmons v. State15 6 prevented him from
being convicted of both armed robbery and grand theft of a motor vehicle
because both acts arose out of a single criminal episode and are degree
variants of the core offense of theft. 157  The court noted that multiple
convictions and punishments may be imposed for separate offenses
committed in a single criminal transaction or episode. 158 It also noted that it
explained its application of the Double Jeopardy Clause in Borges v. State,
159
where the court stated that the clause "seeks only to prevent courts either
from allowing multiple prosecutions or from imposing multiple punishments
for a single, legislatively defined offense."'16 In Sirmons, the court held that
a defendant who was convicted of both robbery and grand theft had been so
150. Id. at 1011.
151. U.S. CONST. amend. V; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
152. 803 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 2001). The court noted that the first district had reached a
similar conclusion in Henderson v. State, 778 So. 2d 1046 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2001) as the
third district had in Hayes and that both of these decisions conflicted with the decision of the
fifth district in Castleberry v. State, 402 So. 2d 1231 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1981). Id. at
698.
153. Id. at 697.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. 634 So. 2d 153 (Fla. 1994).
157. Hayes, 803 So. 2d at 698.
158. Id. at 700 (citing FLA. STAT. § 775.021(4)(a) (1997)).
159. 415 So. 2d 1265 (Fla. 1985).
160. Hayes, 803 So. 2d at 699 (citing Borges v. State, 415 So. 2d 1265, 1267 (Fla.
1982)).
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convicted in violation of double jeopardy in an incident in which he robbed
the victim of the motor vehicle at knife point.16
The court noted that the guiding principle in cases such as this one
involves the assessment of whether the taking arose from distinct and
independent acts, a factual issue dependent upon the circumstances.'62 It
noted that it had adopted the single larceny rule in Hearn v. State,163 which
looked at whether the theft occurred at the same time, same place, and under
the same circumstances with the same intent. 64  It then looked at the
"spectrum of approaches" that other jurisdictions have taken in assessing
whether a theft constituted the same or separate larcenies. 65 The court
established that its guideline would require an assessment of whether there
was a separation of time, place, or circumstances between the initial robbery
and subsequent theft.66 In making this determination, courts are advised to
"consider the location of the items taken, the lapse of time between takings,
the number of owners of the items taken, and whether intervening events
occurred between the takings."' 67 In applying this standard to this case, the
court held that the robbery was complete before Hayes exited the residence
and that the taking of the motor vehicle occurred at a different time and
place. 68 Despite the fact that there was a single owner, the court felt that the
separation was sufficient to constitute distinct and independent criminal
acts.169 It distinguished Sirmons on the theory that the transaction in that
case involved a single taking of a motor vehicle.
170
As the court noted, it is difficult to formulate a bright-line rule in these
fact specific cases.' l7  This difficulty is reflected in the spectrum of
approaches utilized in other jurisdictions as described in the opin-
ion. Nonetheless, the results in Hayes and Sirmons can be distinguished, and
the guidelines set out by the court assist in reaching opposite determina-
tions. How helpful they will be in future cases in which the factors fall
somewhere between the factual scenarios of these cases remains to be seen.
161. Id. at 700 (citing Sirmons, 634 So. 2d at 153-54).
162. Id.
163. 55 So. 2d 559 (Fla. 1951).
164. Hayes, 803 So. 2d at 701.
165. Id. at 702-04.
166. Id. at 704.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Hayes, 803 So. 2d at 704.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 705.
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C. Separation of Powers
In State v. Cotton,172 the Supreme Court of Florida rejected a separation
of powers challenge to the Prison Release Reoffender Punishment
Act. The court was called upon to resolve a conflict between the district
courts in determining this question. The argument raised by the defendants
was that the Act "deprives" the judiciary of all sentencing discretion" and
placed it "in the hands of the state attorney, who is a member of the
executive branch."' 174 The court found that the legislature's intent in the Act
was to give the state attorney the authority to determine whether or not to
seek sentencing under it. 75  The court noted that Florida courts have
traditionally applied a strict separation of powers doctrine and under this
theory, this Act does not violate the doctrine. 176 The court also rejected cruel
or unusual punishment, overbreadth, and substantive due process claims. 77
VIII. CONCLUSION
As can be seen by this review, the Supreme Court of Florida has not
issued any opinions in the past two years that seem to radically alter settled
criminal law principles in this jurisdiction. The battle over the proper
interpretation of Florida's burglary statute reflects some of the ongoing
debate between the Florida courts and the state legislature over the
difference between interpretation of the law and creating law. In this area,
unlike most of the other substantive decisions, the court's interpretation of
burglary and attempt in this state does seem out of step both with common
law principles and the general trends in other jurisdictions. In most of the
other areas addressed, however, Florida's criminal law and its interpretation
by its highest court seems to be in line with the approach taken by most
American jurisdictions at this point in time.
172. 769 So. 2d 345 (Fla. 2000).
173. FLA. STAT. § 775.082(8) (1997).
174. Cotton, 769 So. 2d at 347 (quoting Woods v. State, 740 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1999)).
175. Id. at 349.
176. Id. at 353-54.
177. Id. at 353-58. Justice Quince argued in dissent that placement of the sentencing
discretion in the hands of the state attorney was a violation of separation of powers
doctrine. Id. at 358-59 (Quince, J., dissenting).
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I. INTRODUCTION
This article surveys the various stages of public employment in Florida,
starting logically enough with the law governing the hiring, retention, and
promotion of employees. Part I encompasses such issues as employers
conducting background checks on potential employees, as well as liability a
public employer may face for such emerging torts as negligent hiring. The
question of who owns inventions produced by employees at work is also
considered. Moreover, the recurring knotty issue of employers hiring family
members is addressed.
Part Ill plumbs the law governing the terms of employment. This area
of the law addresses issues arising over the hours and wages of public
employees. It then turns to the array of employee benefits that pose legal
issues concerning disability benefits, death benefits, public pensions, health
benefits, family medical leave act benefits, and unemployment benefits,
among other miscellaneous items such as privacy in the workplace, and
occupational health and safety issues.
Part IV delves into the law governing the disciplining and dismissal of
public employees. This wide ranging area encompasses dismissals in
retaliation for legal acts committed by public employees, whistle-blowers
who are fired for exposing public corruption, and public employees who are
cashiered for exercising their First Amendment rights in the workplace.
Next, Part IV summarizes current cases and issues arising out of employ-
ment discrimination: race, gender, age, disability, and religion. Part IV also
touches on procedural due process, remedies for wrongful discharge, Section
1983 claims, and finally turns to a recent United States Supreme Court case
26
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limiting the remedies available to illegal workers who are targeted for
discrimination. Finally, Part V explores recent labor issues involving public
sector unions and arbitration.
HI. HIRING, RETENTION, AND PROMOTION
A. Privatization
Privatization is the process of converting governmental agencies into
private entities that are more responsive to market forces. Florida has taken
the lead in this area, but the movement has come under heavy criticism.' For
example, two years ago services to disabled Floridians seeking work were
placed under private management.2 But recently state auditors recommend
ending the project, finding that private management increased costs and
delivered far poorer services.3 Indeed, the agency that oversees the states'
federal vocational rehabilitation funding has tagged Florida as the only state
likely to lose its federal funding.4
B. Selection of Trial Judges
On June 27, 2002, the United States Supreme Court held that rules
barring judicial candidates from discussing legal and political issues during
the campaign are unconstitutional. 5 The Court struck down, '5-4, limits on
6Minnesota judicial candidates. The dissenters in the case worried that
unbridled judicial campaigns would erode the impartiality of the bench.7
Florida's Code of Judicial Conduct forbids a would-be judge to "make
statements that commit or appear to commit the candidate with respect to
cases, controversies or issues that are likely to come before the court.",8 This
type of restriction on judicial speech was called into question by the
Supreme Court ruling in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White.9 The
1. Carol Marbin Miller, Privatization Panel Ripped For High Costs, Poor Service,
MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 9, 2002, at lB.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 122 S. Ct. 2528 (2002); Beth Reinhard
& Lesley Clark, Would-be Judges Free to State Views, MIAMI HERALD, June 28, 2002, at 18A.
6. White, 122 S. Ct. at 2528; Reinhard & Clark, supra note 5, at 18A.
7. White, 122 S. Ct. at 2546; Reinhard & Clark, supra note 5, at 18A.
8. FLA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCr CANON 7A(3)(d)(ii) (2002).
9. 122 S. Ct. 2528 (2002).
20021
27
: Nova Law Review 27, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 2002
Nova Law Review
Court ruled that a Minnesota rule, similar to Florida's, unconstitutionally
violated the candidate's free speech rights.' 0 As one commentator has noted,
the ruling does not prevent judicial candidates from signing a voluntary code
agreeing to say nothing that might tie their hands to rule a certain way.
C. Term Limits
In Cook v. City of Jacksonville,12 voters imposed a two-term limit on
the office of clerk of the circuit court.' 3 Plaintiff Cook challenged the term
limits ordinance after the supervisor of elections refused to accept Cook's
application to run for a third term as clerk of the circuit court.' 4 The trial
court ruled in favor of Cook, finding nothing in the Florida Constitution that
enabled the city to set additional qualifications or disqualifications for the
Jacksonville clerk position. '5  On appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida
affirmed, concluding that the county charter term limits measure amounted
to an unconstitutional effort to create another disqualification from election
to office. 16
D. Background Checks
Many employers are hiring companies that offer outsourcing services to
help with background checks in the hiring process. 7 Since the terrorist
attacks on September 11, 2001, far more employers are conducting
background checks.' 8  School districts that fail to ensure that molesting
teachers do not continue teaching elsewhere are being sued for civil damages
10. Id. at 2542.
11. Edward Wassenman, Let Informed Public Elect Judges, MIAMI HERALD, July 8,
2002, at l1B.
12. 823 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 2002).
13. Id. at 87.
14. Id. at 88.
15. Id.
16. Id. at95.
17. Shannon Tan, Hiring Out the Hiring and Firing, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 27, 2002, at
IE.
18. Eve Tahmincioglu, Tense Employers Step Up Background Checks, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 3, 2001, at C9.
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when the teacher abuses again.' 9 Some states protect employers, who give
unfavorable references, from lawsuits. 20
E. Promotions
In Herold v. University of South Florida, an associate professor at a
public university contested its refusal to give him a formal evidentiary forum
22regarding the denial of his promotion to full professor. In concluding that
the professor suffered no deprivation of liberty or property interests
stemming from his damaged professional reputation, the court ruled that no
substantial interest was adversely affected that would warrant an evidentiary
hearing.23 In other words, denial of a promotion, to a higher faculty rank,
did not implicate a substantial interest that would entitle the professor to a
hearing. 24
F. Nepotism
Nepotism is the disfavored practice of hiring one's own relatives when
25
new jobs become available. While not illegal under federal law, Florida
has enacted anti-nepotism laws with loopholes. Two state lawmakers
sponsored a bill26 that would omit a loophole for school boards after a
Miami-Dade County School Board member hired her husband for her
27personal staff.
G. Negligent Hiring
The Supreme Court of Florida, in Malicki v. Doe,2 8 ruled that the First
Amendment 29 ban on government involvement in religion does not afford a
19. Diana Jean Schemo, Teachers in Sex Abuse Cases are Often Silently Transferred,
N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2002, at Al.
20. Id. Laws in at least twenty-six states protect employers from these types of
"defamation lawsuits." Id.
21. 806 So. 2d 638 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
22. Id. at 639-40.
23. Id. at 642.
24. Id. at 640 (citation omitted).
25. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1039 (6th ed. 1990).
26. H.R. 65, 2002 Leg., 104th Sess. (Fla. 2002).
27. Nepotism Targeted In Board Hiring, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 30, 2002, at 9B.
28. 814 So. 2d 347 (Fla. 2002).
29. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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shield behind which a church may avoid liability for negligent hiring and
supervision of its clergy members.
H. Patent Rights
In City of Cocoa v. Leffler,31 city employees invented a bacterial-based
system for removing hydrogen sulfide from the Florida aquifer and also hit
upon a better method of cleaning the water treatment tanks.32 In the patent
application process, three of the inventors refused to assign their patent
rights to the city.33 During the trial it became known that the city sought a
more efficient and cheaper plan which never envisioned that anything new
would be invented. 4 The trial court found that the plaintiffs need not assign
their patent rights to the city and found no conflict of interest because both
parties benefited from the discovery.35 On appeal, the Fifth District Court of
Appeal affirmed.36
Ill. TERMS OF EMPLOYMENT
A. Hours and Wages
The average American works 42.4 hours per week, according to a
survey of working hours conducted by RoperASW. 37 In terms of total hours,
Americans work, on average, thirty-six more hours per year than a decade38
ago.
While the national average public school teacher's pay rose thirty-one
percent to $43,000 in the 1990s, Florida's average teacher's salary was
under the national average at $38,230.39 While Florida teachers' pay rosetwenty-five percent in the 1990s, it still fell four percent when factoring in
30. Churches Can Be Sued, Court Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2002, at 30.
31. 803 So. 2d 869 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
32. Id. at 870-71.
33. Id. at 871.
34. Id. at 872.
35. Id.
36. Leffler, 803 So. 2d at 874.
37. Diane E. Lewis, South Koreans put in Most Time Working, According to Survey,
THE BOSTON GLOBE, reprinted in MiAMi HERALD, Nov. 26, 2001, Business at 32.
38. Id. According to the International Labor Organization, Americans work 1,978
hours per year, an increase from 1,942 hours per year just ten years ago. Id.
39. Average Teachers' Pay Jumped 31% in 1990s to $43,000, Union Says, MiAMi
HERALD, Apr. 8, 2002, at 10A.
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inflation.4° Nationally, elementary school principals average $73,000;
middle school principals earn $78,000; and high school principals earn about
$84,000.
41
The Supreme Court denied certiorari of a 2001 federal appeals court
ruling that Congress acted constitutionally when it rejected cost-of-living
42
raises for federal judges. Article III of the Constitution ensures to federal
judges "a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their
Continuance in Office. 43  Studies indicate that federal judges have lost
more ground to inflation than public and private employees in other
occupations.
44
The events of September 11, among other things, reduced Florida's
revenues dramatically, creating a budget crunch that has led many school
boards to take many drastic cost-cutting measures. 45  For example, "[t]he
Miami-Dade School Board voted.., to impose a two-day emergency pay cut
on almost all district employees." 46  Without economizing, the district
"would be 'teetering on the possibility' of operating at a deficit, which is
illegal under state law.'
The Eleventh Circuit ruled, in Bailey v. Gulf Coast Transportation,
Inc.,4s that Fair Labor Standards Act 9 remedies for violation of its anti-
retaliation provision are greater than those recoverable for violations of the
Act's wage and overtime provisions.5°
The Hollywood City Commission has come up with an innovative wa l
of financing pay raises for police: allow thirty-one officers to retire early.
Instead of waiting twenty-five years to retire with full benefits, the proposal
would allow the thirty-one eligible officers to retire sooner and receive a
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Williams v. United States, 240 F.3d 1019 (Fed. Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S.
Ct. 1221 (2002); Linda Greenhouse, Despite Complaining About Pay, Justices Won't Review
a Ruling That Blocks Raises, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2002, at A21.
43. U.S. CONST. art. Il, § 1.
44. Greenhouse, supra note 42.
45. Charles Savage, Pay Cut for Dade School Workers, MIAMI HERALD, May 23,
2002, at 1B.
46. Id.
47. Id.; FLA. STAT. § 129.07 (2001).
48. 280 F.3d 1333 (11 th Cir. 2002).
49. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-209 (2000).
50. Bailey, 280 F.3d at 1335; see Snapp v. Unlimited Concepts, Inc., 208 F.3d 928,
933-34 (11 th Cir. 2000).
51. Elena Cabral, Plan for Police Buyouts Would Help Pay for Raises, MIAMI
HERALD, Apr. 10, 2002, at 5B.
2002]
31
: Nova Law Review 27, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 2002
Nova Law Review
pension at once, so long as "they first pay into the pension fund the amount
they would have paid by their 25th year.'
' 2
B. Benefits
1. Disability and Death Benefits
Florida law recognizes a legal presumption that fire fighters that
develop heart disease, hypertension, or tuberculosis contracted it in the line
of duty.53 Disability benefits are more generous for impairments deemed to
have occurred in the line of duty than those that are not considered to be job
related.54 Efforts to extend this legal presumption to police and corrections
officers have met with resistance in light of its cost.
55
On June 25, 2002, President Bush signed a bill, the Mychal Judge
Act,56 authorizing the extension of death benefits to domestic partners of
firefighters and police officers that die in the line of duty.57 The law allows
a $250,000 federal death benefit for police and fire officers' survivors who
are listed as beneficiaries on the decedents' life insurance policies. 58 No
longer will only spouses, children, and parents be eligible for such benefits.
By contrast, only a spouse or child is entitled to death benefits of members
of the military.
2. Public Pensions
a. Public Pension Legislation
For the first time, "American workers now put more money into
pension and retirement savings plans sponsored by their employers than the
52. Id.
53. FLA. STAT. § 112.18 (2001).
54. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 51.1-812 (Michie 2002); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch.
32, § 6(1) (West 2001); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 100-A:6(I)(a) (Supp. 2002).
55. Proposed Police Perk Draws Ire of City Leaders, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 13, 2002,
at 3B.
56. Mychal Judge Police and Fire Chaplains Public Safety Officers' Benefit Act of
2001, H.R. 3297, 107th Cong. (2002) (amending the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3796(b)).
57. Mike Allen, U.S. Extends Death Benefits for Gay Cops, Firefighters, MIAMI
HERALD June 26, 2002, at IA.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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companies themselves do."' ' Traditionally, public pensions have followed
the defined-benefit model in which the employer provides a fixed pension
amount for eligible retirees.6 ' But increasingly, public pensions are
converting from defined-benefit plans to defined-contribution plans, similar
to 401 (k)s found in the private sector.62
Indeed, Florida adopted a new 401(k)-style retirement plan option in
which state and local government employees can choose from among fifty
63investment options. The Florida Legislature approved the new plan in the
2000 session.64 The plan envisions converting "between $8 billion and $30
billion [of the state's] $96 billion pension [fund into] employee-controlled
investment accounts. ' 65 In 2002, all 650,000 public employees are choosing
between staying with the traditional fixed-pension formula which guarantees
a certain income or opting for the new defined contribution plan.66 On
November 20, 2001, the Florida Retirement System selected Prudential
Financial, Fidelity Investments, and Nationwide Financial to administer
401 (k)-like retirement plans for state and local public employees.67
b. Public Pension Fund Investments
The trustees of the Florida Retirement System approved a number of
investment firms that will offer comprehensive investment services for state
workers who opt to direct their own retirement portfolios. 68 The retirement
plan for 650,000 public employees in Florida will, for the first time, be
allowed to decide if they should shift from defined benefits plans that
guarantee retirees a certain amount of money until death, to defined
contribution plans where individual employees decide how to invest their
pensions. 69
60. Edward Wyatt, Pension Change Puts the Burden on the Worker, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 5, 2002, at IA.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Joni F. James, New State Retirement Plan May Include Market Option, MIAMI
HERALD, Nov. 15, 2001, at IC.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. John Dorschner, Firms Picked for Pension Plan, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 21, 2001,
at 3C.
68. John Dorschner, Trustees Approve Four Firms for Pension Plan, MIAMI HERALD,
Nov. 28, 2001, at 3C.
69. James, supra note 63.
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Several public pension plans with substantial holdings in Enron and
WorldCom stock have sustained enormous losses as these corporations
collapsed in 2002.70 For example, Florida's public pension fund lost $329
million, much of it from its now worthless Enron holdings. 71 In addition,
Florida lost about $92 million owing to its investments in WorldCom.72
Moreover, Florida is pursuing "a lawsuit against a money management firm• • ,,73
whose [hapless] Enron investments cost the fund $281 million.
Florida's Attorney General is probing whether Enron violated federal
racketeering laws in connection with the state's public employee pension
fund's $306 million loss on Enron stock.74 The state is also investigating
Alliance Capital Management, the New York financial firm that bought 7.6
million Enron shares for the state pension fund, of which 2.7 million were
purchased after an SEC investigation was launched. 75 An Alliance executive
76was also a board member of Enron. Alliance was fired by the pension fund
in December 2001 .77 The pension fund lost one third of one percent of its
78$96 billion balance as a result of its holdings in Enron stock.
c. Taxation
The IRS has ruled that an employee is not taxed on deferred compensa-
tion payments transferred to an ex-spouse in divorce proceedings.79
d. Double-Dipping
Double-dipping is the suspect practice of allowing retired public
employees who are drawing a pension to go back to work in a public-paying
job.80 The City of Miami's pension laws prohibit this practice but a majority
70. Joni James, State Fund Takes Big Plunge in Value, MIAMI HERALD, June 28,
2002, at 1C.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Joni James, Pension Board Hires Two Law Firms to Consider Suit Over Enron
Losses, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 10, 2002, at 9B.
74. Joni James, Enron Under Scrutiny, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 18, 2002, at IC.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. REV. RUL. 2002-22, 2002-19 I.R.B 849.
80. Editorial, For Fiscal Responsibility Don't Change Pension Law, MIAMI HERALD,
June 13, 2002, at 6B.
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of Miami's commissioners approved a measure that would allow managers
with the city to engage in double-dipping. A Miami Herald editorial
deplored the proposed tolerance of such a practice." Somewhat inconsis-
tently, the editorial tolerates double-dipping by retired firefighters and police
officers.82
3. Privacy and Surveillance
Florida is a national leader in making public records open and
accessible to its citizenry, but state legislators have enacted some exemp-
tions for public school teachers.83 For example, legislators voted to keep
teachers' identities secret to protect records of their classroom performance
in order to allow principals to assist teachers in improving their perform-
ance. Moreover, public employees' addresses and phone numbers are
confidential.85
On another privacy front, the federal courts issued guidelines for
monitoring the Internet use of judges, striking language that said the
country's 30,000 court employees enjoyed no right of privacy when they
sent e-mail or surfed the Web.
86
4. Health Benefits
Sixty-five percent of Americans have health insurance through their
jobs.87 COBRA, the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act,88
enables former employees to keep their health insurance through their ex-
employers' group health plan.89 But, COBRA coverage costs so much that
only twenty percent of those eligible, 4.7 million people, chose COBRA
coverage in 1999.90 Instead, many jobless individuals forego healthcare
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Lesley Clark, House Votes to Hide IDs of Schoolteachers, MiAMi HERALD, Mar.
14, 2002, at 7B.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Judges Ease Surveillance of Web Use, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2001, at A15.
87. Shannon Tan, COBRA Helps Those Laid Off, MIAMi HERALD, Nov. 7, 2001, at
1C.
88. Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA) of 1985, Pub. L.
No. 99-272 (1986) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1091).
89. Tan, supra note 87.
90. Id.
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coverage altogether. 9' To continue under a former employer's policy,
eligible persons pay the whole premium and as much as two percent in
overhead fees.92 Florida offers "mini-COBRA" for some laid off workers
who are ineligible for federal COBRA.93  The Eleventh Circuit ruled, in
Wright v. Hanna Steel Corp.,94 that penalties under COBRA may be
recoverable only by plan participants, not by plan beneficiaries. 95
The medical privacy regulation, required by the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), 96 affords federal protection
while allowing states to enact tougher laws governing disclosure of patient
medical information. A group of insurers have joined to analyze the fifty
state privacy laws to aid employers in efforts to meet the HIPAA privacy
regulation's deadline of April 14, 2003.97
5. Occupational Health and Safety Issues
The South Florida Building Code prescribes how fire walls between
rooms should be constructed to shield building inhabitants in a fire. 98 A
former Fort Lauderdale building inspector alleged, in a federal district court
suit,99 that the fire walls were improperly sealed, posing the risk of smoke
inhalation to those inside.' ° The city, in turn, alleged that the inspectors
forced contractors to use fire-retardant caulk to seal the fire walls, in
violation of the building code.' 0'
Florida law bans smoking inside all state correctional facilities except
death row or employee housing.'02 Only outdoor smoking is allowed under
state law. 03 A corrections department spokeswoman claims the ban on
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. 270 F.3d 1336 (1 th Cir. 2001).
95. Id. at 1343.
96. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936.
97. 70 U.S.L.W. 28, p. 2457, Jan. 29, 2002.
98. BROWARD COUNTY, FLA., SOUTH FLORIDA BUILDING CODE § 3704 Table 37-B
(1992).
99. Wilkes v. City of Fort Lauderdale, No. 01-CV-7372, (S.D. Fla. Aug. 17,2001).
100. Brad Bennett, Lauderdale Sued Over Fire-Safety Inspections, MIAMI HERALD,
Oct. 10, 2001, at 3B.
101. Id.
102. Monica Rhor, Inmates Say Ban on Smoking Indoors Is Ignored, MIAMI HERALD,
Oct. 28, 2001, at 1BR.
103. FLA. STAT. § 944.115(3)(a) (2001).
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indoor smoking is enforced.'14 Besides inmates, some guards also complain
about indoor smoking.' ° So far, the state has refused to ban the sale of any
tobacco products in correctional facilities.' °6 Some prison officials argue
that tolerating smoking in prison aided in controlling inmates and cut down
on smuggling of cigarettes. °7 A 1993 United States Supreme Court ruling,
however, makes clear that prisoners who can show second-hand smoke
poses a health threat can sue.IO8
6. Family Medical Leave Act
On June 24, 2002, the United States Supreme Court agreed to hear an
appeal filed by the State of Nevada that contests Congress' authority,
pursuant to the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA),' °9 to force states to
accord public employees leave.' 0 At issue is whether the Act should receive
only minimal judicial scrutiny or heightened scrutiny because the Act is
related to Congress' interest in rooting out sex discrimination. ,"
The Eleventh Circuit has ruled that the FMLA provision enabling
"employees" to sue their employers includes former employees."m2
Under a Department of Labor regulation,' 3 "[i]f an employee takes
paid or unpaid leave, and the employer does not designate the leave as
FMLA leave, the leave taken does not count against an employee's FMLA
entitlement."' 14 On March 19, 2002, in a 5-4 opinion, the Supreme Court
struck down this regulation, ruling that it incorrectly set up an irrebuttable
presumption without requiring the employee to prove that he or she was
prejudiced by the lack of notice." 5 The decision has been hailed as a victory
for employer groups who claimed the regulation penalized employers for
104. Rhor, supra note 102.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 2601-19 (1999).
110. Hibbs v. Dep't of Human Res., 273 F.3d 844 (9th Cir. 2001).
111. Linda Grenhouse, Justices Agree to Hear Major Federalism Case, N.Y. TIMES,
June 25, 2002, at A21.
112. Smith v. BellSouth Telecomm. Inc., 273 F.3d 1303 (lth Cir. 2001).
113. 29 C.F.R. § 825.700(a) (2000).
114. Id.
115. Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 122 S. Ct. 1155, 1157 (2002).
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bestowing benefits beyond those set out in federal law." 6 The case is the
first ruling addressing the scope of the 1993 FMLA.1
7
7. Unemployment Benefits
In 2001, about forty-percent of unemployed Americans received
benefits, down from fifty-five percent in the 1950s." 8  Moreover, the
average level of benefits had declined and some states have enacted stricter
eligibility rules. " 9
As part of the Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002,2
federal funds will be distributed to the states to supplement unemployment
benefit trust funds in the wake of September 11.11 Eligible persons will
receive an additional thirteen weeks of jobless benefits.122
According to Labor Department officials, about eight percent of the $30
billion in unemployment benefits paid in 2001 were fraudulent claims or
overpayments. 3  Almost 3000 claims were paid to people using Social
Security numbers that did not exist or belonged to dead people.1
24
On November 13, 2001, the Department of Labor issued a new rule
lifting eligibility restrictions for disaster unemployment assistance.1
5
IV. DISCIPLINE AND DISCHARGE
A. Retaliation
Federal anti-discrimination statutes enable public (and private)
employees to sue their employers when employees are retaliated against for
116. Greg Stohr, High Court Strikes Down Leave Penalty, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 20,
2002, at IC.
117. Id.
118. David Leonhardt, Georgia Finds Itself in Jobless Benefits Bind, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
16, 2002, Section A14.
119. Id.
120. Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-147, 116 Stat.
21(2002).
121. See id.
122. Shannon Tan, Jobless Benefits Expanded, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 13, 2002, at 3C.
123. Leigh Strope, Fraud Grows in Jobless Insurance System, MIAMI HERALD, June 12,
2002, at 3C.
124. Id.
125. Employment and Training Administration, 66 Fed. Reg. 56,959 (Nov. 13, 2001)
(to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pt. 625).
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exercising any of their statutorily protected right. 12 6 The employee must
prove that the employer took an adverse employment action against her
because, for example, she filed a claim of sexual harassment. 127 The circuit
courts are split over whether a reassignment constitutes an adverse
employment action. 28  For example, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, in
Barrios v. Florida Board of Regents,129 the trial court's holding that
reassignment to another job with different hours and conditions of
employment can amount to an adverse employment action for purposes of
establishing a retaliation claim. 1
30
B. Whistle-Blowing
On April 30, 2002, the House of Representatives enacted the Notifica-
tion and Federal Employee Anti-discrimination and Retaliation Act 13' that
requires federal agencies to pay out of their own budgets any judgments
against them in whistle-blower cases. The Senate enacted an amended
version of the bill 32 which went to the President for his signature.
The First Circuit has ruled that states retain sovereign immunity from
federal administrative proceedings invoked by state employees' federal
whistle-blower protection statutes. 
33
C. The First Amendment
A controversy arose after three firefighters removed the American flag
from their fire truck four days after the terrorist attack. 34 While the three
126. 29 U.S.C. § 2615 (2002).
127. Id.
128. See e.g. Cravens v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 214 F.3d 1011 (8th Cir. 2000);
Myers v. Hose, 50 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 1995).
129. 31 Fed. Appx. 932 (1 1th Cir. 2002) (unpublished opinion), petition for cert. filed
Apr. 16, 2002, cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 2621 (2002).
130. Barrios v. Florida Bd. of Regents, No. 00-CV-1995 (S.D. Fla. 2000).
131. Pub. L. No. 107-174, 116 Stat. 566 (2002).
132. H.R. Con. Res. 169, 107th Cong. (2002) amended by S. AMDT. 3328 (signed by the
President May 15, 2002).
133. R.I. Dep't of Envtl. Mgmt. v. United States, 286 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 2002) (holding
a state official is a person who may be sued in an individual capacity in a federal whistle-
blower action) withdrawn and superseded by 2002 WL 1974389 at *1 (1st Cir. Aug. 30,
2002).
134. Nicole White, Firefighters Didn't Refuse to Fly Flag on Truck, Chief Says, MIAMI
HERALD. Oct. 26.2001. at lB.
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firefighters regarded the flag as an emblem of oppression for African-
Americans, they insisted that they removed the flag because it blocked their
view. 135 Two of the firefighters who were out on administrative leave with
pay, were cleared to return to work after an investigation. 36 Two days after
the incident, the fire department ordered all trucks to display the American
flags. The three firefighters expressed concerns about their safety after
several firefighters said they would refuse to back them up in a fire. 1
37
Does a public school teacher have a first amendment right to appear in
an online pornographic video? The Broward County School Board voted to
suspend without pay an elementary school physical education teacher whose
appearance in a pornographic movie prompted complaints by educators and
parents. 38 Some parents have urged the Broward County School Board to
fire him and seek revocation of his teaching license." 9 The complaint
against the teacher specifically alleges that his actions have publicly
disgraced the education profession as a whole and violated the school
board's policies.14° In response, the teacher's attorney plans to appeal the
suspension, claiming his client has done "absolutely nothing illegal or
criminal."' 14' An informal poll of high school students was taken and a
majority said they would feel uneasy around the teacher. 42
In McKinley v. Kaplan,143 a former member of a Miami-Dade County
Film Board alleged that she was dismissed from her post in retaliation for a
public statement she made about a controversial county policy.' 44 The
Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to
the county, concluding that plaintiff's removal from her at-will appointed
position did not constitute a violation of her free speech rights under the
First Amendment. 45 In coming to this conclusion, the court applied the
four-part First Amendment retaliation test, assumed her speech touched on a
matter of public concern, and focused on the balancing part of the Pickering
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Sonji Jacobs, Board Suspends Teacher in Video: Online Porn Film "Crossed the
Line," MiAmi HERALD, June 19, 2002, at lB.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. 262 F.3d 1146 (1 th Cir. 2001).
144. Id. at 1147.
145. Id.
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test.14 Relying on the public employer's need to trust policy-making
employees, the court ruled that the4laintiffs First Amendment right was
outweighed by the county's interest.
In Mason v. Village of El Portal,48 a chief of police claimed that he
was not reappointed in retaliation for speaking out at a public safety
commission meeting about the commission's undue emphasis on gender and
race in discussing the replacement of a black police officer who had
resigned. 149 The Eleventh Circuit addressed only the third part of the First
Amendment retaliation test: whether the employee's speech played a
substantial part in the employer's decision not to reappoint him. In light
of the evidence that a majority of the council who voted not to reappoint the
chief did not even know of his controversial comments, the court concluded
that the vote not to reappoint the chief could not have resulted from those
statements. 151
In Littleford v. Department of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 152 a
Florida Highway Patrol supervisor was fired for a string of incidents of
"verbal abuse, profanity, use of racist or sexist epithets and one incident of
making a false statement under oath during the investigation." 53 On appeal
from the Public Employees Relations Commission order sustaining
Littleford's dismissal, the Fifth District Court of Appeal ruled that Littleford
was not injured by the Commission's failure to follow its own rules and
procedures in disciplining him.
In Stueber v. Gallagher,5 5 a public high school art teacher appealed the
revocation of his teaching license on grounds that the Education Practices
Commission deprived him of his right to due process of law by allowing the
commission to raise claims not found in the complaint. 156 At the administra-
tive hearing, the teacher admitted that he accessed pornography on his
school computer (but denied accessing teenage pornography) and that he had
battered his wife. 157 The district court refused to reverse the revocation of
146. Id. at 1150 (citing Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968)).
147. Id.
148. 240 F.3d 1337 (11th Cir. 2001).
149. Id. at 1338-39.
150. Id. at 1339.
151. Id. at 1340.
152. 814 So. 2d 1258 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
153. Id. at 1259.
154. Id.
155. 812 So. 2d 454 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
156. Id. at 456.
157. Id.
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the teacher's license since the teacher failed to preserve his rights when he
failed to properly object to the presentation of evidence by the Commis-
sioner of Education during the informal hearing.1
5 8
A former Fort Lauderdale building inspector alleged in a federal suit
that the city threatened him with disciplinary action after he insisted that
contractors use fire-retardant caulk to seal fire walls. 159 The inspector, who
sought back pay and other damages, claimed that the city violated his First
Amendment right to free speech because it barred him from properly
enforcing the building code.
The various circuit courts have applied three different tests in assessing
the free speech rights of public school teachers over classroom speech.'
An Iranian medical technician at the University of Miami lost his job over
remarking on his birthday, September 11, "[s]ome birthday gift from Osama
bin Laden !"62
D. Employment Discrimination
1. Generally
Many employers have purchased insurance policies to cover employ-
ment discrimination claims. 163 But with the increase in damages assessed by
juries (twenty-percent are for $1 million or higher), insurers are doubling or
tripling their rates.' 64 Liability insurance for employment practices became
popular after Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991,1 65 which made
158. Id. at456-57.
159. Brad Bennett, Lauderdale Sued Over Fire Safety Inspections, MIAMI HERALD,
Oct. 10, 2001, at 3B.
160. Id.
161. E.g., Cal. Teachers Ass'n v. State Bd. of Educ., 271 F.3d 1141 (9th Cir. 2001)
(noting, without deciding, the issue); Vega v. Miller, 273 F.3d 460 (2d Cir. 2001) (asking if
there are content-based differences under the First Amendment between academic speech
involving political matters and academic speech involving other matters); Cockrel v. Shelby
County Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d 1036 (6th Cir. 2001) (applying Pickering balancing test while
noting that some circuits apply the reasoning from Hazelwood School District v. Kuhimeier,
484 U.S. 260 (1988)).
162. Gail Epstein Nieves, UM Employee Lost His Job For Remarks on September 11,
MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 16, 2001, at IA.
163. Reed Abelson, Surge in Bias Cases Punishes Insurers, and Premiums Rise, N.Y.
TtMEs, Jan. 9, 2002, at CI.
164. Id.
165. Pub. L. 102-166, as enacted on Nov. 21, 1991 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1981).
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jury trials and punitive damages available. 166 As a general rule, however,
employers may not insure against punitive damages. While the number of
claims made annually to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) has not risen, awards in settlements, and. mediation have climbed
two-thirds over three years. 67
The Supreme Court, in EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 16 ruled that the
EEOC, the federal agency charged with eliminating job discrimination, can
sue for damages on behalf of workers who have agreed to resolve all on-the-
job disputes by arbitration. 69 Since the EEOC was not a party to the
arbitration agreement, the high court ruled the EEOC is not bound by the
arbitration agreement. 17 The EEOC has an independent mandate to pursue
lawsuits that serve the public's interest.' 7'
On March 19, 2002, the Supreme Court ruled, in Edelman v. Lynchburg
College,172 that an EEOC regulation enabling a plaintiff to "verify" at a
future date an unsworn discrimination charge that was timely filed was
permissible. 73 Under section 706(e)(1) of Title VII of the United States
Code, 74 discrimination charges must be filed within 180 days of the alleged
injury or within 300 days in a deferral state that has an agreement with the
EEOC to handle such claims. 175 But the Supreme Court ruled that a claimant
may "verify" by oath after the filing deadline an unsworn charge filed before
the deadline. 17
The Supreme Court ruled, in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., '177 that, in
order to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint alleging employment
discrimination, need not spell out specific facts which proves a prima facie
case in order to survive a motion to dismiss. 178 Under McDonnell DouglasCorp. v. Green,179 a complaint need only set out a "short and plain statement
166. Id.
167. Abelson, supra note 163.
168. 122 S. Ct. 754 (2002).
169. Anne Gearan, EEOC Can Sue When Worker Can 't, Court Rules, MIAMI HERALD,
Jan. 16, 2002, at 4C.
170. Waffle House, Inc., 122 S. Ct. at 761-62.
171. Id. at 764.
172. 122 S. Ct. 1145 (2002).
173. Id. at 1147.
174. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (2000).
175. Id.
176. Edelman, 122 S. Ct. at 1152-53.
177. 122 S. Ct. 992 (2002).
178. Id. at 998.
179. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
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of the claim."' 80 The Supreme Court has also ruled that illegal aliens who
have been discriminated against under federal labor law may not recover
back pay.181
2. Race
The relationship between white administrators for the City of Fort
Lauderdale and its black employees has continued to deteriorate over the
past year.182  The city attorney has been accused, by black community
leaders, of illegally keeping separate personnel files.' 83 According to critics,
this enables the city to hide smoking gun information on white administra-
tors who may be accused of discrimination.18
3. Gender
In Danskine v. Miami Dade Fire Department,'85 a county fire
department's affirmative action program was challenged both under equal
protection and Title VII.186  The program aimed to hiring more female
firefighters during the 1994-97 period, specifically thirty-six percent females
for entry-level posts. 187 In rejecting the equal protection claims of male
applicants, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the plan was substantially
related to the interest in remedying the after effects of earlier unlawful
discrimination. 18 Moreover, the thirty-six percent goal did not amount to an
inflexible quota.189 Finally, plaintiffs could not establish any injury.19°
On June 10, 2002, the Supreme Court ruled, in National Railroad
Passenger Corp. v. Morgan,191 that an employee who raises a hostile work
180. Swierkiewicz, 122 S. Ct. at 994 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
181. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 122 S. Ct. 1275 (2002).
182. See Brad Bennett, Activists Push City Attorney to Resign, MIAMI HERALD, Oct.
24, 2001, at 3B.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. 253 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2001).
186. Id. at 1289.
187. Id. at 1295.
188. Id. at 1294.
189. Id. at 1295.
190. Danskine, 253 F.3d at 1295.
191. 122 S. Ct. 2061 (2002).
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environment claim under Title VII may recover for the whole term of hostile
environment as long as one act takes place within the filing period. 
92
In Miles v. Florida A&M University,193 a state university dismissed the
general manager of the radio station for allegedly harassing female students
more than sixty days after some of the abuse allegedly took place. 194 Mr.
Miles sought a formal administrative hearing under Florida law. 195 After a
formal evidentiary hearing, Mr. Miles' dismissal was upheld.'9 On appeal,
the court ruled that the administrative law judge's findings were supported
by the weight of the evidence.1 7 The court concluded the sixty-day filing
limit in no way prohibited the University from investigating complaints filed
later.
98
4. Age Discrimination
The EEOC has changed its view that employee benefit plans, that stop
or reduce benefits once a retiree becomes eligible for Medicare, violate the
ADEA.199 The EEOC will no longer challenge these Medicare bridge
cases.200
On September 13, 2001, the Senate Health, Education, Labor, and
Pensions Committee voted 12-9 to approve the Older Workers Rights
Restoration Act of 2001. 2° ' This amendment requires states receiving
federal funding to waive its immunity against ADEA lawsuits brought by
state employees. 202
The Supreme Court ultimately decided not to rule on whether the
federal age discrimination law allows "disparate impact" suits, an issue that
203has split lower federal courts. The Supreme Court would have reviewed
192. Id. at 2076.
193. 813 So. 2d 242 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
194. Id. at 244-45.
195. Id. at 244; FLA. STAT. § 120.57(1) (2001).
196. Miles, 813 So. 2d at 244.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 245.
199. Rescission of Section IV(B) of EEOC Compliance Manual Chapter on "Employee
Benefits" and Deletion of Example, http://www.eeoc.gov/docs/benefits-rescind.htm (Aug. 20,
2001).
200. Id.
201. S. 928, 107th Cong. (2002) (amending 29 U.S.C. 621 et seq.).
202. Id.
203. Adams v. Fla. Power Corp., 122 S. Ct. 1290 (2002) (affirming Adams v. Fla.
Power Corp., 255 F.3d 1322 (11th Cir. 2001).
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claims by former Florida Power Corporation employees that the company
committed age discrimination when seventy percent of those let go during
204company reorganizations were age forty or older. Previously, the
Eleventh Circuit ruled out the disparate impact framework under -the
ADEA.2 °5
5. Disability
The Supreme Court ruled on June 17, 2002, in Barnes v. Gorman,2°
that punitive damages are not recoverable against a municipal government
under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973207 or section 202 of the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.208
In US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett,209 the Supreme Court ruled that if
reassignment to accommodate a disabled employee would violate an
established seniority system, then that reassignment is not a reasonable
accommodation.21°
In Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal,2  the Supreme Court ruled that
the ADA does not force employers to hire individuals whose own health or
212
safety would be placed at risk by the job. In that case, a refinery
employee suffered from a liver disease that rendered it hazardous for him to
213
continue laboring in a chemical-laden environment.
In January, 2002, the Supreme Court unanimously ruled, in ToyotaS 214
Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, that a worker's inability
to perform manual tasks substantially limits a major life activity only if the
impairment prevents the worker from performing tasks of central importance
to daily life. This case is one of several this year in which the Supreme
Court has made it harder than the ADA's advocates envisioned for plaintiffs
204. Anne Gearan, Court to Rule on Age Bias, MIAMi HERALD, Dec. 4, 2001, at 7A.
205. Adams v. Fla. Power Corp., 255 F.3d 1322 (1 1th Cir. 2001).
206. 122 S. Ct. 2097, 2103 (2002).
207. Nondiscrimination Under Federal Grants and Programs Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794
(2000).
208. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2000).
209. 122 S. Ct. 1516 (2002).
210. Id. at 1524-25.
211. 122 S. Ct. 2045 (2002).
212. Id. at 2047.
213. Id. at 2048.
214. 534 U.S. 184 (2002).
215. Id. at 198.
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to prevail, or even to make it into court at all under narrower definitions of
disability.216
The Eleventh Circuit, in Johnson v. K Mart Corp.,217 reversed one of its
earlier decisions218 and ruled that Title I of the ADA permits a former
employee to sue for post-employment benefits. 19 In Johnson, the court
ruled that a disability plan violates the ADA when it grants fewer benefits
for mentally disabled employees than for physically disabled employees.220
In Chenoweth v. Hillsborough County, 2 1 the Eleventh Circuit ruled that
an inability to drive to work does not substantially limit the major life
activity of working.222 Therefore, the plaintiff was unable to establish a
223prima facie case of disability discrimination.
In Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental Associates Inc.,224 the Eleventh
Circuit ruled that a dental hygienist, who was H1V-positive, posed a direct
225threat to others owing to the substantial risk of transmission. At least
facially, this decision seems at odds with the Supreme Court decision in
Bragdon v. Abbott22 6 which held individuals who are HIV-positive are
227protected under the ADA. 
In Olmstead v. Walter Industries Inc., 8 the Eleventh Circuit affirmed
the Middle District of Florida's order that dismissed an employee's claim
that that held it is not a reasonable accommodation for a disabled worker to
229insist upon an indefinite leave of absence.
216. Linda Greenhouse, Justices Narrow Breadth of Law on Disabilities, N.Y. TiMEs,
Jan. 9, 2002, at Al.
217. 273 F.3d 1035 (11th Cir. 2001). The opinion was originally vacated and a
rehearing en banc was granted on December 19, 2001, but the court stayed all proceedings
when K Mart filed for Chapter I 1 bankruptcy protection. Johnson v. K Mart Corp., 281 F.3d
1368 (11th Cir. 2002).
218. Gonzales v. Garner Food Servs., Inc., 89 F.3d 1523 (1 th Cir. 1996).
219. Johnson, 273 F.3d at 1048.
220. Id. at 1059.
221. 250 F.3d 1328 (11th Cir. 2001).
222. Id. at 1329.
223. Id. at 1330.
224. 276 F.3d 1275 (1 1th Cir. 2001) for petition for cert. filed March 20, 2002.
225. Id. at 1284.
226. 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
227. Id. at 631.
228. 275 F.3d 1087 (11 th Cir. 2001) (unpublished table opinion).
229. See generally id. (affirming Olmstead v. Walter Indus., Inc., No. 99 Civ. 746
(M.D. Fla. Feb. 26, 2001)).
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The EEOC asserts that employers may select any effective accommoda-
tion and need not be limited to the most effective accommodation option.230
In Florida, any Highway Patrol Trooper who is more than fifteen
pounds over the department's weight limit is ineligible for a five hundred
231dollar performance bonus.
6. Religion
The Pentagon reversed itself and decided to no longer require female
service members in Saudi Arabia to wear a traditional veil while off the
232
military base. Even so, the new rule recommends the use of the veil to
avoid offending Muslims.
233
Even though employees are entitled to the free exercise of their religion
234
at work, there are limits to what an employer must put up with. For
example, an employer will not violate federal law if the company terminates
the employment of a worker who insists on proselytizing at work. 23 While
religious employees can discuss their religious beliefs at work, an employer
236may legitimately impose discipline when talk turns into harassment.
A Palestinian professor at the University of South Florida is challeng-dmmlsaloverhisu ore t237
ing his dismissal over his purported terrorist associations. The University
regards the professor as a security risk and also believes his controversial
238
views have cost the University financial support.
230. EEOC Advisory Letter, 70 U.S.L.W. 2432 (Jan. 22, 2002).
231. Phil Long, Plump Cop Not a Good Cop? No Bonus for Heavy Troopers, MIAMI
HERALD, Apr. 15, 2002, at IA.
232. Pentagon Drops Veil Rule for Saudi, Arabia, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2002, at A15.
233. Id.
234. Tennessee: Suit Says Company Discouraged Religion. N.Y. TIMES, May 4,
2002, at A10. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has dismissed nine
grievances filed by current and former workers of the Whirlpool plant in La Vergne,
Tennessee. Id. The workers had filed federal lawsuits against the company, claiming that
supervisors followed them into restrooms to see if the workers were praying after warning
them not to pray on breaks. Id.
235. Adrienne P. Samuels, Jury Rejects Bias Suit by Born-again Christian, MIAMI
HERALD, Feb. 9, 2002, at 3B.
236. Id.
237. Vickie Chachere, USF Professor Fighting Dismissal, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 15,
2002, at 5B.
238. Id.
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E. Procedural Due Process
In Cannon v. City of West Palm Beach,239 the Eleventh Circuit
addressed the denial of a promotion of a firefighter who claimed he was
stigmatized by a letter of reprimand placed in his personnel file.240 The
firefighter claimed he was deprived of a liberty interest without due process
of law.241 The court applied the "stigma-plus" test,242 in which plaintiff
"must establish the fact of the defamation 'plus' the violation of some more
tangible interest before [he] is entitled to the procedural protections of the
Due Process Clause. 243 The court concluded that absent a discharge, injury
to reputation, alone, is not a protected liberty interest.244
In Jones v. Miami-Dade County, Public Schools,245 Mr. Jones was
employed as a school principal for a one-year-at-a-time basis using annual
employment contracts. In June 2001, Mr. Jones learned he would not
secure another annual contract as principal, but was entitled to re-
employment as a teacher. 247 Mr. Jones sued, alleging that he had a property
interest under the Due Process Clause that entitled him to notice and an
opportunity to be heard.248 The court rejected these due process claims,
concluding that there was no entitlement to continued employment beyond
the contract year.249
F. Remedies for Wrongful Discharge
The ABA's ethics committee has ruled that it is not unethical for a
former in-house corporate counsel to bring a wrongful discharge claim
against his former employer provided the attorney does not disclose more
client information than necessary to prove his claim.
25 °
239. 250 F.3d 1299 (1 1th Cir. 2001).
240. Id. at 1300-01.
241. Id. at 1301.
242. Id. at 1302 (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701-02 (1976)).
243. Id.
244. Cannon, 250 F.3d at 1303.
245. 816 So. 2d 824 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
246. Id. at 824.
247. Id. at 825.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 826.
250. ABA Comm. on Prof'I Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 01-424 (2001).
20021
49
: Nova Law Review 27, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 2002
Nova Law Review
G. Section 1983 Claims
The Eleventh Circuit ruled, in Griffin v. City of Opa Locka,25 '. that a
city manager acted under "color of state law" when he raped a female
subordinate in her apartment.
25 2
In Wilson v. Clay County, Florida, School Board,253 the Eleventh
Circuit ruled that legislative immunity does not protect a school board from
a former employee's Section 1983 claim.
254
H. Illegal Workers' Remedies
The Supreme Court ruled, in a 5-4 decision, that undocumented aliens,
who are victims of discrimination at the workplace, are not entitled to back
pay.255 This ruling affects seven million illegal employees who have jobs in
the United States.
V. PUBLIC SECTOR UNIONS AND ARBITRATION
A. Public Unions
According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, thirty-seven percent of
257government employees were union members in 2001 .
Florida law prohibits anyone from giving or taking political contribu-
258tions in government buildings. What remains in dispute, however, is
whether payroll deductions to pay union dues violates this ban when a
portion of these dues are used for political purposes.
9
251. 261 F.3d 1295 (1 1th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 U.S. 1789 (2002).
252. Id. at 1303.
253. Wilson v. Clay County Sch. Bd., No. 98-01080-CV-J-20C, 2001 WL 1690240 at
*1 (llth Cir. Nov. 21, 2001).
254. Id.
255. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 122 S. Ct. 1275, 1282 (2002).
256. Gina Holland, Illegal Workers Not Owed Restitution, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 28,
2002, at 23A.
257. Steven Greenhouse, Roll of Union Workers Is Steady, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2002,
at A17.
258. FLA. STAT. § 106.15(4) (2001).
259. Steve Harrison, Schools at Risk Over Union Dues, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 18, 2001,
at 2B.
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By executive order, citing national security concerns, President Bush
prohibited union representation at the United States Attorneys' office, and at
260four other agencies in the Justice Department.
B. Arbitration
On January 15, 2002, the United States Supreme Court settled this split
in authority, in EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc.261 In Waffle House, Inc., the
Court ruled that a contract between an employee and employer to arbitrate
all employment-based conflicts did not bar the EEOC, relying on statutory
authority, from suing for injunctive and other relief, including back 2ay,
reinstatement, and damages, under the Americans with Disabilities Act.2
The circuit courts are split over who should decide whether an
arbitration clause is invalid. The Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh265
Circuits have ruled that the court should determine whether the clause is
invalid. The Third266 and Ninth26 7 Circuits take the view that the court is
entitled to determine whether the contract is void, but the arbitrator should
decide whether the clause is voidable. Finally, the Sixth Circuit maintains
that the district court should decide both questions.268
An arbitration agreement requiring the parties to share arbitration costs
and fees equally may violate the employee's right to seek a complete awards
of fees and costs under Title VII.
269
VI. CONCLUSION
Public sector employment and labor law covers considerable ground.
Every stage of employment, from hiring, to the terms of employment, to
employment discrimination, to discipline and discharge, gives rise to its own
array of issues at the federal, state, and local levels. Post retirement also
260. Steven Greenhouse, Bush, Citing Security, Bans Some Unions at Justice Dept.,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2002, at A14.
261. 122 S. Ct. 754 (2002).
262. Id. at 760.
263. We Care Hair Dev., Inc. v. Engen, 180 F.3d 838 (7th Cir. 1999).
264. Barker v. Golf U.S.A., Inc. 154 F.3d 788 (8th Cit. 1998).
265. Bess v. Check Express, 294 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2002).
266. Sandvik AB v. Advent Int'l Corp., 220 F.3d 99 (3d Ci. 2000).
267. Three Valleys Mun. Water Dist. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 925 F.2d 1136 (9th Cir.
1991).
268. Burden v. Check Into Cash of Ky., LLC, 267 F.3d 483 (6th Cir. 2001).
269. Flyer Printing Co. v. Hill, 805 So. 2d 829, 833 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
2002]
51
: Nova Law Review 27, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 2002
50 Nova Law Review [Vol. 27:23
covers such issues as public pensions, disability retirement, and death
benefits. Finally, September 11 has also left its imprint on employment law
ranging from stepped up background checks for many public employees, to
prolonged unemployment benefits for those affected by the terrorist attacks.
52
Nova Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 1 [2002], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol27/iss1/1
Regulating Watershed Restoration: Why the Perfect Permit
Is the Enemy of the Good Project
Keith Rizzardi
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ......................................................................... 52
II. REASONS FOR REGULATING RESTORATION .............................. 52
A. Ensuring Review of Environmental Impacts .................... 53
B. Providing Opportunities for Public Participation ........... 53
C. Creating a Permit Shield for the Permittee ...................... 54
HI. REALITIES OF RESTORATION: EXAMPLES FROM
THE EVERGLADES ....................................................................... 55
A. Dredge and Fill Permits ................................................... 56
B. NPDES Permits ................................................................. 57
C. Everglades Forever Act Permits ...................................... 62
D. Aquifer Storage and Recovery Permits ............................ 63
E. Problems of Permit Compliance ...................................... 65
1. Unexpected Events and Permit Modifications ........... 65
2. Revision to Water Quality Standards ......................... 66
IV. THE RANGE OF REGULATORY OPTIONS ................................... 68
A. Exemptions and De Minimus Permits ............................... 69
B. General Perm its ............................................................... 71
C . Variances .......................................................................... 73
D. Project-Specific Statutory Permitting Criteria ................. 74
E. Comprehensive Legislation .............................................. 76
1. Amend the Clean Water Act to Exempt Restoration ...... 76
2. Create a Single State Watershed Restoration Law .......... 76
V . CONCLUSION ............................................................................ 78
* Keith W. Rizzardi (JD, University of Florida; MPA, Florida Atlantic University;
BA, University of Virginia) currently practices environmental and administrative law and
formerly worked as an attorney at the South Florida Water Management District specializing
in environmental law. Any opinions expressed in this article are his own, not those of his
employer. The author would like to thank David Halpem for his assistance on this article.
53
: Nova Law Review 27, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 2002
Nova Law Review
I. INTRODUCTION
Water resource restoration projects have become essential components
of public policy due to the ecological connection between land and water
and the economic benefits.' Ironically, despite the resulting improvements
to water quality, flood control, water supplies, and natural resources,
watershed restoration projects can be subjected to the same types of
environmental regulations that were designed for industrial activities and
other intense land uses. In many ways, this type of regulation of restoration
is beneficial, providing due process and adequate review of environmental
issues. However, through the regulatory process, the law of unintended
consequences emerges, and environmental protection laws and regulations
can actually hamper implementation of important environmental restoration
efforts.
This article explores the problems of regulating watershed restoration,
especially in the Florida Everglades. Part II discusses the reasons for
regulating watershed restoration. Part III explores the consequences, based
on examples and experiences of the South Florida Water Management
District in its effort to obtain permits for the Everglades restoration. Part IV
then considers the range of options available for regulating watershed
restoration projects, and Part V provides the author's recommendations and
conclusions.
II. REASONS FOR REGULATING RESTORATION
At first, the concept of regulating environmental restoration seems
oxymoronic. Why use laws to protect the environment from projects
designed to protect or benefit the environment? Because Florida's history is
spotted with well-intentioned projects that had severe environmental impacts
-from the construction of the canal systems carving up the Everglades to
the channelization of the Kissimmee River to the Cross-Florida Barge
1. See Robert W. Adler, Addressing Barriers to Watershed Protection, 25 ENVTL. L.
973, 981-91 (1995). In 1994 the Florida Legislature concluded that:
[Tnhe Everglades ecological system not only contributes to South Florida's water
supply, flood control, and recreation, but serves as the habitat for diverse species of
wildlife and plant life. The system is unique in the world, and one of Florida's great
treasures. The Everglades ecological system is endangered as a result of adverse
changes in water quality, and in the quantity, distribution and timing of flows, and,
therefore, must be restored and protected.
Everglades Forever Act, FLA. STAT. § 373.4592(1)(a) (2001).
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Canal.2 As a result, there is a clear need for environmental regulation-evenfor watershed restoration projects.
A. Ensuring Review of Environmental Impacts
To avoid unintentionally creating environmental problems at the federal
level, Congress passed the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) in
1974, requiring an environmental impact statement to be conducted for
projects with potential environmental consequences.3  Environmental
permitting laws and regulations take an additional step, ensuring that
permitted 5projects meet established standards,4 such as state water quality
standards, by requiring compliance with permit conditions. These types of
review ensure adequate analysis of environmental issues, and in theory
prevent governmental entities from implementing measures that adversely
impact the environment.
B. Providing Opportunities for Public Participation
Through the environmental permitting process, the permittee and the
interested members of the public also ensure compliance with the well-
established principles of due process in administrative law requiring notice
6and. the opportunity to be heard. Typically, the development of an
environmental permit involves a public comment period or a workshop to
openly discuss the project and its requirements.7 In some cases, pursuant to
Florida's Administrative Procedures Act,8 parties whose substantial interestsare affected will file petitions to administratively challenge proposed agency
2. See NELSON MANFRED BLAKE, LAND INTO WATER-WATER INTO LAND: A
HISTORY OF WATER MANAGEMENT IN FLORIDA vii-viii (1980). See also LUTHER J. CARTER,
THE FLORIDA EXPERIENCE: LAND AND WATER POLICY IN A GRowTH STATE 52 (1974).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (2000).
4. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1344 (2000) (including Clean Water Act provisions
authorizing environmental permitting programs).
5. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 62-302.500 (2000).
6. See, e.g., Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1 (1938). See also Singer Island
Civic Ass'n, Inc. v. State, 636 So. 2d 723 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994); Friends of the
Hatchineha, Inc. v. State, 580 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
7. See, e.g., FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 62-620.510(10)-(14) (2000). These types of
public hearings and workshops can also be conducted pursuant to NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4321
(2000), during the development of an environmental impact statement.
8. FLA. STAT. ch. 120 (2001).
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actions.9 This gives the permittee and the public an opportunity to question
whether a regulatory agency has met its burden, and whether the permit
provides "reasonable assurances"-the legal standard typically used for
environmental permits-that the requirements of law will be met.l°
C. Creating a Permit Shield for the Permittee
Another benefit of the environmental permitting process is its creation
of a "permit shield," an assurance that compliance with the permit
constitutes compliance with the law, and a freedom from future liability
related to any pollutants regulated by that permit. 11 Although not without its
opponents,12 this concept is an outgrowth of the basic principles of good
faith reliance and prosecutorial discretion.' 3 It has been formally codified in
some state and federal environmental laws, 4 and has been upheld in court. 5
Notably, the federal Clean Water Act16 and Florida's National Pollutant
9. § 120.569.
10. Fla. Dep't of Transp. v. J.W.C. Co., 396 So. 2d 778, 789 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1981). The Florida Department of Environmental Protection also has rulemaking efforts
underway to further define and clarify the concept of "reasonable assurances." See 25 Fla.
Admin. Weekly 4121 (Sept. 10, 1999).
11. See Operating Permit Program, 57 Fed. Reg. 32,251, 32,265-66 (July 21, 1992)
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 70); see also Memorandum from Robert Perciasepe, Steven A.
Herman, and Jean C. Nelson, United States Environmental Protection Agency, to Regional
Administrators and Regional Counsels, United States Environmental Protection Agency (July
1, 1994), at http://www.epa.gov/compliancetresources/policies/civillcwalshield.pdf (relating
policy statement on scope of discharge authorization and shield associated with NPDES
permits); Daniel F. O'Sullivan, The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990: Permits and
Enforcement-The Guts of the New Law, 18 U. DAYTON L. REV. 275, 300-03 (1992).
12. Some environmental groups criticize this concept, however, fearing that permits
themselves will become the law and that environmental protection could be undermined. See,
e.g., MISSOURI COALmON FOR THE ENVIRONMENT, 1998 ENVIRONMENTAL BRIEFING BOOK: A
GUIDE FOR THE STATE LEGISLATURE ch. 8 (1998).
13. See Shell Oil Co. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 950 F.2d 741, 762 (D.C. Cir.
1991). "[A]n agency's decision not to prosecute or enforce, whether through civil or criminal
process, is a decision generally committed to an agency's absolute discretion." Id. at 763
(quoting Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985)).
14. See, e.g., 45 Fed. Reg. 33,290, 33,312 (May 19, 1980) (establishing RCRA permit
shield rule, and stating that EPA "will not take enforcement action against any person who has
received a final RCRA permit except for noncompliance with the conditions of that permit");
30 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 122.148 (2002).
15. See Shell Oil, 950 F.2d at 762.
16. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(k) (2000).
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Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) rulesI7 both state that compliance
with an NPDES permit constitutes compliance with the law, thus giving the
permittee a permit shield. 8
Thus, the issuance of an environmental permit provides significant
benefits to the permittee by clearly defining the objectives and standards
which need to be met by the project. The permit benefits the holder by
allowing the permittee to move forward with fewer concerns about litigation
due to enforcement measures or citizen suits, so long as the permittee
complies with those terms.' 9 This protection is useful even in the area of
environmental restoration, because despite their positive attributes, even
environmental restoration projects can be challenged. 2°
III. REALITIES OF REGULATION: EXAMPLES FROM THE EVERGLADES
While governmental entities are traditionally thought of as the
permitting agency, sometimes they become the permittee. Construction of a
watershed restoration project, like any other construction project, is subject
to environmental regulation. In those cases, the value of the permit shield
becomes readily apparent. Indeed, the experience of the South Florida
Water Management District (Water Management District) with the
Everglades restoration effort demonstrates the difficulties that occur when
rules of law meet laws of nature.
21In 1994, after many years of litigation over the Everglades restoration,the Everglades Forever Act (EFA), was passed to provide a roadmap for
17. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 62-620.301 (2000); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 62-
650.300 (1999). The Florida rules do provide exceptions to the permit shield in four
instances: 1) when the permittee is not in compliance with the permit; 2) when the permittee
provides false information; 3) when the permittee fails to provide information; or 4) when the
permittee violates the operating requirements for a wastewater facility. FLA. ADMIN. CODE
ANN. r. 62-600.740 (1999).
18. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 138 n.28 (1977)
[hereinafter Du Pont] (interpreting the clean water act to provide a permit shield to permittees,
protecting them from permit changes); United States v. Frezzo Bros., Inc., 602 F.2d 1123,
1128 (3d Cir. 1979).
19. See Du Pont, 430 U.S. at 138 n.28.
20. For example, environmental interest groups have challenged aspects of the
Everglades restoration on the grounds that the restoration is not protective enough of the
environment. See, e.g., Miccosukee Tribe of Indians v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 721 So. 2d
389 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998); Miccosukee Tribe of Indians v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist.,
98 Envtl. & Land Use Admin. L. Rep. 119 (FALR) (Apr. 20, 1998).
21. See Keith W. Rizzardi, Alligators and Litigators: A Recent History of Everglades
Regulation and Litigation, FLA. B.J., Mar. 2001, at 18.
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the restoration effort. The EFA required the implementation of the
Everglades Construction Project (ECP).23 The ECP is one of the largest
environmental restoration projects ever undertaken, 24 and includes the
construction of over 40,000 acres of marshlands in agricultural areas north of
the Everglades, known as Stormwater Treatment Areas (STAs).25  The
marshes use natural vegetation to filter excess nutrients, especially
phosphorus, from upstream agricultural discharges before those waters reach
the Everglades.26  Ironically, the construction and operation of the STA
marshes, which are a critical component of the Everglades restoration effort,
have been delayed by the permitting requirements of environmental laws.
A. Dredge and Fill Permits
Pursuant to section 404 of the federal Clean Water Act, the Water
Management District's construction of the STAs needed a dredge and fill
27permit from the United States Army Corps of Engineers (Corps). The
situation was ironic, since these wetland protection provisions of the federal
Clean Water Act were being used to regulate the construction of new
wetlands on previous agricultural lands. Further adding to the irony, decades
of discharges from those same lands had been unregulated by the Clean
28Water Act due to agriculture's exemption from that law.
The 404 permit for the ECP would prove unique, because instead of
focusing upon STA construction, the federal 404 permits issued to the Water
Management District; included operating conditions regulating the water
quality of discharges-an issue normally reserved for federal National
29Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permitting. In support
22. FLA. STAT. § 373.4592 (2001).
23. § 373.4592(4).
24. § 373.4592(1)(h).
25. See, e.g., S. FLA. WATER MGMT. DIST., 2001 EVERGLADES CONSOLIDATION
REPORT, available at http://www.sfwmd.gov/org/ema/everglades/consolidated-Ollindex.html
(last visited Oct. 13, 2002). See also Andrew G. Wright, Focus on Environment: A Last Ditch
Attempt to Save the Everglades, ENGINEERING-NEWS RECORD, June 8, 1998, at 36;
Christopher Jones, One Last-Ditch Effort to Restore the Everglades, COMPRESSED AIR, Sept.
1998, at 10.
26. S. FLA. WATER MGMT. DIST., 2001 EVERGLADES CONSOLIDATION REPORT,
available at http:llwww.sfwmd.gov/orglemaleverglades/consolidated. Olindex.html (last
visited Oct. 13, 2002).
27. United States Army Corps of Engineers, Permit No. 199404532 (Mar. 13, 1997).
•28. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(1)(1) (2000); 40 C.F.R. § 122.3 (2001).
29. See id.
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of this unprecedented action, the record of decision for the 404 permit
explained that since water quality issues had not yet been clearly addressed
by an NPDES permit, the Corps was exercising its authority to protect the
public interest. The Corps eventually conceded that operational issues
were best addressed by federal NPDES permits, and agreed to modify its
initial draft permit to include a condition stating that the permit would
"eliminate duplicate, conflicting, or unnecessary terms" to conform with the
NPDES permits.32
Until those NPDES permits were in place, the Corps' conditions
required a substantial research and monitoring program to continue.33 Con-
cerns over the sweeping scope of the 404 permit even reached the Florida
Legislature, which held hearings on the subject, calling the Corps' District
Engineer to testify.3 Ultimately, the legislature passed a law creating a Joint
Legislative Committee on Everglades Oversight to monitor permitting issues
related to the Everglades. 35 But the Water Management District was still left
holding an unprecedented 404 permit as its reward for constructing a
36
massive environmental restoration project.
B. NPDES Permits
The anticipated NPDES permits regulating the operation of the
Everglades Construction Project proved just as complicated and controver-
sial as the 404 permit that authorized thelproject's construction. Pursuant to
the Clean Water Act, NPDES permits regulate the addition of a pollutant to
navigable waters from a point source discharge." Initially, the District
argued that the STAs did not fit this criteria, because STAs were not point
sources that added pollutants to waters of the United States. Rather, STAs
were non-point source stormwater systems that removed pollut-
30. Bob Barron, United States Army Corps of Engineers, Memorandum for Record,
Record of Decision for Permit No. 199404532 (Mar. 13, 1997).
31. See 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a) (2001).
32. United States Army Corps of Engineers, Permit No. 199404532 (Mar. 13, 1997).
33. See id.
34. See generally Bush Signs Law to Help Restore Everglades, ST. PETERSBERG TIMES
(Fla.), May 17, 2000, at 5B.
35. Ch. 97-258, § 1, 1997 Fla. Laws 4604 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 11.80 (2001)).
36. Notably, the Water Management District never signed the 404 permit. See United
States Army Corps of Engineers, Permit No. 199404532 (Mar. 13, 1997).
37. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12)(A) (2000); see also Nat'l. Wildlife Fed. v. Consumers
Power Co., 862 F.2d 580, 583 (6th Cir. 1988) (citing Nat'l Wildlife Fed. v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d
156, 164-65 (D.C. Cir. 1982)).
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38ants. Furthermore, the District argued that the STAs, which treated
agricultural waters, also deserved the benefit of the agricultural exemption
from NPDES regulation. 39  The United States Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) concluded that these interpretations of the NPDES rules were
not applicable to the high-profile Everglades restoration effort. 40 Instead,
EPA informed the District's counsel that even though the STAs removed
pollutants, they were treatment systems4' that actively "collected" pollut-
42
ants, and, therefore, fell within NPDES review. Rather than continue a
history of litigation in the Everglades, and given the Corps' expansive
interpretations of its 404 permits, the Florida Department of Environmental
Protection (Florida DEP) and the Water Management District agreed to
process NPDES permits for the STAs, although Florida Governor Jeb Bush
would later insist that the permits be issued by the state, and not the federal
government.43
Having lost the struggle over whether an NPDES permit was needed,
the Water Management District then sought to limit the scope of the
permit. In the past, courts ruled that NPDES permits should not hold a
permittee responsible for the pollutants already existing in the watershed,
concluding that "[c]onstituents occurring naturally in the waterways or
occurring as a result of other [upstream] ... discharges [did] not constitute
38. See Memorandum from Paul Nettleton, Attorney, to Barbara Markham, General
Counsel, South Florida Water Management District (Nov. 29, 1993) (on file with author).
39. Id.
40 Id.
41. Id.
42. Memorandum from Thomas K. MacVicar, Deputy Executive Director, and
Barbara A. Markham, General Counsel, South Florida Water Management District, to South
Florida Water Management District Governing Board Members (Dec. 6, 1993) (on file with
author). See also Comm. to Save the Mokelumne River v. E. Bay Mun. Util. Dist., 13 F.3d
305 (9th Cir. 1993).
43. See Letter from Jeb Bush, Governor of Florida, to Carol Browner, Administrator,
United States Environmental Protection Agency (Feb. 28, 1999) (on file with author) and
Letter from Carol Browner to Jeb Bush (Mar. 8, 1999). The Florida DEP administers a
federally-approved NPDES program pursuant to an interagency agreement and in accordance
with state administrative codes. See National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
Memorandum of Agreement Between the State of Florida and the United States Environ-
mental Protection Agency, Region 4 (May 1, 1995) (on file with author).
Although the issue had remained unresolved prior to the Governor's intervention, the
debate over NPDES permitting actually began in 1993 when the Water Management District's
Governing Board agreed to apply for its first NPDES permit for the Everglandes Nutrient
Removal project, the prototype STA. See MacVicar and Markham Memorandum, supra note
42.
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an addition of pollutants."" Florida DEP rules for the NPDES program
specifically acknowledge this reality through regulations governing
"pollutants in intake water., 45 The Florida DEP did not apply this "pass-
through" pollution concept to the Water Management District's discharges.
Instead, to obtain its NPDES permits, the Water Management District
was required to provide the Florida DEP with reasonable assurances that its
STA discharges were not likely to cause pollution4 and that the discharges
47would comply with applicable rules and regulations. For a project that was
substantially improving water quality, proving that it would "not discharge
or cause pollution" should have been an easy task.4 But in reality, that
evaluation required the Florida DEP to consider: 1) whether the discharges
will meet numeric or narrative water quality criteria for individual chemical
constituents; 49 2) whether the discharges will interfere with the designated
uses and classifications of the receiving waterbody;50 and 3) whether the
discharges meet anti-degradation requirements.51  Thus, application of
NPDES permitting rules to the Everglades proved particularly difficult
because the STAs only improve conditions and did not completely solve all
the water quality problems in the watershed.52
In the Everglades ecosystem, phosphorus is a critical water quality
parameter, because phosphorus enrichment in the watershed can cause
significant changes to the ecosystem.53  At the time that the Water
Management District sought its NPDES permits, the water quality criterion
for phosphorus in the Everglades was a narrative standard preventing
"imbalance of flora and fauna,"4 although rulemaking was imminent to
44. E.g., Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 545 F.2d 1351, 1377 (4th Cir. 1976).
45. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 62-620.620(2)(h) (2000).
46. r. 62-620.320(1).
47. r. 62-620.320(2).
48. r. 62-620.320(1).
49. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 62-302.500 (2002).
50. FLA. STAT. § 403.088(2)(b) (2001).
51. Id.; FLA. ADMiN. CODE ANN. r. 62-620.320(1) (2000), r. 62-4.242 (2002), r. 62-
302.400 (2002).
52. See S. FLA. WATER MGMT. DIST., supra note 25.
53. See § 373.4592(1)(d) (legislative finding that Everglades contains excessive
phosphorus). See also S. FLA. WATER MGMT. DIST., supra note 25 (evaluating ecological
effects of phosphorus enrichment in the Everglades); Letter from John H. Hankinson, Jr.,
Regional Administrator, Region IV, United States Environmental Protection Agency, to Billy
Cypress, Chairman, Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida (May 23, 1999) (on file with
author) (approving tribal water quality standards).
54. FLA. ADmiN. CODE ANN. r. 62-302.530 (2002). The standard is currently under
revision, and in accordance with the Everglades Forever Act (EFA), sections 373.4592 and
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develop a new numeric criterion for phosphorus. 55 While research suggested
56that the number would later be ten garts per billion (ppb), as already
recommended by the Florida, DEP, and as indicated in the state's
Everglades Forever Act,5a the STAs were only designed to achieve fifty
ppb.
Despite being a substantial improvement over existing water quality,
fifty ppb was not good enough for the Clean Water Act and its NPDES
permits. Until the Florida DEP had reasonable assurances that the state's
water quality criteria would be met, permits could not be issued, and the
treatment systems could not be operated. 60 Eventually, after nearly two
years of interagency negotiations, the Water Management District, the
Florida DEP and the United States EPA all agreed on an NPDES permit for
STA-1 West.61 The STA-1 West permit was issued in conjunction with an
administrative order acknowledging that phosphorus water quality criterion
would not be met,62 and allowing the District until 2006 to comply with all
water quality standards in accordance with the state's Everglades Forever
Act.6' This approach was authorized by the federal Clean Water Act, and
was based on the concept of a compliance schedule.64 Unfortunately, under
federal law, compliance with an administrative order provides less of a
65permit shield for the permittee than compliance with a permit, thereby
373.4592(4) of the Florida Statutes. The Florida Environmental Regulation Commission will
establish a numeric criterion for phosphorus in the Everglades no later than December 31,
2003.
55. See § 373.4592(4)(d).
56. Evidence suggests that changes in Everglades flora and fauna are seen at levels as
low as ten parts per billion. See S. FLA. WATER MGMT. DIST., supra note 25.
57. Proposed Rule No. 63-302.540, 27 Fla. Admin. Weekly 6110 (Dec. 28, 2001).
58. § 373.4592(4)(e).
59. Additional treatment technologies capable of reaching lower levels of phosphorus
are also part of ongoing research. See § 373.4592(4)(d), (9)0).
60. See § 373.4592(9)(e).. See also Fla. Dep't of Transp. v. J.W.C. Co., 396 So. 2d
778 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
61. Florida Department of Environmental Protection, NPDES Permit No. FL0177962
(1999). Additional NPDES permits will be needed, or already have been developed, for STA-
2, STA-3/4, and STA-5.
62. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit No. FL0177962, Florida
Department of Environmental Protection, Administrative Order No. AO-001-EV (Apr. 13,
1999) [hereinafter Administrative Order].
63. § 373.4592(10).
64. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(A), (e)(3)(F) (2000); 40 C.F.R. § 122.47(a) (2001).
65. Whereas administrative orders issued by the Florida DEP are final agency action,
subject to review under Chapter 120 of the Florida Statutes, they are not considered final
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exposing the permittee to the potential for more liability and litigation over
violations of water quality standards.6 In fact, fear of an administrative
challenge to the permit and administrative order was so pervasive that the
Florida Legislature enacted an expedited process for challenging Everglades-
related permits.67
Thus, in the end, the District and other agencies spent hundreds, if not
thousands, of staff hours to develop an incomplete permit that would require
future modifications and that did not even create an adequate permit
shield. Adding insult to injury, the District's environmental restoration
project was classified as "industrial" and charged significant permitting
68fees. Perhaps most significantly, the permit will eventually hold theDistrict responsible for achieving water quality standards, despite the fact
agency action under federal law and therefore do not provide a permit shield. See Laguna
Gatuna, Inc. v. Browner, 58 F.3d 564 (10th Cir. 1995); S. Ohio Coal Co. v. Office of Surface
Mining, Reclamation and Enforcement, 20 F.3d 1418 (6th Cir. 1994); S. Pine Assoc. v.
United States, 912 F.2d 713 (4th Cir. 1990).
66. Despite the successful negotiation of and compliance with an administrative order,
permittees could still face enforcement actions and citizen suits for violations of water quality
standards and the federal Clean Water Act. See United States v. Avatar Holdings, Inc., 1995
WL 871260 (M.D. Fla. 1995) (stating government may seek enforcement of water quality
violations even after negotiating administrative order); Wash. Pub. Interest Research Group v.
Pendleton Woolen Mills, 11 F.3d 883 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding citizen suits may be brought
against a permittee alleging violations of the federal Clean Water Act even if USEPA is
content with an existing administrative order).
Under Florida law, however, an administrative order is a final agency action. 1800 Ad.
Developers v. Dep't of Envtl. Regulation, 552 So. 2d 946 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1989);
Booker Creek Pres., Inc. v. Mobil Chem. Co., 481 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
67. Chapter 99-11, 1995 Fla. Laws 533 (amending FLA. STAT. § 403.088 (1999));
FLA. STAT. § 403.088(g) (2001).
68. A quick look at the bottom line clearly demonstrates how NPDES permitting is
misapplied to environmental restoration projects. Despite their benefits, these STAs, which
cleanse agricultural runoff from rainfall, were classified as industrial wastewater publicly
owned treatment works (POTW). FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 62-620.200(21) (2001). This
conclusion was reached by process of elimination, because the treatment facilities were not
domestic wastewater treatment facilities. r. 62-620.200(15). Unfortunately, this apparently
unavoidable conclusion had other consequences, because industrial discharge facilities must
pay application processing and operating fees. See FLA. STAT. §§ 403.087(6)(a), 403.0885(1)
(2001), and FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 62-620.310(5) (2000), 62-4.050 (2001), 624.052
(2002). As a result, the Florida DEP may charge the Water Management District over
$30,000 per year in administrative fees for the privilege of building and operating facilities
that clean up waters flowing into the Everglades. The first STA was assessed a fee of $5,800
per year by the Florida DEP. See Florida Department of Environmental Protection Bureau of
Finance and Accounting, Invoice No. 1411 (Dec. 2, 1999).
2002]
63
: Nova Law Review 27, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 2002
Nova Law Review
that all the pollutants generated by upstream a gicultural activities were
exempt from regulation under the Clean Water Act. All these problems are
a product of the obvious reality that NPDES permitting regulations were
simply not designed for watershed restoration projects.
C. Everglades Forever Act Permits
Compared to the problems of federal permitting, the permitting process
under Florida law was simple for the Everglades Construction Project.
Through the Everglades Forever Act (EFA), the Everglades Construction
Project was mandated,7° funding mechanisms were provided,7' and
72regulatory mechanisms were established. Unlike federal law, which treated
the Water Management District's environmental restoration projects no
differently than an industrial factory,73 the EFA established an alternative
approach to regulating watershed restoration.
In the EFA, a special set of permits was established for the Everglades
Construction Project, with criteria designed to meaningfully regulate the
watershed restoration project.74  These permits were in lieu of other
environmental permits that would normally apply.75 Instead of requiring
absolute compliance with the narrative phosphorus criterion, the EFA
permits required the STAs to achieve reasonable performance and "design
,,76objectives. Instead of looking only at the quality of waters at the
discharge point, the EFA permits require the quality of waters discharged
from the STAs to be "of equal or better quality than the inflows. 77 Instead
of applying strict mitigation criteria for wetland impacts, the EFA acknowl-
edged the fact that the Everglades Construction Project was actually
constructing wetlands, and required the "minimiz[ation of] wetland impacts,
to the maximum extent practicable. 78 Finally, the EFA required assurances
69. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(1) (2000) (prohibiting the permitting of agricultural
irrigation flows); 40 C.F.R. § 122.3 (2001).
70. FLA. STAT. § 373.4592(4)(a) (2001).
71. § 373.4592(6)-(8).
72. § 373.4592(9)-(10).
73. See infra Part I.A.
74. See also infra Part IIH.D.
75. § 373.4592(9)(c).
76. § 373.4592(9)(h)(1).
77. § 373.4592(9)(h)(2).
78. § 373.4592(9)(e)(3).
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that the "STAs [did] not pose a serious danger to the public health, safety, or
welfare."79
So far, this state permitting process has produced four permits for
STAs, with hundreds of pages of conditions and appendices. Each one
includes substantial reporting requirements, which are being met through the
annual publication of the Water Management District's Everglades
Consolidated Report.80 Thus, even the EFA permitting process, custom
tailored for the Everglades Construction Project, had its drawbacks and
difficulties.81 So the fundamental question remains: whether the complexity
and rigors of permitting watershed restoration are truly necessary, or whether
an alternative and more simplistic approach can be found?
D. Aquifer Storage and Recovery Permits
While the EFA presents an example of moderately successful state
regulation of watershed restoration, the future of state regulation of Aquifer
Storage and Recovery (ASR) systems is not as bright. During the 2000
session of the Florida Legislature, a huge debate erupted over the permitting
of ASR systems. These systems can help manage the fluctuations of water
levels in a natural system by injecting excess surface waters deep under-
ground for storage, which would allow for later recapture of the waters in
82times of drought or need. By injecting freshwater into the saline Florida
aquifer, an underground freshwater bubble is created.83  The proposed
legislation8 would have, authorized these projects, which are an essential
water storage component of the Comprehensive Everglades Restoration
79. § 373.4592(9)(h)(3).
80. See, e.g., S. FLA. WATER MGMT. DIST., supra note 25.
81. Although the EFA permitting criteria was designed especially for the Everglades
Construction Project, it still had limitations-especially because dissolved oxygen levels in
the outflow discharges from the STAs were, on occasion, lower than inflows. However, since
the problem was a result of natural fluctuations in marsh environments, EFA permits were
issued by the Florida DEP with another administrative order establishing special conditions to
monitor dissolved oxygen and ensure environmental protection. See, e.g. Everglades Forever
Act, Permit No. 503074709, Florida Department of Environmental Protection, Administrative
Order No. AO-002-EV (Apr. 23, 1999).
82. See web page on the Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan, at
http://www.evergladesplan.org (last visited Oct. 13, 2002).
83. COMPREHENSIVE EVERGLADES RESTORATION PLAN AQUIFER STORAGE AND
RECOVERY PROGRAM, at http://www.evergladesplan.org/docs/asr-whitepaper.pdf (last visited
Sept. 6, 2002).
84. Fla. SB 854 (2001) (proposed FLA. STAT. § 403.065) (regulating aquifer storage
and recovery).
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85Plan. However, absent treatment of the surface waters, ASR technology
was not expected to be able to meet the requirements of the federal Safe
Drinking Water Act 86 nor the associated state regulations governing
underground injections.
One major concern with ASR was that biological organisms, including
coliform bacteria in the surface waters, would be injected into the aquifer.
However, these organisms were expected to die-off once injected into. the
oxygen-deficient waters. 89 Based on that scientific expectation, the Florida
Legislature proposed a bill to allow a zone of impact provided that there was
no adverse risk to human health. 90 After initially passing the House and
Senate, the bill was later reconsidered, and public concerns with the
scientific uncertainties of ASR led to the bill's death. 91
Those public concerns may prove wise, and the effort to expedite
permitting of ASR may have been premature. However, in the meantime,
the Water Management District's efforts to implement experimental ASR
facilities will be significantly burdened. Despite the fact that ASR
technology is designed for surface waters and is never intended to be used
for consumption, it will be subjected to the very same regulatory framework
92usually reserved for drinking waters. In addition, once the ASR waters are
discharged from the ASR system back into their original surface waters, they
could also face NPDES permitting problems if they are considered a point
93
source discharge of pollutants into waters of the United States. Thus, as
85. See, e.g., U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS & S. FLA. WATER MGMT. DIST.,
OVERVIEW: CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN FLORIDA PROJECT COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW STUDY 16-
17 (1998); U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS & S. FLA .WATER MGMT. DIST., CENTRAL AND
SOUTHERN FLORIDA PROJECT COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW STUDY, FINAL INTEGRATED FEASIBILITY
REPORT AND PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT (1999) [hereinafter FINAL
IMPACT STATEMENT].
86. 42 U.S.C. § 300(h) (2000).
87. See FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 62-528 (2001).
88. Fla. SB 854 (2001).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Press Release, Florida Department of Environmental Protection, Statement by
Secretary David B. Struhs Regarding Aquifer Storage and Recovery (Apr. 23, 2001),
available at http://www.dep.state.FL.us/secretary/comm2001/01-DBSasr.htm.
92. See FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 62-528 (2001).
93. Perhaps the most significant problem ahead for ASR is the potential for regulation
of nutrients. Consider, for example, an ASR well near Lake Okeechobee, which is widely
recognized as being impacted by phosphorus. Currently, the Florida DEP is implementing
Total Maximum Daily Loads (TMDLs) in the region, and has adopted a TMDL of forty ppb.
for Lake Okeechobee. As of the writing of this article, that standard is not being met, and
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difficult as the 2000 Legislative Session was for ASR advocates, their
problems may have just begun.
E. Problems of Permit Compliance
Even when watershed restoration projects are able to obtain permits, it
simply signals the beginning of a new series of regulatory problems. Once
the exposure to an Administrative Procedures Act challenge passes, the next
task of complying with existing permit conditions-sometimes an extraordi-
narily difficult task-begins.
1. Unexpected Events and Permit Modifications
For the Water Management District, a perfect example of the
difficulties of permit compliance was the NPDES permit for the Water
Management District's Everglades Nutrient Removal (ENR) Project94-the
prototype for the STAs. That permit required mercury monitoring.95 Accord-
ing to the permit conditions, the district was required to monitor mercury
accumulation in fish trapped inside mesh cages.96 Unfortunately, due to the
lower dissolved oxygen levels and the inability of the fish to search for food,
the fish died when confined in those cages, making compliance with the
permitting conditions impossible.97 Similarly, the ENR project required the
monitoring of atmospheric deposition in order to evaluate the amount of
phosphorus coming from rainfall and dust. 98 Once again, nature made the
monitoring efforts extremely difficult because wading birds often perched
indeed, water quality standards in the region are not anticipated to be met until at least 2015.
See FLA. STAT. § 373.4595 (2001). If the Water Management District withdraws phosphorus-
laden waters from a tributary to Lake Okeechobee and injects those waters into an ASR well,
regulatory problems could occur.
94. United States Environmental Protection Agency, NPDES Permit No. FLD043885
(July 1, 1997).
95 Id.
96. Id. at Conditions 22-23.
97. Letter from Ronald Bearzotti, Staff Environmental Analyst, South Florida Water
Management District, to Roy Herwig, Enforcement Division, Region IV, United States
Environmental Protection Agency (Oct. 30, 1997). Letter from Roosevelt Childress, Surface
Water Permits Section, Region IV, United States Environmental Protection Agency, to C.
Alan Hall, Ecosystems Restoration Department, South Florida Water Management District
(Mar. 9, 1998).
98. EPA, supra note 94 at Conditions 22-23.
2002]
67
: Nova Law Review 27, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 2002
Nova Law Review
and defecated upon the ground-level collectors. 99 Efforts to use airborne
buckets atop poles and towers encountered similar contamination problems
with high-flying vultures and nesting cormorants 1° As a result of these
types of unexpected events, environmental permits for watershed restoration
projects can require frequent modification, which, in turn, creates adminis-
trative burdens for both the permitting agency and the permittee.
Even when agencies anticipate the unexpected, permitting problems can
still occur. For example, the absence of knowledge surrounding environ-
mental restoration projects is problematic in the context of environmental
permitting, where regulatory certainty--or at least reasonable assurances-is
essential. The EPA, Army Corps of Engineers, and the Florida DEP have all
issued permits to the Water Management District with long lists of
monitoring requirements just to make sure that environmental problems will
not occur, and with the promise to remove those monitoring requirements
after collecting a year or more of data or after new information becomes
available.' °' While this approach seems reasonable, it is also resource
intensive, and substantial modifications of a permit can trigger another
window of opportunity for legal challenges.l°2
2. Revision to Water Quality Standards
Another major problem to permit compliance is presented when state
water quality standards are revised. As mentioned above, in Florida, the
current state water quality criterion for phosphorus is a narrative standard
preventing an imbalance of flora and fauna. However, on December 31,
2006, a numeric water quality criterion for phosphorus in the Everglades will
99. Interview with Larry Grosser, Staff Environmental Scientist, and Larry Fink,
Mercury Program Manager, South Florida Water Management District, West Palm Beach, Fla.
(Mar. 9, 2000). See also ATMOSPHERIC DEPOSmON INTO SOUTH FLORIDA: MEASURING NET
ATMOSPHERIC INPUTS OF NUTRIENT, Symposium, South Florida Water Management District
(Oct. 20-22, 1997).
100. Interview with Larry Grosser and Larry Fink, supra note 99.
101. See, e.g., Florida Department of Environmental Protection, Permit No. 0126704
(Sept. 29, 2000) (regulating STA-2, with Specific Condition 29 allowing removal of
parameters from the monitoring table after one year of data is collected); see also infra Part
II.B.
102. See, e.g., Manasota-88, Inc. v. Agrico Chem. Co., 576 So. 2d 781 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1991); The Conservancy, Inc., v. Collier Dev. Corp., 16 Fla. Admin. Law Rep. 3930
(1990); Manatee County v. State, 429 So. 2d 360 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Hopwood v.
State, 402 So. 2d 1296 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
103. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 62-302.530 (2002).
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take effect. This new criterion will be established either by the State of
Florida, through the Environmental Regulation Commission, 104 or, if the
state fails to adopt a criterion, by the EFA, as a default phosphorus criterion
of ten ppb.'0 5 In either event, the Water Management District will be
required to meet for all discharges to the Everglades by December 31,
2006. l10
Unfortunately, only one technology-chemical treatment-has been
identified that is capable of reaching the low levels of phosphorus that may
be needed for the Everglades, and the costs and chemical by-products of that
technology may make it impracticable to implement." 7 But the Clean Water
Act (CWA) generally does not recognize practicability; rather, the CWA
simply says that water quality standards must be met. 108 Thus, despite the
fact that the Everglades Construction Project has been able to dramatically
reduce phosphorus levels flowing into the Everglades,"°9 if it cannot achieve
the new state water quality criterion, then the facility will be in violation of
its permit.'"0 At that point, the regulatory agencies and Water Management
District will be back to the beginning-wrestling with how to apply the strict
requirements of NPDES permitting rules to the realities of watershed
restoration.
104. See FLA. STAT. § 373.4592(4)(e) (2001) (requiring establishment of a numeric
standard for phosphorus in the Everglades); see also FLA. STAT. § 403.804 (2001) (providing
the Environmental Regulation Commission with standard-setting authority).
105. § 373.4592(4)(e).
106. See Administrative Order, supra note 62.; see also § 373.4592(10).
107. See S. FLA. WATER MGMT. DIST., supra note 25.
108. See § 373.4592(10).
109. See S. FLA. WATER MGMT. DIST., supra note 25.
110. Once effluent limits are established in a permit, the CWA does not allow
subsequent permits to contain less stringent effluent limits. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(o)(1) (2000); 40
C.F.R. § 122.45(l)(2) (2001). This concept of "antibacksliding" in the Clean Water Act
means that there is very little room for error when it comes to the regulation restoration and
the establishment of discharge limits. While there are exceptions when new information
becomes available, see, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1342(o)(2)(B)(i) (2000); 40 C.F.R. §
122.45(l)(2)(1B)(1) (2001), exceptions are very narrowly construed by EPA, and the agency's
interpretations are generally granted great deference by the courts. See U.S. ENTVL. PROT.
AGENCY, NPDES PERMIT WRITERS' MANUAL, § 10.3.1 (illustrating with examples 1 and 2 that
even new information leading to changes in water quality standards might not justify changes
to effluent limits and that changes are only allowed when the effluent limits become more
stringent.); see Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
2002]
69
: Nova Law Review 27, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 2002
Nova Law Review
IV. THE RANGE OF REGULATORY OPTIONS
As the Water Management District's experience with the regulation of
the Everglades restoration demonstrates, watershed restoration projects can
present unique regulatory problems, requiring special solutions. These
problems will continue as the federal, state, and local governments continue
to implement the Central and South Florida Project Comprehensive Review
Study, known as the "Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan" or
CERP."' That project, which will be jointly implemented by the Water
Management District and the United States Army Corps of Engineers, will
include dozens of environmentally beneficial projects-restoring Lake
Okeechobee and other Florida lakes, lagoons, and estuaries; improving
delivery of waters to Everglades National Park, reducing salt water intrusion
into the aquifer, and otherwise protecting and improving water, fish, and
wildlife resources in the Everglades.'
1 2
CERP is an even more ambitious undertaking than the Everglades
Construction Project. And while the objective of both of these projects may
be to eventually achieve compliance with water quality standards, environ-
mental restoration of the massive Everglades watershed takes time. Indeed,
the Everglades Forever Act, passed in 1994, codified a twelve-year
implementation schedule with two phases. First, from 1999 to 2003, the
District is required to construct the STAs, designed to achieve interim
improvements in water quality standards." 3  Later, additional treatment
technologies may be constructed as necessary to achieve all water quality
standards by December 31, 2006.14 This implementation schedule
accounted for scientific uncertainty, research needs, and the practicalities of
spreading the costs of the Everglades restoration over time." 
5
Unfortunately, and as all of the above examples show, environmental
permitting laws do not appreciate the uncertain nature of watershed
restoration projects." 6  Of course, in an ideal world, all water quality
standards would be met. But the reality is that seventy percent of the
111. See FINAL IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 85.
112. Id.
113. FLA. STAT. § 373.4592(4)(a) (2001).
114. § 373.4592(10). See also PEER CONSULTANTS, P.C. AND BROWN & CALDWELL,
P.C., DESKTOP EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVE TECHNOLOGIES FINAL REPORT, CONTRACT C-
E008, A3 (Aug. 1996).
115. See § 373.4592(1)(g)-(h) (showing legislative findings that a reasonable approach
to Everglades restoration required implementation of immediate and long-term efforts).
116. See, e.g., Warren T. Coleman, Legal Barriers to the Restoration of Aquatic
Systems and the Utilization of Adaptive Management, 23 VT. L. REv. 177, 177 (1998).
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waterbodies in the United States are impaired. While some form of
regulation of environmental restoration projects in the Everglades may be
needed to ensure adequate environmental protection and to preserve due
process, the current methods are crude, burdensome, and highly ineffi-
cient. In fact, in the opinion of the author, the past regulatory efforts in the
Everglades have succeeded solely due to the creativity of well-meaning
agency officials. Alternative approaches, including exemptions, general
permits, variances, and new legislation must be explored.
A. Exemptions and De Minimus Permits
Exemptions from environmental permitting requirements are frequently
found in state and federal environmental laws. The federal Clean Water Act
and its regulations specifically exempt certain discharges, such as the
controversial exemption for agricultural discharges. 17 At the state level, the
Florida DEP and regional Water Management Districts also have the ability
to issue exemptions from environmental regulations for certain projects."I
These "de minimus" exemptions are for activities which are determined to
have only minimal or insignificant individual or cumulative adverse impacts119
on water resources.
Exemptions and de minimis authorizations could be used for some
watershed restoration projects. Theoretically, the de minimus exemption in
Florida law could be used for many environmental restoration projects since
these types of projects should not have any significant individual or
cumulative adverse impacts on the water resources; rather, they should have
environmental benefits. Indeed, this type of exemption was repeatedly used
for the construction of a temporary pump station in south Dade County,
117. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(/), § 1344(f)(1)(A) (2000). See, e.g., NATURAL RESOURCES
ACCOUNTABILTY PROJECT, THE CRANBERRY INDUSTRY AND THE ENVIRONMENT (Dec., 1998),
available at http://www.isthmus.com/features/docfeed/archive/1999/01, (last visited Mar. 7,
2000). At the federal level, agricultural lands are regulated by the Department of Agriculture
through the "Swampbuster" program, an incentive-based program for preservation of
agricultural wetlands. 16 U.S.C. § 3821. Under the Swampbuster provisions, farmers who
plant crops on converted wetlands that were converted by drainage, leveling, or any other
means after November 28, 1990, become ineligible for federal farm subsidies for any of their
crops. 16 U.S.C. § 3821(c). See also Jeffrey A. Zinn, 1B 96030: Soil and Water Conservation
Issues, CRS ISSUE BRIEF FOR CONGRESS, Aug. 20, 2001, available at
http:llwww.cnie.org/nle/crsreports/agriculture/ag- 1 8.cfm, (last visited Aug. 28, 2002).
118. FLA. STAT. § 373.406 (2001).
119. § 373.406(9).
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where waters were being diverted to protect the endangered Cape Sable
Seaside Sparrow.1 20
Project-specific exemptions have also been passed in Florida legisla-
tion. For example, Florida's Everglades Forever Act granted the Everglades
Construction Project a clear exemption from certain permitting requirements
of Florida law. In addition, due to the immediate need for Everglades
restoration, the district was empowered to begin construction on the STAs
prior to obtaining construction permits through final agency action. 122 In the
2000 session, the Florida Legislature even passed a special exemption for
environmental restoration or water quality improvement projects on
agricultural lands.
123
The use of exemptions for environmental restoration projects, however,
should be exercised with caution. In the case of the Everglades Construction
Project, the legislature already had a copy of the proposed engineering
design documents for the project when it passed the Everglades Forever
Act,' 24 and the engineering designs were developed with the cooperation of
Florida and federal agencies, along with numerous public interest groups. In
such cases, where the project details and benefits are already well defined,
where the public interest in the project is high, where the need for action is
imminent, and where public input and support has already been obtained, a
legislatively granted exemption from environmental permitting is clearly the
quickest and most efficient way to ensure implementation of the project.
The exemptions, however, have consequences as well. First, even
though an environmental restoration project may be in the public interest, the
need for immediate implementation must be balanced with the public interest
120. See Emergency Authorization to Operate the S-332B and S-332D Pump Stations
and Construct the Accelerated C-Ill Project Features, Florida Department of Environmental
Protection, Office of General Counsel, Case Nos. 00-0889 and 99-2242, Sixth Amended
Emergency Final Order (Mar. 28, 2002). For more information on the efforts to save the
endangered Cape Sable Seaside Sparrow, see Keith W. Rizzardi, The Everglades in Jeopardy:
A Drama of Water Management and Endangered Species, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 349 (2000).
121. FLA. STAT. § 373.4592(9)(b) (2001).
122. Id.
123. § 373.406(9). This exemption, however, is more akin to a general permit, as
discussed infra Part IV.B., because it requires a case-by-case review and a determination that
the activity will have "minimal or insignificant individual and cumulative adverse impact on
the water resources of the state." Id.
124. See § 373.4592(2)(t) (incorporating by reference the engineering designs). See
also BURNS & MCDONNELL, EVERGLADES PROTECTION PROJECT CONCEPTUAL DESIGN (Feb. 15,
1994).
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in due process. 125  Through the permitting process, projects are given a
degree of public scrutiny they may not otherwise obtain, and, as a result,
defects may be discovered and remedied before they lead to unanticipated
consequences. Absent an opportunity for public participation, opponents of
the project may continue to contest the project, creating new roadblocks until
they obtain their opportunity to be heard. Second, creative attorneys may
attempt to claim exemptions for their projects simply to avoid environmental
regulation, so exemptions should be narrowly written. Finally, it may seem
inappropriate for governmental agencies to exempt themselves from the laws
that are applied to the rest of the public. In the case of the Water Manage-
ment District, an agency known for the issuance of environmental permits to
developers and other permittees, an exemption from environmental
permitting for its own projects creates a perception of a double standard.
Thus, while exemptions from environmental permitting provide a potential
solution to some of the problems created by the regulation of restoration, it is
a solution that should be used sparingly.
B. General Permits
Occasionally, environmental permitting programs provide for a
streamlined review, not quite an exemption, but not a comprehensive permit
with project-specific conditions either. Instead, these "general permits" pro-
vide a process for authorizing projects with limited environmental impacts
and avoiding unnecessary duplication of regulatory control. 26 For example,
the United States Army Corps of Engineers' dredge and fill permitting
program, also administered pursuant to the Clean Water Act, includes a
"nationwide permit" to authorize discharges of dredged or fill material thatS 127
will have minimal adverse effects on the aquatic environment. This
nationwide permit, which has been frequently modified,128 and which also
125. See DEBORAH STONE, POLICY PARADOX Pt. I1 (1997) (discussing the tension
between equity and efficiency in the development of public policy).
126. See, e.g., 33 C.F.R. § 322.2(f) (2001); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 40E-40.042
(2002).
127. 33 C.F.R. § 330 (2001); see also Claudia Copeland, Nationwide Permits for
Wetlands Projects: Permit 26 and Other Issues and Controversies, CRS REPORT FOR
CONGRESS, available at http://cnie.org/NLEiCRSreports/wetlands/wet-7.cfm, (last updated
Jan. 21, 1999); U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, REPLACEMENT OF NATIONWIDE INFORMATION
PAPER (April 7, 1998).
128. See Proposal to Issue and Modify Nationwide Permits, 63 Fed. Reg. 36,041 (July
1, 1998); Press Release, United States Army Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers Announces Replacement Nationwide Permits, (March 6, 2000), available at
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has been subject to controversy and debates, 129 provides a streamlined
approval process for small-scale projects, including dredge and fill projects
affecting less than ten acres. 130  Similarly, Florida's Water Management
Districts administer Environmental Resource Permitting programs, which
include a series of general permits for minor projects such as road
resurfacing, dock maintenance, mosquito control, underground cables, and
utility infrastructure.'13  One general permit, in fact, is specifically designed
for environmental restoration efforts implemented by the Florida DEP.'
32
The general permit pre-approves projects that do not significantly impede
navigation 33 and that provide vegetative stability to areas subject to
erosion.'34
While general permits may provide a greater degree of regulation for
projects than exemptions, their use should also be limited for environmental
projects. General permits typically include predetermined permit conditions
and, as a result, are unlikely to be able to address all the uncertainties
associated with environmental restoration projects. 135 The general permit for
Florida DEP's environmental restoration activities, for example, only
authorizes a few types of environmental restoration projects that are
implemented in accordance with other statutes.136  Furthermore, general
permits may be subject to some of the same critiques as exemptions,
including insufficient public review and unfair special treatment of
government, although to a lesser degree. Thus, while general permits may
be an excellent approach for regulating small-scale environmental
http://www.hg.usace.army.mil/cepa/releases/nationwidepemts.htm (last visited Oct. 13,
2002).
129. See, e.g., National Wildlife Federation, Nationwide Permit Proposal: An
Overview, available at http://nwf.org/wetlands/nwp/overview.html (last visited March 9,
2000); Letter from National Wildlife Federation to Sam Collinson, Office of the Chief of
Engineers, available at http://nwf.org/wetlands/nwp/replace.html (last visited March 9, 2000);
Trout Unlimited, Public Opposition Letter, available at http://www.tu.org/network/8-5-
98letter.html (last visited March 9, 2000).
130. See National Wildlife Federation, Nationwide Permit Proposal: An Overview,
available at http://nwf.org/wetlands/nwp/overview.html (last visited March 9, 2000).
131. See, e.g., FLA. ADMiN. CODE ANN. r. 40E-400 (2001).
132. See r. 40E-400.485.
133. r. 40E-400.485(3)(a).
134. r. 40E-400.485(3)(b). A similar noticed general permit is available to water
management districts for environmental restoration or enhancement efforts. FLA. ADMiN.
CODE ANN. r. 62-341.485 (2002).
135. Consider,, for example, the difficulty of developing a general permit that would
address the uncertainties related to ASR implementation. See infra Part lI.D.
136. r. 40E-400.485(2).
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restoration projects, they are not an ideal solution for regulating large ones.
Larger projects, such as the Everglades restoration, require increased
regulatory flexibility while also granting an appropriate degree of ?ublic
scrutiny to ensure adequate environmental review and public support.
C. Variances
Variances provide a third tool for the regulation of environmental
restoration. These variances require the regulatory agencies to conclude that
the particular project presents a special situation, warranting a deviation
from the otherwise applicable requirements. 38 Additionally, both state and
federal laws already allow variances for some water-related projects.
At the federal level, the NPDES permitting program authorizes multiple
types of variances, allowing a permittee to deviate from otherwise applicable
effluent limitations that would regulate its discharges. 39 These variances
can authorize discharges that do not comply with otherwise applicable
effluent limits due to "fundamentally different factors" or "non-conventional
pollutants," provided that best available technologies are used.14° For some
ecosystems, including the Chesapeake Bay, Great Lakes, Long Island Sound,
and Lake Champlain, the Clean Water Act even includes custom-tailored
provisions.141
Variances are available in Florida law as well. Water resource laws
allow the Florida DEP to grant variances from laws and regulations where
there is no available method of pollution control, where compliance needs to
be measured over a period of time, or to relieve hardship for a period of up
to twenty-four months. 4 2 The state Administrative Procedures Act even
includes a broad provision empowering agencies to grant relief from
regulations where application of the rule creates a substantial hardship or
violates principles of fairness. 
43
State and federal variance provisions like the ones above could be
applied to environmental projects. But again, as with regulatory exemptions
137. See STONE, supra note 125, at 287-382 (discussing the tension between flexibility
and precision in the establishment of administrative rules).
138. See, e.g., BLACK'S LAW DICnONARY 1553 (6th ed. 1990).
139. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 122.21(n), pt. 125(D) (2001). At the state level, the Florida
DEP implements NPDES compliance schedules based upon section 403.0885 of the Florida
Statutes.
140. 40 C.F.R. § 125.31 (2001).
141. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1267-1270 (2001).
142. FLA. STAT. § 403.201 (2001).
143. § 120.542(2).
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and general permits, variances have limitations. As noted above, variances
are often allowed for only a limited period of time. Watershed restoration
projects, however, though they may provide substantial benefits for an
unlimited period of time, might never achieve the desirable goal of full
compliance with existing standards. In some cases, such as the ECP, where
the ultimate goal for 2006 is compliance with all water quality standards in
the Everglades, a variance for a defined period of time may be the appropri-
ate solution. But in other cases, when improvements will be made
immediately but no further modifications are expected, variances may be an
imperfect mechanism for regulating restoration.
D. Project-Specific Statutory Permitting Criteria
A fourth way to resolve the problems of regulating restoration uses a
case-by-case approach. Through project specific legislation, simplified and
specially-tailored regulatory programs can be created. Indeed, over the past
ten years, the Florida Legislature has passed numerous laws providing
alternative regulatory procedures for environmental restoration efforts,
including the Everglades,' Florida Bay,145 Kissimmee River, 46 Lake
Apopka, t47 and most recently, Lake Okeechobee. 14 Similarly, at the federal
level, historic examples of project-specific legislation include the Tennessee
Valley Authority Act,149 and the Colorado River Salinity Control Act.
150
These project-specific laws can be narrowly tailored to meet the needs
of each project. The regulatory requirements in the EFA, as explained in
Part III.C above, were designed specifically for the permitting of the STAs.
Custom-made legislation was developed for CERP as well, including the
Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan Regulation Act. Demonstrating
awareness of the difficulties of regulating restoration, the Florida Legislature
and Governor enacted sections 373.1501 and 373.1502, creating a two-step
process for the regulation of CERP. First, the Water Management District
and Florida DEP must conduct an initial evaluation of CERP projects during
the development phase, and determine with reasonable certainty that the
144. § 373.4592.
145. § 373.4593.
146. FLA. STAT. § 373.197 (1999) (repealed 2000).
147. § 373.461 (2001).
148. § 373.4595.
149. 16 U.S.C. § 831 (2000).
150. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1571-1599 (1994).
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projects could be permitted and operated as proposed.' 5' Later, when the
project is ready to be implemented, the project must be permitted, and
reasonable assurances are required that the project will achieve design
objectives, and will not pose serious danger to public health, safety, or
welfare. 52 But the most significant clause in the Comprehensive Everglades
Restoration Plan Regulation Act states that "[s]tate water quality standards
will be met to the maximum extent practicable. Under no circumstances
shall the project component cause or contribute to violation of state water
quality standards.'
53
This provision is remarkable in that it explicitly accepts non-
conformance with state water qualit standards, a permitting concept that has
been upheld by Florida courts.' Indeed, the concept of achieving
compliance with water quality standards to the maximum extent practicable
was recognized as providing additional flexibility to the reasonable
assurances concept, considering the limitations of time, money, staff
resources, technology, and information,155 although it does not provide
unbridled discretion to exceed or violate state water quality stan-
dards.156 The question remains, however, whether Florida's use of this
"maximum extent practicable" concept for CERP will be accepted by the
United States Environmental Protection Agency and the federal government
as consistent with the Clean Water Act.
This piecemeal approach to environmental restoration can be effective,
but is obviously labor intensive. Agencies and legislators work together to
craft new laws, which are then reshaped and debated in the legislature,
before finally being codified and implemented. The process also increases
the number of laws on the book-reversing Florida's recent efforts to reduce
laws and regulations. 57 These problems are compounded when mistakes are
made during the legislative process, requiring "glitch bills" in subsequent
years. 5 Even the custom-made Everglades Forever Act permitting process
151. FLA. STAT. § 373.1501(4)(c) (2001).
152. § 373.1502(3)(b).
153. § 373.1502(3)(b)(2).
154. See Miccosukee Tribe v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 721 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1998); Miccosukee Tribe of Indians v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 98 Envtl. & Land
Use Admin. L. Rep. (EL FALR) 119, at 7 (FALR) (Apr. 20, 1998).
155. Miccosukee Tribe, 98 EL FALR 119, at 7, 16.
156. Id. at 18.
157. Governor Lawton Chiles, On Rules Reduction and Rational Executive Branch
Reform, FLA. B.J., Mar. 1997 at 16, 18.
158. Id.
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generated the need for remedial legislative efforts. 159 So, like all the other
options for regulating restoration, project-specific statutes have their
problems and limitations.
E. Comprehensive Legislation
The final option for regulating watershed restoration would be a
programmatic solution. In the opinion of this author, reforms are needed in
both federal and Florida law. Through these reforms, greater efficiency in
permitting of watershed restoration projects could be achieved without
unnecessarily burdening the implementing or regulatory agencies, while
adequate due process and project scrutiny could be preserved.
Ultimately, watershed restoration projects raise four major concerns:
impacts to water quality, water supplies, flood control, and natural resources
such as watershed habitat. Permitting at both the state and federal levels
could be simplified to ensure that these four basic concerns are understood,
and that the projects will not adversely impact them.
1. Amend the Clean Water Act to Exempt Restoration
At the federal level, Congress should amend the Clean Water Act to
exempt watershed restoration, activities from regulation. After all, if
agriculture-widely recognized as a major source of non point source
pollution-does not warrant federal scrutiny, then neither does a project that
improves water quality, flood control, water supply, and associated natural
resources. If a state chooses to undertake a watershed restoration project,
and develops an adequate permitting regime for the project, then no
additional federal permits should be needed.
2. Create a Single State Watershed Restoration Law
At the state level, instead of addressing the problem on a project-by-
project basis, Florida should pass a new state law with new criteria
governing the permitting of watershed restoration projects-a sample
proposal follows this article as Appendix B. Any state legislation should
address each of the four major watershed concerns: water quality, water
supplies, flood control, and natural resource projection. In addition, the state
159. See, e.g., ch. 99-11, §1, 1999 Fla. Laws 533, 534-35 (amending section 403.088
of the Florida Statutes to modify administrative orders process and the rights of parties to
challenge EFA permits).
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law should address four basic principles that can be learned from experi-
ences in regulating the Everglades.
First, it must provide criteria for what a watershed restoration project is,
and what it must achieve. For example, the proposed project must be
primarily for environmental improvements to a watershed, even if it does not
achieve absolute compliance with law. Watershed restoration also must not
include any project that adversely impacts natural resources or third
parties. Limiting the definition of watershed restoration projects to those
projects undertaken by governmental entities could ensure that projects are
implemented for a public purpose as opposed to private projects, which
might simply be seeking to characterize themselves as watershed restoration
to escape more rigorous environmental scrutiny.
Second, the legislation should provide the public with its opportunity to
be heard. The intense interest in the Everglades demonstrates that projects
should not escape all regulatory review. However, reasonable criteria would
help focus the scope of future litigation.
Third, the legislation should require reevaluation of the project and its
success. Adaptability is essential to watershed restoration projects, where
the decision-making process requires trial and effort, monitoring, and
feedback.' 60 Indeed, the concept of "adaptive management" is increasingly
recognized by natural resource protection agencies. Periodic performance
assessments will ensure that the watershed restoration project remains
beneficial to the public, and does not become another Florida case study on
the law of unintended consequences.62
Finally, the concept of adaptability fits neatly with the concept of doing
the maximum extent practicable-the standard that should be embraced for
watershed restoration. As discussed above, this standard is already used in
Florida law for the Everglades restoration.163 But this concept is found in the
Clean Water Act as well, which regulates urban stormwater through a
program known as MS4-short for municipal separate storm sewer systems.
Rather than requiring absolute compliance with all state water quality
standards, MS4 permits "require controls to reduce the discharge of
pollutants to the maximum extent practicable."'"
4
160. A. Dan Tarlock, The Nonequilibrium Paradigm in Ecology and the Partial
Unraveling of Environmental Law, 27 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 1121, 1140 (1994).
161. See, e.g., Coleman, supra note 116, at 186.
162. See infra Part H.A.
163. See FLA. STAT. § 373.1501-.1502 (2001).
164. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(3)(B)(iii) (2000).
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Admittedly, this is a substantial departure from the rigorous pollution
control requirements imposed upon the pulp and paper mills and other
industrial facilities that can be found throughout Florida and the United
States. But there is an important difference between those facilities and
watershed restoration projects-whereas industrial facilities have the
potential to generate pollution, watershed restoration projects simply wrestle
with the pollution that was already generated elsewhere upstream. Thus, the
rigorous use of strict water quality standards in environmental law should be
reserved for potential sources of pollution. The law should recognize
common sense, and authorize watershed restoration projects that represent
the maximum extent practicable to protect water quality, water supplies,
flood control, and natural resources.
V. CONCLUSION
The regulation of watershed restoration is an ironic necessity. It is
ironic because environmental laws, designed to protect the environment, are
being applied to projects designed to improve and protect the environment.
However, it is also a necessity to ensure adequate protection of natural
resources, to avoid unintended consequences, and to ensure due process for
the public and the permittee. Therefore, it is the duty of the regulatory
agency to find a balance that provides reasonable regulation without over-
regulating.
This article has exposed some of the problems of using environmental
laws to regulate restoration by demonstrating that inflexible enforcement of
absolute standards only creates unwelcome barriers to worthy public
projects. Exemptions, variances, and project specific legislation may all be
useful tools in certain situations, but a comprehensive, programmatic
approach may be the best way to find the appropriate regulatory balance. Of
course, it will also have detractors. Environmental groups are likely to
object to any measure that accepts any amount of pollution. But such purist
objections would obscure reality. Environmental permits, developed to
protect the environment, are creating a needless maze of regulation for
watershed restoration projects. Permitting an imperfect restoration project
that achieves partial improvement is certainly better than the grossly
inefficient, usually all-or-nothing, approach of existing environmental laws.
Sometimes, the perfect is the enemy of the good. 65 In the context of
regulating watershed restoration, the maximum extent practicable is good
165. Voltaire, Dictionnaire Philosophique, "Le mieux est l'ennemi de bien."
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enough. The United States Congress and the Florida Legislature-and
indeed, the rest of the nation-should act accordingly.
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APPENDIX A.
Diagram of the Everglades Construction Project.
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APPENDIX B.
Proposed Florida Legislation
Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Florida:
Section 1. This bill is entitled the "Florida Watershed Restoration Policy
Act."
Section 2. Sec. 403.08, Florida Statutes, is created to read:
(1) FINDINGS.
(a) The Legislature finds that watershed restoration projects have
substantial public benefits to water quality, water supply, flood control and
natural resources, even though projects may also produce other short-term
and incidental adverse impacts, such as construction impacts.
(b) The Legislature finds that permitting requirements of
Chapters 373 and 403 can present substantial regulatory obstacles to these
otherwise beneficial watershed restoration projects, and that it is in the
public interest to reduce these obstacles to enable efficient and reasonable
regulation and implementation of these projects.
(2) DEFINITIONS. For purposes of this section:
(a) Watershed Restoration Projects include projects undertaken by
an agency for the primary purpose of improving environmental conditions in
a watershed, including wetland construction, hydropattern improvements,
stream or river bank improvements, and other similar projects designed to
benefit water quality, water supplies, flood control, and natural resources.
(b) Agency includes all political subdivisions of the state.
(3) WATERSHED RESTORATION ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENTS. In lieu of the permitting requirements of Chapters 373 and
403, except for permits issued under delegated or approved federal
programs, agencies implementing watershed restoration projects may submit
a watershed restoration environmental impact statement to the Secretary that
contains:
(a) a description of the project, including location, current
environmental conditions, and proposed physical alterations;
(b) resources needed to implement the project, availability of
those resources, and a projection of the future availability of the resources;
(c) anticipated maintenance of the project, and consequences of
failing to adequately maintain the project; and
(d) a description of the design objectives of the project, including
an evaluation of the benefits and consequences of the project, reasonable
alternatives to the project, and the consequences of not implementing the
project.
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(4) PERMITTING OF WATERSHED RESTORATION PROJECTS.
(a) The Secretary shall permit the watershed restoration project if
the environmental impact statement provides reasonable assurances that:
(1) water quality, if impacted, is substantially improved
when compared to pre-project conditions, except that naturally-occurring
reductions in water quality constituents may be authorized if the water
quality improvements substantially outweigh any adverse water quality
impacts and if the decreases are not likely to impact public health, safety or
welfare;
(2) water supplies, if impacted, are enhanced, and are not
likely to produce adverse effects on legally existing users resulting from the
project;
(3) flood control, if impacted, is enhanced, and adverse
flooding impacts are not likely to result upon upstream, downstream or
otherwise hydrologically-connected privately-owned properties;
(4) natural resources, including native flora and fauna, if
impacted, are beneficially affected by the project, and those beneficial
effects substantially outweigh any incidental adverse effects that result;
(5) the watershed restoration project contains a program for
maintaining, monitoring and evaluating the environmental effects of the
watershed restoration, including benefits and adverse impacts to water
quality, water supply, flood control and natural resources, as applicable; and
(6) the goal of watershed restoration is achieved to the
maximum extent practicable, and is otherwise in the public interest.
(b) Any watershed restoration project permitted by the Secretary
shall be required to substantially conform with the environmental impact
statement, and shall implement the monitoring and evaluation program as
described in the environmental impact statement, the results of which shall
be reported to the Secretary on an annual basis.
(c) If monitoring and evaluation of the watershed restoration
project demonstrate unanticipated adverse impacts that are not in accordance
with subsection (3) above, then the Secretary shall require the agency to
supplement the environmental impact statement with additional information
to provide reasonable assurances in accordance with subsection (3) above,
and if the project is substantially modified, then the Secretary shall issue a
revised watershed restoration project permit that includes additional permit
conditions, as appropriate.
(5) Notice of watershed restoration projects permits shall be published
in the Florida Administrative Weekly by the agency implementing the
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project, and shall otherwise be in accordance with and subject to Chapter
120, Florida Statutes and Title 28, Florida Administrative Code.
(6) In cases where the department is the agency implementing a
watershed restoration project, the permit will be issued by the water
management district with jurisdiction over the location of the project.
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I. INTRODUCTION
As Sir Thomas More says in A Man for All Seasons, "[tihe law is not a
'light' for you or any man to see by; the law is not an instrument of any kind.
The law is a causeway upon which so long as he keeps to it a citizen may
walk safely."' An attorney is charged with helping "citizens" in the twists
and turns along this causeway and even helping them back to the causeway
when they have lost their direction. When an attorney fails in carrying out
his responsibilities, one remedy available to the injured "citizen" or person is
an action for legal malpractice.
IH. ELEMENTS OF A LEGAL MALPRACTICE ACTION
A legal malpractice plaintiff must plead and prove: (1) the attorney's
employment; (2) the attorney's neglect of a reasonable duty; and (3) the
negligence resulted in, and was the proximate cause of, loss to the plaintiff.
2
I. ROBERT BOLT, A MAN lOR Au. SEASONS, Act 11 (1960).
2. Steele v. Kehoe, 747 So. 2d 931 (Fla. 1999); Olmsted v. Emmanuel, 783 So. 2d
1122 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 2001); Home Furniture Depot, Inc. v. Entevor AB, 753 So. 2d
653 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000); Anderson v. Steven R. Andrews, P.A., 692 So. 2d 237
(Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Sure Snap Corp. v. Baena, 705 So. 2d 46 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1997); Bolves v. Hullinger, 629 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Chipman v.
Chonin, 597 So. 2d 363 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Riccio v. Stein, 559 So. 2d 1207 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Thompson v. Martin, 530 So. 2d 495 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1988);
Maillard v. Dowdell, 528 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Hatcher v. Roberts, 478
So. 2d 1083 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Weiner v. Moreno, 271 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1973). See also Arky, Freed, Steams, Watson, Greer, Weaver, & Harris, P.A. v.
Bowmar Instrument Corp., 537 So. 2d 561, 563 (Fla. 1988) (holding litigants must state their
pleadings with sufficient particularity for the defense to be prepared).
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A. The Attorney's Employment
The first element of the cause of action, that an attorney must be
employed by the plaintiff/client, 3 is addressed in Ginsberg v. Chastain.4 The
issue before the court in Ginsberg was whether attorney Daniel Ginsberg's
one-time representation of Fred Chastain in a real estate matter entitled
Chastain to believe that Ginsberg was also representing him at a meeting
between Chastain and Annmarie Ahlers, one of Ginsberg's long-time
clients.5
Where the record is devoid of any evidence, which indicates that an
attorney-client relationship existed for legal services related to the particular
6
meeting at issue, the element is not proven. Chastain testified at trial that he
never discussed the subject of the meeting with Ginsberg, that he never
asked Ginsberg to perform any services in connection with drafting the
agreement between the parties, that Ginsberg never billed Chastain for any
services in connection with the agreement, that Chastain never requested a
bill, and that the parties had no fee agreement.7 Chastain thus failed to
establish employment of the attorney and had no cause of action for legal
malpractice.
Whether an attorney-client relationship existed in Giedzinski v. Palmer9
was deemed to be a factual issue resulting in a summary judgment being
reversed.' ° Palmer claimed that attorney Giedzinski breached his fiduciary
duty and confidential relationship to her when she purchased an interest in a
land trust from him." Giedzinski claimed he was not acting as Palmer's
attorney or as an attorney for the land trust when Palmer purchased her
3. Riccio v. Heitner, 559 So. 2d 609 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (holding law firm
estopped from denying the attorney client relationship existed due to failure to advise clients
that law firm had been dissolved while continuing to represent the clients).
4. 501 So. 2d 27 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
5. Id. at 28.
6. Accord Gutter v. Wunker, 631 So. 2d 1117 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994)
(affirming dismissal for failure to allege attorney client relationship).
7. Ginsburg, 501 So. 2d at 29.
8. Id.
9. 595 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
10. Contra Voutsinas v. Stutin, 626 So. 2d 300 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993)
(showing no facts to indicate attorneys ever agreed to handle the matter).
11. Giedzinski, 595 So. 2d at 295.
20021
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interest.12 Due to the disputed issues of fact, the case was "simply not a case
that lends itself to disposition via summary judgment."' 3
Even if an attorney-client relationship exists, the action complained of
must be within the scope of the attorney's initial employment. 14  The
aggrieved client in Atkin v. Tittle & Tittle 5 sued a lawyer for failing to
properly investigate zoning issues prior to the client purchasing an
unimproved lot. The trial court entered a directed verdict for the attorney,
overruling a jury verdict in favor of the former client.16 The Third District
Court of Appeal reinstated the jury verdict. 17
The Atkin trial court relied upon Maillard v. Dowdell18 in concluding
that the lawyer had "performed the duties for which he was employed,
investigated issues brought to his attention, and was not required to render
additional land use and zoning opinions for which he was not retained."' 9
This limited view of the attorney's duty was rejected by the appellate court
due to the expert testimony presented at trial and the language in the contract
regarding zoning issues.20 The court concluded:
Although Maillard provides the general rule as to an attorney's du-
ties when representing a client in a real estate transaction, that rule
is not absolute. An attorney may not disregard matters that arise
and reasonably signal potential legal problems although those mat-
ters may not fall precisely within the general rule.
21
1. Privity
A cause of action against an attorney for malpractice requires privity of
22contract unless excepted. The Supreme Court of Florida in Angel, Cohen
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Davis v. Hathaway, 408 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (reversing
summary judgment due to dispute in scope of attorneys services in the sale of a business).
15. 730 So. 2d 376 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 378.
18. 528 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
19. Atkin, 730 So. 2d at 377.
20. Id. at 377-78.
21. Id. at 378 (citing Maillard, 528 So. 2d at 515).
22. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Salter, 717 So. 2d 141 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998)
(holding insurance company could not sue attorneys for insured since they were not in privity
with attorneys or an intended third-party beneficiary).
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and Rogovin v. Oberon Inv., N. V.23 set forth the general controlling law as to
who may bring an action for legal malpractice. In Angel, the court stated,
"Florida courts have uniformly limited attorneys' liability for negligence in
the performance of their professional duties to clients with whom they share
privity of contract." 24
2. Third-Party Beneficiary Exception
The Angel court recognized that in Florida, the privity requirement had
been relaxed when "it was the apparent intent of the client to benefit a third
party.' '2s The area of will-drafting was cited as the most obvious example of
26this limited exception to the privity requirement. The First District Court
27
of Appeal in Greenberg v. Mahoney, Adams & Criser, P.A. understood the
Angel decision to encompass those situations where "it was the apparent
intent of the client to benefit the third party. 2 s The facts of the underlying
malpractice case in Greenberg are not set forth in the opinion. Therefore, no
guidance is provided as to what areas outside of the will-drafting arena may
overcome the privity requirement.29
In the case of Espinosa v. Sparber, Shevin, Shapo, Rosen and
Heilbronner,3 ° the court explained the "so-called will-drafting exception.'
The Third District Court of Appeal found that "[oInly where the testator's
intent as expressed in the will itself, not as shown by extrinsic evidence, is
frustrated due to the negligence of the testator's attorney-does the
frustrated beneficiary of the will have a legal malpractice action against the
testator' s lawyer.
' 32
23. 512 So. 2d 192 (Fla. 1987).
24. Id. at 194. See also Voutsinas v. Stutin, 626 So. 2d 300 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1993) (failing to establish employment); Nickolauson v. Rhyne, 529 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1988) (alleging privity sufficiently, details to be determined from the evidence).
25. Angel, 512 So. 2d at 194.
26. Id.; see also Lorraine v. Grover, Ciment, Weinstein & Stauber, P.A., 467 So. 2d
315 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985); DeMaris v. Asti, 426 So. 2d 1153 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1983); McAbee v. Edwards, 340 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
27. 614 So. 2d 604 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
28. Id. at 605.
29. See id.
30. 586 So. 2d 1221 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
31. Id. at 1223.
32. Id; accord Miami Beach Cmty. Church, Inc. v. Stanton, 611 So. 2d 538 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1992) ("[A] beneficiary of a will does not have a legal malpractice action
against the testator's lawyer unless the testator's intent as expressed in the will, not as shown
by extrinsic evidence, is frustrated due to the lawyer's negligence.") (citing Espinosa, 586 So.
20021
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Espinosa cited the following as an example of the privity exception:
[Wlhere (1) the testator makes a will leaving all her property to her
daughter and remarries thereafter, (2) hires a lawyer to make cer-
tain that her daughter remains the sole beneficiary under the will
after her remarriage, and is negligently assured by the lawyer that
no change was necessary to effect this intention, and (3) upon her
death, her husband takes a statutory share of her estate as a preter-
mitted husband-it has been held that the daughter has a legal mal-
practice action against the testator's lawyer; this is so because the
testamentary intent, as expressed in the will, to leave all her prop-
erty to her daughter was frustrated due to the lawyer's negligent
failure to draft a new will specifically excluding the testator's new
husband and again leaving all her property to the daughter. 
33
The court in Espinosa found that "[a]n attorney preparing a will has a
duty not only to the testator-client, but also to the testator's intended
beneficiaries, who may maintain a legal malpractice action against the
attorney on theories of either tort (negligence) or contract (as third-party
beneficiaries). 34 The Third District's decision was approved by the
Supreme Court of Florida. 5 Since there was no intention in any of the wills
or codicils to provide for the person suing the testator's attorney, the court
held that the claimant was not a third-party beneficiary and had no cause of
action against the attorney.36
The Supreme Court of Florida, in its Espinosa decision, stated "we
adhere to the rule that standing in legal malpractice actions is limited to
those who can show that the testator's intent as expressed in the will is
frustrated by the negligence of the testator's attorney. 37 The Fourth District
Court of Appeal denied the plaintiffs' cause of action in Babcock v.
2d at 1223); DeMaris v. Asti, 426 So. 2d 1153, 1154 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (lacking
any indication that the testator's intent had been frustrated, the complaint failed to state a
cause of action for legal malpractice); O'Neill v. Sacher, 526 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1988); Martin v. Nemec, 526 So. 2d 157 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Arnold v.
Carmichael, 524 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
33. Espinosa, 586 So. 2d at 1223 (citing McAbee v. Edwards, 340 So. 2d 1167 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1976)).
34. Id.; see Espinosa v. Sparber, Shevin, Shapo, Rosen and Heilbronner, 612 So. 2d
1378, 1380 (Fla. 1993).
35. Id.; see also Hare v. Miller, Canfield, Paddock and Stone, 743 So. 2d 551 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
36. Id. at 1380.
37. Espinosa, 612 So. 2d at 1380.
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Malone.38 The plaintiffs in Babcock sued a lawyer for failure "to timely
prepare a new will for their uncle., 39 Their uncle died before signing the
new will, which resulted in the plaintiffs' obtaining nothing. 4° The appellate
court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the complaint for failure to state
a cause of action.41 The appellate court relied upon Espinosa in holding that
although the would-be beneficiaries had alleged that the attorney knew that
the uncle was very ill, no cause of action existed because their uncle never
signed the new will.42
Although Lorraine v. Grover, Ciment, Weinstein & Stauber, P.A.43
involves a lawsuit by a frustrated beneficiary against the attorney who
drafted her son's will, the court decided the matter on lack of proximate
cause." Because the court determined that the intended bequest in Lorraine
was homestead property, the property passed to the decedent's children
pursuant to article X of the Florida Constitution45 rather than to the
decedent's mother as designated in the will.46 The mother sued the attorney
who drafted the will.47 The appellate court affirmed a summary judgment in
favor of the attorney finding that the "testamentary intent was not frustrated
by [the attorney's] professional negligence, but rather by Florida's
constitution and statutes. 48  The Lorraine appellate court distinguished
McAbee v. Edwards by stating that "[t]he attorney in McAbee could have
drafted the will to" obtain the result sought by the testator; however, in
Lorraine, Florida's homestead provisions made drafting the desired result
impossible.49
A cause of action did not exist ajainst the attorney who drafted the will
at issue in Kinney v. Shinholser. The personal representative and
38. 760 So. 2d 1056 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1057.
42. Id. (citing Espinosa, 612 So. 2d at 1380).
43. 467 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
44. Id. at 316-17.
45. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(c).
46. Lorraine, 467 So. 2d at 319.
47. Id. at 317-18.
48. Id. at 319.
49. Id. at n.7; see also Mann v. Cooke, 624 So. 2d 785, 788 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1993) (holding that an attorney is not liable to third-party beneficiary of husband's revocable
trust because terms were clear and unambiguous); Rosenstone v. Satchell, 560 So. 2d 1229,
1229-30 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (relaxing strict privity requirement in area of will
drafting).
50. 663 So. 2d 643, 646 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
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beneficiary under a trust sued the lawyer who had drafted the will, claiming
that the lawyer "knew or should have known that the inclusion of the general
power of appointment in the trust would frustrate [the] intent [of the testator]
and cause an increase in [estate] taxes." 51 The only evidence of such intent
was the will's "direction that the just taxes be paid. 52 This was insufficient
to allow the personal representative and beneficiary under the trust to sue the
attorney who drafted the will for damages resulting from having to pay taxes
because of the inclusion of the general power of appointment.53 However, in
the same case, the appellate court held that a cause of action did exist against
the attorney retained to probate the will because he allegedly failed to timely
advise the client that disclaiming the power of appointment within nine
months after the death of the decedent would overcome the inclusion of the
general power of appointment in the trust.M The Kinney court found that
Espinosa's third-party beneficiary test had been satisfied since the client was
the ultimate beneficiary under the wills and trusts at issue.55 The Fourth
District in Stept v. Paoli,56 citing to Kinney, also found an attorney not liable
to revocable living trust beneficiaries who claimed that taxes were paid
unnecessarily since the trust did not contain the "expressed intent of the
testator to avoid or minimize taxes. 57
The third-party intended beneficiary exception to the privity require-
ment for bringing a legal malpractice action is not limited to will drafting; it
extends to adoptees. The case of Rushing v. Bosse58 established that "privity
between the child and attorney" is not required in a legal malpractice action
"against the attorney who institutes and proceeds with a private adoption. 59
The RushinI court stated that it did not read Angel, Cohen and Rogovin v.
Oberon Inv. as "creating an exception to the privity requirement limited
solely to the area of will drafting.",
6 1
Furthermore, the Florida courts have considered the third-party
beneficiary exception to the privity requirement in other areas, specifically
in condominium and association law. In Hunt Ridge at Tall Pines, Inc. v.
51. Id. at 644-45.
52. Id. at 645.
53. Id. at 645-46.
54. Id. at 646.
55. Kinney, 663 So. 2d at 646.
56. 701 So. 2d 1228 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
57. Id. at 1229 (citing Espinosa, 586 So. 2d at 1221).
58. 652 So. 2d 869 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
59. Id. at 873.
60. 512 So. 2d 192, 193-94 (Fla. 1987).
61. Rushing, 652 So. 2d at 873.
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Hall,62 a homeowners' association sued an attorney claiming that its
"declaration of covenants, conditions, and restrictions" was invalid,
precluding the association from "perform[ing] its duties, including collecting
fees.' ' 6 3 Relying upon Espinosa, the appellate court affirmed the dismissal of
the complaint because the general partner of the limited partnership which
developed the residential community, not the homeowners' association, had
retained the attorney who drafted the declaration. 64 The homeowner's
association's argument that it was a third-party beneficiary was unpersuasive
since the declaration explicitly stated, "that its provisions were intended for
the benefit of the owners. It did not indicate that it was for the benefit of the
,,65homeowners' association.
Individual condominium unit owners, in Silver Dunes Condominium of
Destin, Inc. v. Beggs and Lane66 attempted to establish that they were
intended third-party beneficiaries of the representation by the condominium
67
association's attorney. The unit owners claimed "they were the apparent
intended third-party beneficiaries of the legal services contract between the
association and [its attorneys] because the association was at all times acting
,,68
on behalf of and for the benefit of the unit owners as their fiduciary. The
court held that the members "were not the apparent intended third-partyb ,- • • ,,69
beneficiaries. As a result of the association's lawyer having "threatened
legal action against some unit owners," the court could not conclude that the
lawyer was representing both the individual unit owners and the association
while the individual unit owners and the association were adverse to each
other.7°
As demonstrated in the results above and herein, the third-party
beneficiary exception to the privity requirement is not unlimited. 7  In
62. 766 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
63. Id. at 400.
64. Id. at 400-01 (citing Espinosa, 612 So. 2d at 1378).
65. Id.
66. 763 So. 2d 1274 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
67. Id. at 1275.
68. Id. at 1276.
69. Id. at 1277.
70. Id. See Salit v. Ruden, McClosky, Smith, Schuster & Russell, P.A., 742 So. 2d
381, 389 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (holding an attorney who represents a corporation
owes no fiduciary duty to the shareholders) (citing Brennan v. Ruffner, 640 So. 2d 143, 145-
46 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994)).
71. Vargas v. Reinert, 547 So. 2d 264 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (concluding lack
of privity precluded suit against City of Hialeah attorney who agreed to court order to preserve
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Brennan v. Ruffner,72 a lawsuit was brought by a "disgruntled minority
shareholder of a closely held corporation" against the attorney representing
the corporation. 7  The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed a final
summary judgment74 and found "that an attorney-client relationship did not
exist between [such] shareholder and the [corporate] attorney, notwith-
standing the fact that such attorney had drafted a shareholder's agreement
76that directly affected the shareholder's rights. The appellate court was no
doubt influenced by a previous lawsuit instituted by the disgruntled minority
shareholder against the other shareholders in which the disgruntled minority
shareholder claimed that he "was not represented by counsel inthe
negotiation of the shareholder's agreement."7
78Similarly, in Chaiken v. Lewis, no error was found where the trial
court instructed the jury that "counsel for a partnership represents the
partnership entity, but does not thereby become counsel for each partner
individually. 79 In contrast to the Brennan ruling, Greenberg v. Mahoney,
Adams & Criser, P.A.8° held that the mere assertion by the client that it was
an intended third-party beneficiary was sufficient to obtain a reversal of the
lower court's decision dismissing a professional malpractice suit.8'
Assertion of privity failed in Athans v. Soble. The client in Athans
claimed that the attorney caused the loss of a potential buyer's deposit in a
real estate transaction.83 Due to record evidence supporting the client's
assertion that although the attorney dealt only with the daughter of the
plaintiff, the attorney knew that their legal services were rendered on behalf
of the plaintiff, the appellate court overturned a summary judgment in favor
of the attorney. 4
City vehicle involved in an accident but failed to inform City of order resulting in destruction
of vehicle).
72. 640 So. 2d 143 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
73. Id. at 144.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 146-47.
77. Brennan, 640 So. 2d at 145.
78. 754 So. 2d 118 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
79. Id.
80. 614 So. 2d 604 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
81. Id. at 605.
82. 553 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
83. Id. at 1362.
84. Id. at 1361-63.
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3. Effect of Negligent Misrepresentation and Fraud
Privity is not required when an attorney makes a negligent misrepresen-
tation to a nonclient, and lack of privity will not protect an attorney from
direct fraudulent acts or statements.86 Although the underlying facts of the
case are not discussed, Bongard v. Winter" holds that "an attorney may
properly be held liable for his or her own fraudulent misrepresentations even
if acting on behalf of a disclosed client. ' 88  However, where different
counsel represents each party, one party's counsel is not liable to the other
party for malpractice.89.
The malpractice claim was dismissed for failing to allege an attorney-
client relationship in Gutter v. Wunker;90 however, the fraud claim
survived.91 The fraud in Gutter allegedly involved failure to disclose
material facts in limited partnership documents related to a restaurant
venture.92 The court described those situations in which a claim for fraud
would lie as follows:
To state a cause of action for fraud, a party must allege: (1) a false
statement concerning a material fact; (2) the representor's knowl-
edge that the representation is false; (3) an intention that the repre-
sentation induce another to act on it; and (4) consequent injury by
the party acting in reliance on the representation. Lance v. Wade,
457 So.2d 1008 (Fla. 1984); A.S.J. Drugs, Inc. v. Berkowitz, 459
So.2d 348 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984). A defendant's knowing con-
cealment or nondisclosure of a material fact may also support an
action for fraud where there is a duty to disclose. See Don Slack
Ins., Inc. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 385 So.2d 1061 (Fla. 5th
DCA 1980) and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 550, 551
(1977). Furthermore, where a party in an arm's length transaction
85. Riggs Nat'l Bank of Wash., D.C. v. Freeman, 682 F. Supp. 519, 520 (S.D. Fla.
1988); see also TransPetrol, Ltd. v. Radulovic, 764 So. 2d 878, 880 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2000) (dismissing counts for fraud and RICO due to lack of duty to disclose and lack of
proximate cause); Zafiris, Inc. v. Moss, 506 So. 2d 27 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
86. Moss v. Zafiris, Inc., 524 So. 2d 1010, 1011 (Fla. 1988); A.S.J. Drugs, Inc. v.
Berkowitz, 459 So. 2d 348, 350 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (suggesting oral statement by
attorney could constitute fraud against non-client).
87. 516 So. 2d 27 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App 1987).
88. Id.
89. Drawdy v. Sapp, 365 So. 2d 461, 462 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
90. 631 So. 2d 1117 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
91. Id. at 1119.
92. Id. at 1118.
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undertakes to disclose information, all material facts must be dis-
closed. Vokes v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 212 So.2d 906 (Fla. 2d DCA
1986). 9"
4. Insurer's Liability for Acts of Defense Counsel and Subrogation Rights
The issue of whether an insurance company is vicariously liable for the
malpractice of the attorney it selects to defend an insured was examined in
Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Protective National Insurance Co. of
Omaha.94 After acknowledging that cases in other jurisdictions were split on
this issue, the court was "persuaded by the reasoning of those cases which
have held that an insurance company is not vicariously liable for the
malpractice of the attorney it selects to defend the insured. 95 This reasoning
prevented Protective, an excess general liability insurance carrier, from suing
Aetna, the primary general insurance carrier and its counsel under an
equitable subrogation theory for allegedly not raising a statute of limitations
defense.96
Marlin v. State Farm97 held that an insured could not sue his carrier for
negligence in failing to exercise control over the insurance company's
appointed attorney after an excess verdict was rendered against the insured.98
The court succinctly stated "[a]s the insurer has no obligation or right to
supervise or control the professional conduct of the attorney, it is not liable
for the litigation decisions of counsel." 99
In Don Reid Ford, Inc. v. Feldman, 1° after taking over a bankrupt
insurance carrier, the Florida Insurance Guaranty Association, Inc. (FIGA),
sued the attorney appointed to represent an insured for failing to defend. 01
The result was a final judgment against the insured that was paid by FIGA. °2
A summary judgment in favor of the attorney was affirmed upon a finding
that the statute of limitations began when the oudgment against the insured
was entered, not when the judgment was paid.
93. Id. at 1118-19.
94. 631 So. 2d 305, 306 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 305-06.
97. 761 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
98. Id. at 380-81.
99. Id. at 381 (citations omitted).
100. 421 So. 2d 184, 185 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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B. Reasonable Duty
Secondly, a malpractice plaintiff must plead and prove neglect of a
reasonable duty. 4 As is more fully set out below, fulfillment of this duty
does not require the attorney to be a predictor of the future in unsettled areas
of the law, nor does it require him to inform his client of conflicting law
unless the conflicting question will soon be answered by controlling
authority.' °5 The attorney's duty does require him to exercise good faith and
to make diligent inquiry in order to be protected by judgmental immunity. 106
A cause of action exists against an attorney who neglects to perform the
services that he explicitly or impliedly agrees to when he accepts employ-
ment.1°7 However, an attorney's failure to accurately predict changes on
unsettled points of law is not actionable.' 08 A cause of action against the
attorneys in Kaufman v. Stephen Cahen, P.A.'o9 for their failure to timely file
a wrongful death claim did not exist since the law regarding the statute of
limitations for such cause of a action was changed by a Supreme Court of
Florida decision during the course of the representation. 10
However, Stake v. Harlan". holds that an attorney has a duty to inform
his or her clients of a possible change in the law known to the attorney that
could have a materially adverse effect upon the clients."' In Stake, the
attorney had actual knowledge of the certification of a question to the
Supreme Court of Florida, evidenced by his citation of the pending case in a
letter he wrote to the client." 3 The Second District Court of Appeal held
that the attorney breached his duty to make his clients aware of the
implications of the certified question, and thereby, denied his clients the
104. See DyKema v. Godfrey, 467 So. 2d 824 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
105. See generally Home Furniture Depot, Inc. v. Entevor AB, 753 So. 2d 653, 655
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (holding "a lawyer owes the client a duty to exercise the degree
of reasonable knowledge and skill which lawyers of ordinary ability and skill possess and
exercise."); Azuz v. Singer, 708 So. 2d 292, 293 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (finding that
negligence action available upon claim that stipulated final order differed from terms
authorized by client); McCurry v. Eppolito, 506 So. 2d 1110 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1987)
(stating attorney's failure to see that mechanic's lien law requirements were met was
malpractice); Dykema, 467 So. 2d at 824.
106. See cases cited in supra note 105.
107. See cases cited in supra note 105.
108. See cases cited in supra note 105.
109. 507 So. 2d 1152 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
110. Id. at 1152-53.
111. 529 So. 2d 1183 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
112. Id. at 1186.
113. Id. at 1184-85.
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opportunity to make an informed decision on whether or not to transact the
subject real estate closing in the manner suggested by the attorney." 14
In Crosby v. Jones,' 5 the Supreme Court of Florida held that the
evaluation of an attorney's judgment could be determined as a matter of
law.' 6 The Supreme Court of Florida exercised jurisdiction because of a
conflict between districts in Jones v. Crosby" 7 and Kaufman v. Stephen
Cahen, P.A." 8 The client in Crosby released the driver of the vehicle that
collided with him, but the client did not release the driver's employer." 9
The employer obtained a summary judgment at the trial level, which was
affirmed on appeal.' 20 The attorney obtained summary judgment upon the
trial court's holding that JFK Medical Center, Inc. v. Price1 set forth the
longstanding law in Florida on the doctrine of judgmental immunity. 22 JFK
Medical Center specifically disapproved the Jones v. Gulf Coast Newspa-
pers, Inc. holding, thereby establishing that the attorney acted properly.
23
"The rule of judgmental immunity is premised on the understanding
that an attorney, who acts in good faith and makes a diligent inquiry into an
area of law, should not be held liable for providing advice or taking action in
an unsettled area of law."'' 24  At the time the attorney entered into the
dismissal with prejudice both Sun First National Bank v. Batchelor,125 which
was a decade old Supreme Court of Florida decision, and case law in the
attorney's district supported his decision. 26 The only contrary decision was
outside his district. 27 The Supreme Court of Florida went on to hold that
there is not always an absolute duty to inform the client of conflicting case
law. 12  "Attorneys cannot be placed in the position of having to accept
114. Id. at 1186.
115. 705 So. 2d 1356 (Fla. 1998).
116. Id. at 1357.
117. 677 So. 2d 379 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
118. 507 So. 2d 1152 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
119. Crosby, 705 So. 2d at 1357.
120. Jones v. Gulf Coast Newspapers, Inc., 595 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1992).
121. 647 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 1994).
122. See Crosby, 705 So. 2d at 1357.
123. Id. (citing JFK Medical Center, Inc., 647 So. 2d at 833).
124. Crosby, 705 So. 2d at 1358 (Fla. 1998); accord Meir v. Kirk, Pinkerton
McClelland, Savary & Carr, P.A., 561 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
125. 321 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 1975).
126. See, e.g., Crosby, 705 So. 2d at 1358, 1359.
127. Id. at 1359 (citing Walsingham v. Browning, 525 So. 2d 996 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1988)).
128. Id.
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direction from clients on intricate interpretations of the correct or current
state of the law. The, attorney, not the client, is the individual trained to
interpret the law."' 29 The Kaufman holding was approved in Crosby.130
Stake was distinguished "because the issue was pending on a certified
question before this Court at the time the attorney rendered the advice; thus
the attorney had the duty to inform the client that issue would soon be
decided by a higher court."'
3
'
The attorney's good faith and diligent inquiry are questions of fact.
The appellate court in DeBiasi v. Snaith132 indicated that the attorney's
actions in failing to timely seek a motion for certification were not "fairly
debatable" and did not deal with an "unsettled area of the law" to which
judgmental immunity would apply; thus, it reversed a summary judgment in
the attorney's favor. The DeBiasi court held that "Crosby v. Jones teaches
that the lawyer who seeks the protection of judgmental immunity must have
acted in good faith and made a diligent inquiry into that area of the law."' 34
Since the issues of good faith and diligent inquiry remained unresolved, the
"case was not ripe for summary disposition."' 13
Judgmental immunity does not insulate the attorney from exercising
ordinary care. Both Crosby and DeBiasi were relied upon in Sauer v.
Flanagan and Maniotis, P.A. 36  Sauer sued her attorneys alleging their
failure to properly advise her regarding her rejection of a million dollar offer
of judgment. The underlying trial resulted in a defense verdict and the
imposition of attorney's fees and costs against the client. 138  In the
malpractice action, the attorneys argued that the defense of judgmental
immunity should apply to settlement recommendations. 39 The court could
"discern no basis for concluding that an attorney is insulated from liability
129. Id.
130. Id. (citing Kaufman, 507 So. 2d at 1152).
131. Crosby, 705 So. 2d at 1359 n.3.
132. 732 So. 2d 14 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
133. Id. at 16.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. 748 So. 2d 1079 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000). See also Dollman v. Shutts and
Bowen, 575 So. 2d 320 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (reversing summary judgment due to
factual issues surrounding communication of proposed sale of real estate).
137. Sauer, 748 So. 2d at 1080.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1081.
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for failing to exercise ordinary skill and care in resolving settlement
issues.", 14 0
It was undisputed that the attorney accused of malpractice in Herig v.
Akerman, Senterfitt & Edison14' "acted in good faith and made a diligent
inquiry into the law [that] was not disputed."'' 42 Accordingly, the summary
judgment in favor of the attorney was affirned since, at the time the attorney
was engaged to prepare a personal management contract for a minor, "there
was no statute or case law governing artistic management contracts of
minors per se." 14 3 The enactment of the Child Performer and Athlete
Protection Act,' 44 adopted several years after the agreement was signed,
allowed the agreement to be set aside. 145  Therefore, the attorney was
protected by the doctrine of judgmental immunity.146
An attorney does not owe a duty in a real estate closing to any party
other than the attorney's client, 47 or in a will drafting to a previous
beneficiary when an attorney omits the beneficiary at the request of the
testator or testatrix.148 "[V]iolation of the Rules of Professional Conduct ...
[is not] negligence per se[; however, a violation] may be used as some
evidence of negligence.' ' 49 The Rules of Professional Conduct do not create
a legal duty on a lawyer. 150 However, evidence that an attorney did not
conduct himself or herself as reasonably as an attorney, with respect to the
140. Id. at 1082.
141. 741 So. 2d 591 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1999). It should be noted that the correct
name of the law firm is Akerman, Senterfitt & Eidson, but the official reporter misspelled the
firm name.
142. Id. at 593.
143. Id.
144. FLA. STAT. § 743.08 (3)(b) (1997).
145. Herig, 741 So. 2d at 594.
146. Id.
147. Assad v. Mendell, 511 So. 2d 682 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (stating that a
bank's attorney owed no duty to borrower); Southworth v. Crevier, 438 So. 2d 1011 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (stating that a seller's attorney in real estate transaction had no duty to
buyer); Amey, Inc. v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, P.A., 367 So. 2d 633, 634 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (stating that a bank's law firm owed no duty to buyer for the negligent
performance of a title search); Adams v. Chenowith, 349 So. 2d 230 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1977) (stating that a seller's attorney owed no duty to purchaser since seller's and purchaser's
interests were adverse and there was no allegation of intentional misrepresentation against the
attorneys).
148. Chase v. Bowen, 771 So. 2d 1181, 1182 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
149. Pressley v. Farley, 579 So. 2d 160, 161 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991), dismissed,
583 So. 2d 1036 (Fla. 1991).
150. Id.
101
: Nova Law Review 27, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 2002
Trazenfeld
Code of Professional Responsibility, is evidence of a failure to use due care
as an attorney.' 5 '
Moreover, an attorney has no duty to pursue faultless or judgment proof
parties. During the investigation of a potential lawsuit arising from an
automobile accident, the law firm, which was sued in Williams v. Beckham
& McAliley, P.A., 152 had determined that no liable party had insurance or
assets. 153 The law firm had filed a lawsuit prior to the expiration of the
statute of limitations for the purpose of preserving the cause of action.'
54
When no action was taken in the lawsuit, the court dismissed the suit for
lack of prosecution. 155 Affirming the summary judgment in favor of the law
firm, the appellate court held that the law firm had no duty to pursue any
party it felt, after investigation, was not culpable or collectible.
5 6
Finally, an attorney's duty does not require him to take futile action on
behalf of his client. In Hunzinger Construction Corp. v. Quarles & Brady
General Partnership,157 the client claimed that its lawyers should have
submitted a claim to its insurance company in a construction litigation
case. 15  If the claim had been submitted, the client argued, the insurance
company would have provided a defense and paid for the attorney's fees
which the client had to pay. 59 The client suffered an adverse summary
judgment. 160 The appellate court found no error in the trial court's
determination "that there was no duty owed to the client on the part of the
lawyer to submit the defense to the insurance company, where the complaint
did not allege any cause of action which arguably came within the coverage
of the policy.'
61
C. Proximate Cause of Loss
The third element that a legal malpractice plaintiff must plead and
prove is that the attorney's negligence resulted in and was the proximate
151. Gomez v. Hawkins Concrete Const. Co., 623 F. Supp. 194, 199 (N.D. Fla. 1985).
152. 582 So. 2d 1206 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
153. Id. at 1207.
154. Id. at 1208
155. Id. at 1207.
156. Id. at 1208.
157. 735 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
158. Id. at 592.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 593.
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cause of loss to the plaintiff. 62 The general tort law that "[n]o damages may
be recovered where losses do not usually result from or could not have been
foreseen as a proximate result of a particular negligence" is set forth in the
legal malpractice case of Chadwick v. Corbin. 16  However, "once a negli-
gent act occurs, the actor will be liable for injury flowing therefrom, unless
'an act unforeseeable to him and independent of his negligence intervenes to
cause the loss."''64
[A]n attorney who drafts documents is not ipso facto a guarantor
that the documents will be litigation free or will accomplish every-
thing that the client might want .... The rationale is that if there
were malpractice liability under those circumstances, an attorney
would in effect insure his work; but since insurance coverage ordi-
narily calls for premium payment, attorneys fees would inevitably
increase substantially to provide for that type of insurance.
165
In Hatcher v. Roberts,'66 a client-mortgagor brought a legal malpractice
action against its attorney and law firm contending that in the underlying
foreclosure proceeding the lawyer negligently withdrew an affirmative
defense of prepayment. 67 The First District Court of Appeal found, as did
the trial court, "that, under all the facts, circumstances, and law existing at
the time of the foreclosure suit, the prepayment defense asserted and then
withdrawn in the foreclosure proceeding could not possibly have succeeded,
even with diligent preparation and litigation by" the attorney.' 68 Therefore,
since the attorney's acts were not the proximate cause of the client's alleged
damages, no legal malpractice had occurred. 169
162. Home Furniture Depot, Inc. v. Entevor AB, 753 So. 2d 653, 655 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 2000).
163. 476 So. 2d 1366, 1368 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (citing 17 FLA. JUR. 2d
DAMAGES § 38); accord Ferrari v. Vining, 744 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
164. Mitrani v. Druckman, 576 So. 2d 406, 408 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (citing
State Farm Ins. Co. v. Nu Prime Roll-A-Way of Miami, Inc., 557 So. 2d 107, 109 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1990)).
165. Daytona Dev. Corp. v. McFarland, 505 So. 2d 464, 467 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1987).
166. 478 So. 2d 1083 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
167. Id. at 1085.
168. Id. at 1086.
169. Id. at 1087; accord Pennington v. Caggiano, 723 So. 2d 931 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1999) (holding attorneys who withdrew were not responsible for former client's failure
or inability to obtain substitute counsel prior to loss on a summary judgment in a medical
malpractice proceeding).
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An attorney will not be liable if "some separate force or action is the
active and efficient intervening cause, the sole proximate cause or an
independent cause."'170 However, if the negligent attorney sets off a chain of
events resulting in harm, or if the intervening cause is foreseeable, his
negligence may be considered the proximate cause notwithstanding the
intervening cause. 171
If the client causes his own damages, the attorney will not be held
liable. 172 In Goodwin v. Alexatos,173 an attorney represented both the seller
and purchaser of an orange grove. 174 Problems developed after the closing
of the transaction, and the purchaser demanded a return of his money for,
among other reasons, the attorney's failure to clear certain title impediments
which were known at the time of closing. 7 5  When the money was not• 176
forthcoming, the purchaser sued the seller and the attorney. One of the
claims against the attorney was for malpractice in failing to clear the title to
the property. 177 The directed verdict on the malpractice claim was upheld on
appeal upon a finding that the "proximate cause was [the purchaser's]
decision to abandon the transaction, not any delay allegedly caused by [the
attorney].' 7 7
The issue in Boyd v. Brett-Major79 was "whether the attorney followed
the explicit directions of his client."' i8 The jury found that the client had
instructed his attorney to delay, rather than win, a mortgage foreclosure.'
8
'
Accordingly, the lawyer did not plead the absolute defense provided by
section 903.14 of the Florida Statutes s2 against the bonding company,
170. DWL, Inc. v. Foster, 396 So. 2d 726, 728 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (citing
Gibson v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 386 So. 2d 520 (Fla. 1980)).
171. DWL, Inc., 396 So. 2d at 728 (citing Gibson, 386 So. 2d at 522). See also
Daytona Dev. Corp. v. McFarland, 505 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (reversing
summary judgment for determination of whether lawyer was proximate cause of client's
damages in a real estate matter).
172. Davenport v. Stone, 528 So. 2d 45, 46 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (noting client
who was fully advised and voluntarily signed property settlement agreement suffered no loss
due to attorneys incompetence).
173. 584 So. 2d 1007 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
174. Id. at 1009.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 1009-10.
177. Id. at 1010.
178. Goodwin, 584 So. 2d at 1010.
179. 449 So. 2d 952 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
180. Id. at954.
181. Id.
182. FLA. STAT. § 903.14 (2001).
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which was foreclosing upon its mortgage, resulting in a summary judgment
adverse to the client.!13 Finding no cases in Florida on point, the court cited
to Orr v. Knowles,'84 for the following proposition:
It is not the role of an attorney acting as counsel to independently
determine what is best for his client and then act accordingly.
Rather, such an attorney is to allow the client to determine what is
in the client's best interests and then act according to the wishes of
[the] client within the limits of the law.18 5
The Boyd court was not impressed by the argument that its ultimate
holding in favor of the attorney would allow lawyers to avoid liability by
saying they followed their client's instructions.'86
The lawyer in Lawyers Professional Liability Ins. Co. v. McKenzie s7
was sued for the profit allegedly lost by the client who had to go through two
foreclosure sales before the litigation was complete. 18 In the first
foreclosure sale, the mortgagor did not redeem the property, and the client-
mortgagee was the highest bidder at the sale. 189 The mortgagee had been
negotiating with a third party to purchase the property after the completion
of the foreclosure. 19° After the sale, the lawyer realized that the legal
description was wrong, which ultimately resulted in the scheduling of
another foreclosure sale.' 9 ' Before the second sale, the mortgagor located a
buyer for the property who paid off the mortgagee. 192 The court found that
the
[AIttorney, though negligent, did in fact do what he was employed
to do. He foreclosed on the mortgage and [the client] received all
that she was entitled to under the terms of the instrument. She did
183. Boyd, 449 So. 2d at 953.
184. 337 N.W.2d 699, 702 (Neb. 1983).
185. Boyd, 449 So. 2d at 954 (quoting Orr v. Knowles, 337 N.W.2d 699, 702 (Neb.
1983)).
186. Id.
187. 470 So. 2d 752 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
188. Id. at 753.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 752.
191. Id. at 753.
192. Lawyers Professional Liability Ins. Co., 470 So. 2d at 753.
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not prove that [the attorney's] negligence was a proximate cause of
her failure to get the property back.
193
Similarly, the lawyer in Snaith v. Haraldson,'94 who drafted balloon
mortgage language and represented both the mortgagor and mortgagee, had
no liability to the mortgagor for failing to properly provide for the legend
required by section 697.05(2)(a) of the Florida Statutes, because the
deficiency did not cause any damages to the mortgagor. 1 95 Although the
Fourth District Court of Appeal in Lefebvre v. James'9 did not mention the
lack of proximate cause as its reasoning for overturning the jury verdict, its
reversal was based upon the fact that the lawyer's failure to amend the
complaint to add a cause of action did not result in any damages to the
client.1 97  The case involved damages to a. farmer's livestock allegedly
because of a problem with the feed delivered to the farmer.' 98 The company
that delivered the feed became bankrupt, and its insurer denied coverage
based upon the pleadings that set forth a defective product theory.'99
Negligent delivery would have been covered under the policy. The attorney
considered adding a claim for negligent delivery, but he did not amend
because he thought that the amendment would not have related back to the
original cause of action and would therefore be barred by the statute of
limitations. 200 The trial court disagreed and ruled as a matter of law that the
amendment would have related back.20 1 The appellate court agreed with the
lawyer's assessment and found that "an amendment to the complaint alleging
negligent delivery of the feed would have constituted a new cause of action,
would not have related back to the filing of the claim, and would have been
barred by the statute of limitations." 2-02 Therefore, the appellate court
193. Id. at 754.
194. 466 So. 2d 1148 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
195. Id.; accord Singer v. William H. Stolberg, P.A., 770 So. 2d 1281, 1282 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (holding an attorney "is not negligent for failing to enforce an order the
trial court was not required to enforce").
196. 697 So. 2d 918 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
197. Id. at 920.
198. Id. at 918.
199. Id. at 919.
200. Id.
201. Lefebvre, 697 So. 2d at 919.
202. Id. at 920. See School Bd. of Broward County v. Surette, 394 So. 2d 147 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
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instructed the lower court to enter a directed verdict in favor of the203
attorney.
In another example of lack of proximate cause, the attorney who filed
an Age Discrimination in Employment Act claim on behalf of his client in
Bolves v. Hullinger2 4 escaped liability for his failure to timely file suit based
upon the appellate court's finding that "[t]here was a complete absence of
evidence of intentional or reckless disregard for whether [the employer's]
actions were in violation of the ADEA.' 'z 5 Since no damages were available
in the underlying action, even if the lawsuit had been timely filed, the
attorney's "negligence in allowing the statute of limitations to expire on the
federal claim did not result in damage to [the client]."206
Lack of proximate cause is determinative of a cause of action even
where the attorneys' negligence, as in Olmsted v. Emmanuel,2°7 is clear. In
the pretrial stipulation, the plaintiff's attorneys failed to invoke Title 42,
section 1981 of the United States Code20 as a basis for recovery. 2°9 The
only basis for recovery invoked was Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 .210 Accordingly, the $3,460,000 jury award was reduced to $300,000
because of the $300,000 cap under Title VII, which would not have applied
to a section 1981 action. The court summarized the law on proximate
cause after setting out the elements of a legal malpractice cause of action:
212
"Fo be liable for malpractice arising out of litigation, the attorney
must be the proximate cause of the adverse outcome of the underly-
ing action which results in damage to the client." The plaintiff
must "demonstrate [ ] that there is an amount of damages which
[he] would have recovered but for the attorney's negligence."
Thus, in a case such as this, the plaintiff has to prove that he
"would have prevailed on the underlying action but for the attor-
ney's negligence." In this case, there is no dispute about the facts
that Olmsted retained appellees and that appellees neglected a rea-
sonable duty owed to Olmsted when they failed to invoke 42
203. Id.
204. 629 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
205. Id. at201.
206. Id.
207. 783 So. 2d 1122 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
208. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000).
209. Olmsted, 783 So. 2d at 1124.
210. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3.
211. Olmsted, 783 So. 2d at 1124.
212. See generally, supra note 2 (citing cases that describe the elements of a legal
malpractice cause of action).
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U.S.C. § 1981 as a basis for relief in the pretrial stipulation, result-
ing in the holding that any claim pursuant to section 1981 had been
abandoned. Here, the dispute relates to the third element, i.e.,
whether Olmsted can establish that appellees' negligence was the
proximate cause of a loss to him.213
After examining Eleventh Circuit cases involving section 1981 claims,
the court concluded that the client could not establish that he would have
214
met the legal requirements of a section 1981 claim. Accordingly, since the
client could not satisfy the proximate cause element, the court affirmed the
dismissal of the legal malpractice claim under section 1981.215
The malpractice plaintiff may use expert testimony to establish that the
client would have recovered damages but for the actions of the attorney or
that the client would have recovered more in damages but for the attorney's
actions. The use of expert testimony to establish causation was examined in
Tarleton v. Arnstein & Lehr.26 The client sued her lawyer as a result of
losing the right to sue upon certain promissory notes due to the release
217
clause in her divorce proceeding settlement agreement. After indicating
that one element of a legal malpractice case is proving that "the attorney's
negligence resulted in and was the proximate cause of loss to the client,
' 21a
which requires the client to demonstrate that "there is an amount of damages
which the client would have recovered but for the attorney's negligence, 21 9
the court stated that the appeal "focuses on whether the Former Wife
presented sufficient evidence to satisfy the third element.,
220
The client produced a legal expert who testified as to standard of care
and an accountant who testified regarding damages.22' The trial court judge
overturned a jury verdict in favor of the client, reasoning that she had not
established proximate cause because she failed to present testimony
indicating that a more favorable result would have occurred in the divorce
213. Olmsted, 783 So. 2d at 1125-26 (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
214. Id. at 1128.
215. Id. See also Somerset Village, Ltd. P'ship v. Carlton, Fields, Ward, Emmanuel,
Smith & Cutler, P.A., 782 So. 2d 414 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (failing to obtain transcript
not proximate cause of summary judgment affinance).
216. 719 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
217. Id. at 327.
218. Id. at 328.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Tarleton, 719 So. 2d at 328.
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222proceeding had the attorney acted differently. The Fourth District Court
of Appeal reinstated the jury verdict finding "that the lay jury was competent
to determine that Former Wife would have been awarded more but for the
Firm's negligence. 223 The Court went on to state as follows:
Under the "trial within a trial" standard of proving proximate
cause, the jury necessarily has to determine whether the client
would have prevailed in the underlying action, in this case the dis-
solution action, before determining whether the client would pre-
vail in the malpractice action. Because the jury is substituting its
judgment for the fact finder of the dissolution proceeding, no ex-
pert testimony specifically stating that a reasonable judge would
have given her more than she received in the settlement agreement
would be required to establish proximate causation. To establish
proximate causation, Former Wife must demonstrate that there is
an amount of damages which she would have recovered but for the
Firm's negligence. From the evidence noted above, the jury, sitting
as the trier of fact in the dissolution action, determined the amount
Former Wife would have been awarded if she went to trial and
concluded that the amount was greater than she received under the
settlement agreement. Thus, Former Wife has established the
proximate cause element. 224
Whether an attorney's negligence is the proximate cause of his client's
injury is a question of fact. Although the Fourth District Court of Appeal
found that the attorney's conduct fell below a reasonable standard of care in
Spaziano v. Price,225 a jury verdic't in favor of the attorney was upheld
because "the question submitted to the jury was whether there was
negligence on the part of [the attorney] which was a legal cause of loss,
injury or damage to Spaziano. The jury chose to answer that question in the
,,226
negative. Since there was conflicting evidence on whether the client
suffered any injuries from the airplane crash, which formed the basis for the
underlying case that was dismissed because of the Warsaw Convention's
two-year statute of limitations, the jury's resolution of the disputed issues of
fact was not disturbed.227
222. Id. at 330.
223. Id.
224. Id. (citations omitted).
225. 763 So. 2d 1047 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
226. Id. at 1049.
227. Id. at 1049-50.
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Im. EFFECT OF MULTIPLE REPRESENTATIONS
Multiple attorney representation of a client affects an attorney's liability
for malpractice. Subsequent representation by another attorney may relieve
an attorney of malpractice liability, and referral by an attorney spreads the
liability. An attorney is not liable for his omission if subsequent counsel had
the opportunity to perform the act and avoid the problem. This issue is
228
examined in Frazier v. Effinan. Lisa Frazier retained attorney Steven
Effman in a medical malpractice action.229 Effman did not join Florida
Patient's Compensation Fund as a defendant.230 Gary Rotella replaced
Effman as Frazier's attorney. 3 Although he could have done so during his
stewardship of the case, Rotella did not join the Compensation Fund
either. 232 Frazier retained a third lawyer who discovered the non-joinder by
Frazier and Effman and the expiration of the limitations period to join the
Compensation Fund.233  Frazier sued both Rotella and Effman for legal
malpractice. 234 The appellate court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the
action against Effman with prejudice.235 "Under the circumstances of this
case, where the complaint shows that the defendant lawyer was discharged
and new counsel retained long before the claim became barred, a claim of
negligence cannot be maintained., 236 The court made no mention of the
proceeding against Rotella.
The extent of a referring lawyer's responsibility for the negligence of
237
the trial attorney was resolved in Norris v. Silver. The trial attorney and
the referring attorney had shared fees on other cases without any written
agreement. 2T8 Under rule 4-1.5 of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar,
when fees are divided "each lawyer assumes joint legal responsibility for the,.,239
representation. Therefore, a division of fees automatically spreads the
228. 501 So. 2d 114 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
229. Id. at 115.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Frazier, 501 So. 2d at 115.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. 701 So. 2d 1238 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
238. Id. at 1239.
239. Id. at 1240 (citing R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-1.5(g)(2)).
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liability between the two attorneys.2M The plaintiffs were required to "prove
an express or implied agreement to divide the fee.
' '2 1
IV. PLEADING REQUIREMENTS
Proper pleading of an action against an attorney for malpractice
requires pleading more than bare legal assertions; however, even such a
complaint should not be dismissed where capable of being cured. The naked
legal conclusion that an attorney was negligent will not satisfy the pleading
requirements for legal malpractice. 242 Nevertheless, as with other causes of
action, a court will only examine the "four corners of the complaint" to
determine if the allegations are sufficient to overcome a motion to dismiss
for failure to state a cause of action.
24 3
A dismissal with prejudice was affirmed in Bankers Trust Realty, Inc. v.
Kluger.244 This harsh sanction resulted from the failure to "state any of the
specifics of the alleged malpractice."'24 5 The complaint merely stated the
"insufficient legal conclusion that the attorneys 'negligently, carelessly,
unskillfully and tardily conducted the ... action and delayed obtaining a
judgment therein."' 246 However, Breakers of Ft. Lauderdale, Ltd. v.
Cassel247 overturned a trial court ruling dismissing a complaint for legal
malpractice with prejudice because the complaint, "while deficient in that it
240. R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-1.5(g)(2)(A) (2002).
241. Norris, 701 So. 2d at 1241.
242. Rios v. McDermott, Will & Emery, 613 So. 2d 544, 545 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1993); Pressley v. Farley, 579 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991), cause dismissed, 583
So. 2d 1036 (Fla. 1991); Dillard Smith Constr. Co. v. Greene, 337 So. 2d 841, 843 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (holding that a client's allegation that attorney had neglected to keep
client informed, without more, lacks specificity as well as a causative relationship to client's
alleged loss and is insufficient to state cause of action for legal malpractice).
243. Bricker v. Kay, 446 So. 2d 1151, 1152 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1984). See also
Baycon Indus. v. Shea, 714 So. 2d 1094 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998); Thompson v. Martin,
530 So. 2d 495 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (a complaint need only indicate that a cause of
action exists and need not anticipate affirmative defenses).
244. 672 So. 2d 897 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct, App. 1996). See also Conley v. Shutts &
Bowen, P.A., 616 So. 2d 523 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (amended complaint did not allege
sufficient facts to state a cause of action, dismissal with prejudice affirmed).
245. Bankers Trust Realty, Inc., 672 So. 2d at 898.
246. Id.
247. 528 So. 2d 985 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
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failed to establish conclusively when appellant actually knew that its
attorney's conduct constituted malpractice, was not beyond cure."4
8
V. VENUE
In general, the venue for a negligence suit is where the plaintiff suffers
249his or her injuries. In legal malpractice suits, this rule is not always easily
250 251
applied. In Tucker v. Fianson, the attorney being sued practiced and
252
resided in Broward County, Florida. The malpractice complaint alleged
that the attorney had rendered negligent advice regarding a condominium
conversion in Dade County, Florida, and the client chose to sue in Dade
County, Florida. 2 3 The trial court denied the attorney's motion to transfer
254the case to Broward County. In affirming the trial court's ruling, the Third
District Court of Appeal relied upon section 47.011 of the Florida
255Statutes, and the court adopted the rule that "for venue purposes, a tort
claim is deemed to have accrued where the last event necessary to make the
defendant liable for the tort took place. 256 The court graphically described
its ruling by invoking a bow and arrow theme.257 "In sum, it is claimed that,
while lawyer Tucker negligently shot his arrow into the air of Broward
County, it did no harm and had no effect until it fell to earth in Dade. It is
therefore here that he must answer for his asserted error."
' 58
The bow and arrow analogy was also attempted in Roberts v. Cason,
259
where one concurring justice could not tell from the record whether "the
arrow shot into the air in Orange County fell to earth in Orange or Lake
County. ,260 In the same case, the dissenting judge suggested that the arrow
248. Id. at 986. See also Parker v. Gordon, 442 So. 2d 273 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1983) (amended complaint explicit on facts but obscure as to causes of action dismissed);
Kartikes v. Demos, 214 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1968) (dismissing case without leave
to amend reversed).
249. Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 201 So. 2d 743, 745 (Fla. 1967).
250. The lack of a transcript of the motion to transfer venue hearing prevented review
in McFadden v. Wolfman & Greenfield, P.A., 616 So. 2d 500 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
251. 484 So. 2d 1370 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
252. Id. at 1371.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. FLA. STAT. § 47.011 (2001).
256. Tucker, 484 So. 2d at 1371.
257. Id. at 1372.
258. Id.
259. 652 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
260. Id. at 440-41 (Harris, C.J., concurring specially).
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"did not land (i.e., accrue) any place at all based upon the plaintiffs'
amended complaint, which is woefully inadequate., 26' The underlying facts
in Roberts indicate that a real estate closing involving property located in
Lake County was held in Orange County.26 The plaintiff filed suit in
Orange County against attorneys having a place of business only in Lake263
County. The Roberts court, relying upon Tucker, held that venue was
properly placed in Orange County because that is where the allegedly
264negligent closing took place.
The allegedly injured client in Weiner v. Prudential Mortgage
Investors, Inc.265 brought suit in Dade County, Florida against its attorneys
who lived and practiced in Marion County, notwithstanding a claim that a
266foreclosure suit had not been brought in Alachua County as instructed.
The aggrieved client attempted to construct a claim based upon false
communications in Dade County.267  The court deemed the attempt
"chimerical," and it was disregarded for venue purposes.268
The dates of service of process, of filing for legal malpractice, and of
filing an action for fees were critical in Hollywood Lakes Country Club, Inc.
v. Silver & Waldman, P.A.269 The law firm of Silver and Waldman, P.A.,
was served with a suit for malpractice in Broward County, Florida, on
October 27, 1998.270 At the time of service, Hollywood Lakes County Club
was not a plaintiff in the Broward County proceeding. 27  In Miami-Dade
County, Florida, on October 29, 1998, Silver and Waldman filed suit to
272
recover attorneys' fees against Hollywood Lakes. Hollywood Lakes was
added as a party plaintiff in the Broward proceeding on November 25,
1998. On November 19, 1998, six days prior to becoming a party plaintiff
in the Broward action, Hollywood Lakes sought to have the Miami-Dade
261. Id. at 442 (Cobb, J., dissenting).
262. Id. at 440.
263. Id.
264. Roberts, 652 So. 2d at 442. See also Williams v. Goldsmith, 619 So. 2d 330 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (holding legal malpractice claim and other claims properly venued
where last event necessary to make the defendant liable for the tort took place).
265. 557 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
266. Id. at 913.
267. Id. at 913 n.1.
268. Id.
269. 737 So. 2d 1194 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
270. Id. at 1194-95.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 1195.
273. Id.
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case transferred to Broward County.2 74 The trial- court denied the motion.275
The appellate court relied upon rule 1.170(a) of the Florida Rules of Civil
Procedure, and it held that the Miami-Dade case was a compulsory
276counterclaim. Since the plaintiffs perfected service of process over Silver
and Waldman in the Broward County case before the Miami-Dade action
was filed, the appellate court remanded the case with instructions to transfer
the Miami-Dade action to Broward County.
Venue was proper in two different counties in Ivey v. Padgett. The
legal malpractice claim was filed both as a contract action, for which venue
would be where the alleged breach occurred, and in tort, for which venue
would be where the act (or omission) occurred.278 The alleged malpractice
was for failure to timely file a medical malpractice case against a Volusia
County doctor.27 9 The attorney resided in Putnam County.28° The court
found that venue was proper in Volusia County because that is where the281
lawsuit was to be filed. The county in which the defendants resided was
282
also proper from a venue perspective. Since the plaintiff's choice of
venue is generally favored, the case proceeded where the plaintiff filed suit,
283in Volusia County.
VI. JURISDICTION
Legal services are often provided to Florida citizens by non-resident
law firms. In Florida, in order to sue a non-resident lawyer, two require-
ments must be met. First, Florida's long arm statute must be applicable.
28 4
Second, minimum contacts must 'exist in order to satisfy due process
285
requirements.
274. Hollywood Lakes Country Club, Inc., 737 So. 2d at 1195.
275. Id.
276. The court cited to Johnson v. Allen, Knudsen, DeBoest, Edwards & Rhodes, P.A.,
621 So. 2d 507 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that a "malpractice action and a fee
dispute based upon the same representation invokes the compulsory counterclaim provision of
FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.170(a)").
277. 502 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
278. Id. at 23.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Ivey, 502 So. 2d at 23.
283. Id.
284. FLA. STAT. § 48.193 (2002).
285. Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais, 554 So. 2d 499, 502 (Fla. 1989).
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The first consideration is Florida's long arm statute. A retainer
agreement spanning several years can satisfy the requirements of Florida's
long arm statute. The denial of a law firm's motion to abate for lack of
personal jurisdiction was affirmed in Windels, Marx, Davies & Ives v.
286Solitron Devices, Inc. The law firm was retained by its client, monthly,
over a period of several years. 287 The court found that there was "record of
substantial activity in Florida, ' 288 which satisfied section 48.193 of the
Florida Statutes.
If Florida's long arm statute is satisfied, further analysis is necessary.
After satisfying itself that the plaintiff had not established jurisdiction under
, 289
Florida's long arm statute, the court in Horowitz v. Laske did not reach the
minimum contacts analysis. In that case, the lawyer's "brief and insubstan-
tial" 290 contacts with Florida did not amount to engaging in a business
venture, and the alleged tortious acts were not committed in Florida.
291
Since neither section 48.193(l)(a) nor 48.193(l)(b) of the Florida Statutes
was satisfied, the court found no personal jurisdiction.292
Establishing jurisdiction under Florida's long arm statute must be
accomplished by establishing minimum contacts. In Florida, minimum
contacts are not established where an out-of-state law firm delivers a legal
opinion for use in Florida. A nonfinal order finding personal jurisdiction
over a New York law firm that rendered an opinion regarding a Florida real
estate transaction was overturned on appeal in Fleming & Weiss, P.C. v.
First American Title Ins. Co. 2 93 "To render a nonresident defendant subject
to jurisdiction in a Florida court, the statutory requirements of the long-arm
statute and the minimum contacts requirement must be met., 294 The New
York law firm had delivered its legal opinion in Florida for use by a Florida
286. 510 So. 2d 1177, 1179 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
287. ld. at 1177.
288. Id. at 1178.
289. 751 So. 2d 82 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999), overruled by Wendt v. Horowitz,
822 So. 2d 1252 (Fla. 2002).
290. Id. at 85.
291. Id. at 86.
292. Id. See Hill v. Sidly & Austin, 762 F. Supp. 931, 935 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (noting
long arm jurisdiction requirements were satisfied, but minimum contacts were insufficient in
an attorney law firm dispute).
293. 580 So. 2d 646 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
294. Id. at 647 (citing Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais, 554 So. 2d at 499 (Fla.
1989).
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bank in transacting a Florida loan.295 The appellate court found these acts
insufficient to establish the required minimum contacts. 6
Florida lacked jurisdiction over a Washington law firn in Foster,
Pepper & Riviera v. Hansard,297 which involved investors in a limited
partnership suing a law firm that had prepared a private placement
29
memorandum. 298 The court found that the law firm's
[Slole act of preparing a part of the private placement memoran-
dum, in the absence of any other contacts with Florida or the pur-
chasers of the securities, was insufficient to constitute engaging in
business in Florida for purposes of long-arm jurisdiction. More-
over, subjecting Foster[,] Pepper[, and Rivera] to Florida jurisdic-
tion under these circumstances does not satisfy the minimum con-
299tacts requirements of due process.
VII. MALPRACTICE IN CRIMINAL DEFENSE
Legal malpractice proceedings stemming from representation in
criminal matters differ from those stemming from other types of legal
representation. The case of Orr v. Black & Furci, P.A. 300 is a good example.
Orr holds that "[w]hile proximate causation ordinarily is a factual issue, in
certain cases proximate cause may be determined as a matter of law, based
on fairness and considerations of public policy. '30 1 The issue in Orr was
whether Florida courts would adopt the majority rule that a criminal
defendant's guilty plea foreseeably and substantially caused the injury from
a conviction.302 The court adopted the majority rule and held that "when
criminal defendants plead guilty to a crime, as malpractice plaintiffs they
must prove their innocence in order to maintain a cause of action against
their attorney. 3 °3 Since the plaintiff in Orr pled guilty, the court ruled that
the motion for summary judgment against the client on the professional
malpractice claim was correctly granted. 3°
295. Id.
296. Id. at 648.
297. 611 So. 2d 581 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
298. Id.
299. Id. at 582.
300. 876 F. Supp. 1270 (M.D. Fla. 1995).
301. Id. at 1276 (citation omitted).
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 1278.
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In addition to proximate cause being determined as a matter of law in
some criminal cases, and criminal defendants being required as malpractice
plaintiffs to prove their innocence after pleading guilty, a criminal
defendant-malpractice plaintiff has a condition precedent to a malpractice
suit. In Steele v. Kehoe,0 5 the Supreme Court of Florida answered the
following certified question in the affirmative: "when a convicted defendant
alleges that his or her attorney agreed to file a postconviction motion on his
or her behalf, but failed to do so in a timely manner... must a defendant
prevail in having his or her conviction or sentence reduced before filing a
legal malpractice action?
' 3°6
After reviewing policy arguments from various cases, the court
determined "that a convicted criminal defendant must obtain appellate or
postconviction relief as a precondition to maintaining a legal malpractice
action. '' °7 However, the statute of limitations for the malpractice action
does "not commence until the defendant has obtained final appellate or
postconviction relief.
308
In Rowe v. Schreiber,3° the Fourth District Court of Appeal followed
the Steele holding, prior to it being rendered,310 in finding that "a defendant
must successfully obtain post-conviction relief for the cause of action to
accrue in a case involving the legal malpractice of a criminal defense
attorney.0 1'1 Rowe goes one step further and requires a plaintiff suing a
criminal defense attorney for negligence "to prove by the greater weight of
the evidence that he was innocent of the crimes charged in the underlying
criminal proceeding.
3 12
Collateral estoppel is an affirmative defense to malpractice in criminal
defense. The Supreme Court of Florida in Zeidwig v. Ward 13 answered the
following rephrased certified question in the negative: "whether identity or
mutuality of the parties or their privies is a prerequisite in Florida to the
defensive application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel in the criminal-to-
305. 747 So. 2d 931 (Fla. 1999).
306. Id. at 932.
307. Id. at 933.
308. Id. See also Manley v. Crawford, 753 So. 2d 792 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000);
Rosen v. Thomas E. Cazel, P.A., 739 So. 2d 1267 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
309. 725 So. 2d 1245 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
310. In so doing, the court followed the district court decision in Steele v. Kehoe, 724
So. 2d 1192 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App 1998).
311. Rowe, 725 So. 2d at 1249.
312. Id. at 1251.
313. 548 So. 2d209 (Fla. 1989).
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civil context. ' ' 3 14 The criminal client in Zeidwig had unsuccessfully asserted
an "ineffective assistance of counsel" argument in the criminal proceeding
with regard to certain recorded conversations that he alleged would have
exonerated him.315 The malpractice case was based upon the use of the same
tapes. 316 The attorney's argument-that the client was collaterally estopped
from proceeding on the same theory that was lost in the criminal proceeding
-trumped the client's argument that the identity of the parties in the two
proceedings were not the same, rendering the doctrine inapplicable.317
VIII. DEFENSES
Various affirmative defenses have been asserted in malpractice actions
against attorneys. Res judicata and a variety of estoppel defenses are
available. An attorney may also plead the comparative negligence of his
client. In pari delicto and fraud by the client are additional aff'rmative
defenses to be used where appropriate.
A. Estoppel
Regarding malpractice in a civil case, the affirmative defenses of res
judicata, collateral estoppel, estoppel based upon taking a position
inconsistent with one taken in a prior suit involving the same party, and
estoppel in pais are all discussed in Keramati v. Schackow.3 18  The
Keramatis' child suffered a profound loss of hearing due to the alleged
medical malpractice of a doctor who failed to promptly diagnose streptococ-
cus bacteria that caused spinal meningitis. 319 The Roberts' child, born at
approximately the same time, born at the same hospital, and attended by the
partner of the doctor who attended to the Keramatis' child, was severely
retarded based upon the same alleged failure to diagnose. 320 Both families
retained Schackow and McGalliard to prosecute medical malpractice
actions.32  The attorneys filed separate civil suits, which were assigned to
314. Id.
315. Id. at 210.
316. Id. at211.
317. Id. at212.
318. 553 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1989). See also Terminello v. Alman, 710
So. 2d 728 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (holding res judicata and collateral estoppel barred
second lawsuit against attorney after first case was dismissed with prejudice).
319. Id. at 743.
320. Id.
321. Id
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different judges.322 The judge overseeing the Roberts case granted the
defendants a summary judgment on statute of limitation grounds, and the
323
appellate court affirmed on appeal. The facts giving rise to the Roberts
decision were equally applicable to Keramati. The attorneys reached a
324
settlement on behalf of the Keramatis for $200,000. The Keramatis,
thereafter, filed a legal malpractice suit claiming the settlement was less than
the claims were worth because of the statute of limitation problems created
by the lawyers' untimely filing of the medical malpractice action.32
Although the trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of the
attorneys on various estoppel theories, the appellate court reversed on
appeal .
The appellate court first rejected the notion that res judicata or
collateral estoppel were viable defenses. 327  "Both doctrines require the
identity of the parties or their privies to be applicable. 3 28 An additional
reason cited for rejecting the collateral estoppel argument is that the actions
and issues in the underlying case and the legal malpractice case were
"clearly not the same., 329 "In the medical malpractice case, the adequacy of
the amount settled for was not litigated, nor was the adequacy of Schackow's
and McGalliards' representation in recommending such a settlement.0
3 0
Also absent was an "equitable basis to apply those cases which hold a
party estopped in subsequent litigation to take a position inconsistent with
one taken in a prior suit involving the same party. '33' The $200,000
settlement may have been the best obtainable because of the lawyers'
negligence. Moreover, because the attorneys would be entitled to a set off
for the malpractice settlement, such settlement "appears to benefit them
more than to harm them.,
332
Holding that the Keramatis' acceptance of the settlement did not
amount to a false representation, the appellate court also rejected the
doctrine of estoppel in pais. Moreover, such a defense would in any event
create a jury issue. Furthermore, Keramati is the only reported decision in
322. Id.
323. Roberts v. Casey, 413 So. 2d 1226, 1227 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
324. Keramati, 553 So. 2d at 742.
325. Id. at 743.
326. Id.
327. Id. at 744.
328. Id.
329. Keramati, 553 So. 2d at 745.
330. Id. at 744.
331. Id. at745.
332. Id.
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Florida to squarely address the issue of whether the acceptance of a
settlement precludes suit against the attorney who negotiated such
settlement.
Collateral estoppel did not bar a claim for legal malpractice in Smith v.
Perry,334 which involved an ex-wife's claim against an attorney who
allegedly failed to properly present her loss of consortium claim in a
personal injury lawsuit brought by her ex-husband. The lawyer unsuccess-
fully claimed that the malpractice issues were previously litigated in the
divorce action.335 The court stated that collateral estoppel is applicable:
[W]here a subsequent cause of action between the same parties is
upon a different claim or demand from the first cause of action. In
such a case, the judgment of the prior action estops the parties from
litigating in the second suit issues or questions common to both
causes of action which were actually adjudicated in the prior litiga-
tion.33
6
The court determined that the issues presented in the dissolution action
would not overlap the issues in the malpractice proceeding and overturned a
contrary trial court summary judgment.
Judicial estoppel as a malpractice defense is examined in Ramsey v.
Jonassen,338 where the appellate court reversed a summary judgment in favor
of the attorney. The attorney argued at the trial court level that the client
"had waived her malpractice claim by failing to disclose that claim to the
bankruptcy court in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding she had filed before
she filed the malpractice action. 3 39 After explaining the concept of judicial
estoppel at length, the court summed up by stating "judicial estoppel is used
to prevent a party from raising a claim that should have been raised in
another action, and the failure to raise it was relied upon by a third party to
333. See also Sauer v. Flanagan & Maniotis, P.A., 748 So. 2d 1079, 1082 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (stating that failing to exercise ordinary skill and care in resolving
settlement issues did not insulate attorney from liability); Bolves v. Hullinger, 629 So. 2d 198,
200 n.2 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (citing Keramati, 553 So. 2d at 741).
334. 635 So. 2d 1019 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
335. See also Torres v. Nelson, 448 So. 2d 1058, 1060 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1984)
(finding that malpractice action for failing to settle within insurance policy limits not barred
by prior verdict in favor of insurance company on bad faith claim).
336. Smith, 635 So. 2d at 1020 (citations omitted).
337. Id. at 1021.
338. 737 So. 2d 1114 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
339. Id. at 1115.
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his or her detriment. '" 34  Since the attorney was not involved in the
bankruptcy proceeding, he could not avail himself of the judicial estoppel
doctrine.
Judicial estoppel was also rejected as a defense to a malpractice claim
in Olmsted v. Emmanuel.342 The client (Olmsted) claimed that the attorneys
(appellees) could not argue in the legal malpractice action that a cause of
action under title 42, section 1981 of the United States Code would not have
been successful since the same attorneys had made a contrary argument in
the underlying case.343 The court describes the law in Florida regarding
judicial estoppel as follows:
Olmsted contends, first, .that appellees are estopped from
"claim[ing] that [his] damages in excess of $310,000 are now a
matter of 'speculation,' . . since they took a contrary position on
the matter throughout the proceedings in the Federal Court." In
other words, Olmsted maintains that, because appellees argued
throughout the federal litigation that he had a valid claim under
section 1981, they should be precluded from taking a contrary posi-
tion in their defense of this malpractice action. We are unable to
agree.
Florida recognizes the equitable doctrine of judicial estoppel,
which prevents litigants from taking totally inconsistent positions
in separate judicial proceedings to the prejudice of the adverse
party. E.g., Chase & Co. v. Little, 116 Fla. 667, 156 So. 609, 610
(1934); Ramsey v. Jonassen, 737 So.2d 1114 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999);
Dunne v. Somoano, 550 So.2d 5, 7 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989). However,
in order to work an estoppel, the parties must be the same, the same
issues must be involved, and the position assumed in the former
trial must have been successfully maintained. Chase, 156 So. at
610; Ramsey, 737 So.2d at 1116. Here, appellees were not parties
in the federal litigation, and the issue of whether Olmsted had a
claim under section 1981 was never addressed on the merits in the
federal litigation. Accordingly, we conclude that appellees are not
estopped from arguing that the section 1981 claim would not have
been successful. Although there are no Florida cases directly on
340. Id. at 1116.
341. See also Berman v. Stem, 731 So. 2d 148 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999)
(reversing summary judgment in favor of client based upon judicial estoppel due to issues of
fact).
342. 783 So. 2d 1122 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
343. Id. at 1125.
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point, our conclusion is supported by Shapiro v. Butler, 273
A.D.2d 657, 709 N.Y.S.2d 687, 690 (App.Div.2000), which held
that the doctrine of judicial estoppel did not bar an attorney and
law firm from arguing in their former clients' legal malpractice ac-
tion against them that the former clients would not have prevailed
in a federal civil action against the clients for alleged illegal inter-
ception and disclosure of telephone conversations where the attor-
ney and law firm had not been parties to the federal action and the
attorny's position in that action had not been adopted by the
court.
Judicial estowel prevented the client from suing his former attorney in
Monyek v. Klein. A law firm and its client embarked upon two real estate
acquisitions. After disagreements about the terms of the deal, a lawsuit
resulted involving, among other matters, a claim that the law firm and its
attorneys had breached their fiduciary duty. The trial judge ruled that the
law firm had not breached its fiduciary duty.34 Over one year later, the
client sued the law firm for negligence related to the same real estate
transactions that were the subject of the previous lawsuit. After stating that
"[u]nder the principle of estoppel by judgment, parties are estopped from
litigating in a second suit points and questions which were common to both
the first and second causes of action and which actually were adjudicated in
the prior litigation,''347 the court affirmed the summary judgment in favor of
348the attorneys.
B. Comparative Negligence
Although not explicitly stated in the cases which discuss the compara-
tive negligence defense in a legal malpractice proceeding, the analysis
appears to turn on whether the client's actions contributed to his damages, in
which case the defense is viable, or whether the client is required to second
guess his attorney's advice or get a second opinion, in which case the
defense is not applicable.
A double comparative negligence situation is involved in Michael
Kovach, P.A. v. Pearce.349  The underlying proceeding in which legal
344. Id. at 1126.
345. 329 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
346. Id. at 26.
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. 427 So. 2d 1128 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
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malpractice allegedly occurred involved an automobile accident. When
Pearce was found to have negligently operated his vehicle, Pearce sued his
trial counsel claiming that Todter, the person who had sued Pearce, was at
fault in the accident and that Pearce's lawyer (Kovach) failed to properly
assert the comparative negligence of Todter.
Accordingly it was necessary for the jury in the malpractice action
to literally "re-try" the Todter v. Pearce case to correctly determine
Todter's negligence, if any, and Pearce's negligence, if any, caus-
ing Todter's injuries and, if both were negligent, to compare their
negligence, in order to determine how much of the $600,000 ver-
dict was properly chargeable to Pearce's negligence in injuring
Todter, how much was chargeable to Todter's own negligence, and
how much resulted from the alleged negligent failure to properly
defend. In the malpractice action, Kovach asserted as a compara-
tive negligence defense that Pearce was contributively negligent in
the defense of the Todter action.35 l
Pearce found himself having to prove a "case within a case" in the
malpractice action.
The verdict against the attorney was reversed because of an error in the
verdict form. Instead of providing the jury with the opportunity to apportion
negligence between Pearce and Kovach as to the negligent defense in the
injury case, and Todter and Pearce in the injury case, the verdict form only
allowed for apportionment of fault between Pearce and Kovach in the
malpractice action.352
Another Florida case in which the comparative negligence defense was
used is Solomon v. Meyer.353 In attempting to purchase assets from a
bankruptcy trustee, Solomon paid monies directly to the bankruptcy trustee
who did not provide the assets to Solomon. Solomon's lawsuit against the
trustee was unsuccessful. The federal court held that Solomon's own
negligence caused his loss. 354 In the malpractice action, the appellate court
could not affirm summary judgment in favor of the attorneys because
Solomon had alleged that his attorneys' advice had caused Solomon's
negligence, and genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the
350. Id. at 1129.
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. 116 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
354. Id. at 38.
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damages were caused by advice provided by the attorneys or the acts of the
bankruptcy trustee.355
The Fourth District Court of Appeal ignored both Kovach and Solomon
356in Tarleton v. Arnstein & Lehr, when it boldly stated "[a] client cannot be
found to be comparatively negligent for relying on an attorney's erroneous
legal advice or for failing to correct errors of the attorney which involve the
exercise of professional expertise.' Thus, the appellate court found that
the trial court erred in failing to issue a directed verdict in favor of the client
on the issue of comparative negligence. The law firm had argued that the
client was sophisticated in matters of business and should have seen the error
of her attorney's actions in advising her to sign a settlement agreement that
served to waive a cause of action regarding certain promissory notes.
"Simply because she was somewhat sophisticated in business matters does
not impose upon her the burden to second guess her attorney's advice or to
hire a second attorney to see if such advice was proper.",
358
C. In Pari Delicto and Fraud
In Turner v. Anderson,359 which was a case of first impression in
Florida, the Fourth District labored to answer "[tihe question of whether a
client who does an illegal act on advice of counsel can sue counsel for
damages resulting therefrom."360 After examining cases from other
jurisdictions, the court held that "no public policy should allow appellant to
recover damages as a result of engaging in criminal conduct such as occurred
in this case."36' The court considered the appellant's sophisticated
background and his deposition testimony in which he admitted committing
perjury with full knowledge of his conduct. What the court did not decide is
more telling. "We need not decide whether the doctrine of in pari delicto is
a bar where the client's misconduct is far less in degree than counsel's...
nor need we decide whether the client can recover fees paid to counsel,
because this is not part of appellant's claim. 362
355. Id. at 38-39.
356. 719 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
357. Id. at 331 (citations to Oregon and California cases omitted).
358. Id.
359. 704 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
360. Id. at 750.
361. Id. at 751.
362. Id.
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False and inconsistent information provided during discovery resulted
in a legal malpractice case being dismissed with prejudice in Cox v. Burke."'
The former client sued her attorneys after being informed the day after the
statute of limitations had expired that they were not going to handle her
medical malpractice case. 364 During the course of the malpractice litigation,
and after a year of discovery, the defendant attorneys were able to prove that
the former client had misled them about her identity, driver's license history,
365social security numbers, and prior injuries. The court found that a clear
showing of "false or misleading answers in sworn discovery that either
appear calculated to evade or stymy discovery on issues central to her
case ' 366 justified dismissal. It is interesting to note that the appellate court
deferred to the trial court's "discretion to fashion the apt remedy" 367 but
suggested that it "might have imposed a lesser sanction."
3 6
D. Statute of Limitations
1. Background
A lawsuit against an attorney for professional malpractice, with whom
the client has privity,369 must be commenced within two years from the time
the cause of action is discovered or should have been discovered with the
exercise of due diligence.370 The applicable statute reads as follows:
Actions other than for recovery of real property shall be com-
menced as follows:
(4) WITHIN TWO YEARS -
363. 706 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
364. Id. at 44.
365. Id.
366. Id. at 47.
367. Id.
368. Cox, 706 So. 2d at 47.
369. Hickey v. Dunn & Corey, 761 So. 2d 1245 (Fla. 3d Dist, Ct. App. 2000) (holding
that since a member of a pre-paid legal services plan was not in privity with attorney, four-
year rather than two-year statute of limitations applied).
370. FLA. STAr. § 95.11(4) (2001); Abbott v. Friedsam, 682 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1996) (reversing summary judgment because affidavits did not conclusively show
when plaintiffs knew or should have known that they had a cause of action to trigger the
running of the statute of limitations).
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(a) An action for professional malpractice, other than medical
malpractice, whether founded on contract or tort; provided
that the period of limitations shall run from the time the
cause of action is discovered or should have been discov-
ered with the exercise of due diligence. However, the limi-
tation of actions herein for professional malpractice shall be
limited to persons in privity with the professional.
371
The difficult question is when the two-year period begins.372 In Peat,
Marwick, Mitchell & Co. v. Lane,373 the Supreme Court of Florida
analogized the accrual of a cause of action for legal malpractice to the
accrual of a cause of action against accountants. 374 "A clear majority of the
district courts have expressly held that a cause of action for legal malpractice
does not accrue until the underlying legal proceeding has been completed on
appellate review because, until that time, one cannot determine if there was
any actionable error by the attorney. 3 75  The court wanted to avoid the
quandary that would require a party to file a malpractice proceeding against
a professional claiming negligence while taking a totally inconsistent
position during an appeal by alleging that the attorney was correct and a
lower court's ruling was incorrect. The Peat case holds that the cause of
action does not begin to accrue until the injured party knew or should have
known of the "redressable harm or injury. 376 When the client knew or
should have known of the attorney's negligence is a question of fact not
ordinarily capable of determination on summary judgment.377 However, if a
client incurs the expense of having to defend a lawsuit that should have been
settled, except for the attorney's malpractice, the accrual of the cause of
action begins at that time, not, as urged by the client in Breakers of Fort
371. § 95.11-.11(4)(a).
372. Rosa v. Roth, 442 So. 2d 323 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (reversing summary
judgment in favor or attorney because issue of fact existed as to when client should have
discovered malpractice).
373. 565 So. 2d 1323 (Fla. 1990).
374. Id. at 1325.
375. Id.; see also Ramsey v. Jonassen, 737 So. 2d 1114, 1115 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1999).
376. Lane, 565 So. 2d at 1325.
377. Freel v. Fleming, 489 So. 2d 1209 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that
affidavit provided by client in trying to set aside a default judgment did not establish client
knew a cause of action had accrued against lawyer who allowed default to be entered); Green
v. Bartel, 365 So. 2d 785 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (holding that when client discovered
wrongful act is a question of fact).
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Lauderdale, Ltd. v. Cassel,378 when damages were paid to the claimant on
the lawsuit that should have been settled.
The earlier case of Sawyer v. Earle379 was disapproved to the extent it
conflicted with Peat. In Sawyer, the Second District Court of Appeal held
that the statute of limitations had been tolled notwithstanding that the
claimant was unable to "determine his exact amount or full extent of
damages ' '380 at the time the statute would have expired. The difference
between the two cases turns on the fact that in Peat the client maintained
that its legal position was correct until after the United States Tax Court had
ruled against such position, while in Sawyer, the client believed his
representation to be improper when he discharged his first lawyer, which
was well within the two-year period.
The clients in Spivey v. Trader 38 retained an attorney who advised
them that transferring certain assets owned as tenants by the entireties to a
corporation would not place such assets at risk in a pending personal injury
action.382  A judgment was rendered in supplemental proceedings to the
personal injury action finding such assets subject to attachment contrary to
the attorney's advice.383 The Spivey court, relying upon Peat, held that the
two-year countdown began when the judgment on the supplemental
proceedings was rendered, not when the client suspected that the attorney's
advice was wrong. This was because the client had "vigorously contested
the fact that the real estate, or his interest therein, was subject to attachment
in the personal injury action filed against him personally."3 84
Since 1989, the Florida courts have been attempting to refine a rule of
accrual applicable to transactional and litigational malpractice.
2. Transactional Malpractice
In the area of transactional malpractice, Peat was further analyzed in
Throneburg v. Boose, Casey, Ciklin, Lubitz, Martens, McBane & O'Connell,
378. 528 So. 2d 985 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1988), overruled in part by Freemont
Indemnity Co. v. Carey, Dwyer, Eckhart, Mason & Spring, P.A., 796 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 2001).
379. 541 So. 2d 1232 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
380. Id. at 1234.
381. 620 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
382. Id. at 213.
383. Id.
384. Id. at 215.
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P.A.,385 in which a dismissal based upon the statute of limitations having
expired was reversed. The Throneburg court stated:
We understand Peat Marwick to draw a distinction between
knowledge of actual harm from legal malpractice and knowledge of
potential harm. The former begins the limitations period; the latter
does not. Legal services, like accounting services, are often subject
to differing views among practitioners. Lawyers often disagree with
one another on the same transaction. It seems clear to us that Peat
Marwick, properly understood, means that the limitations period on
claims of legal malpractice should not commence until it is rea-
sonably clear that the client has actually suffered some damage
from legal advice or services.
386
Based upon the court's view of Peat, the filing of the lawsuit against
the attorney in Throneburg more than two years after the real estate
document in question was prepared, but less than two years after a decision
holding the document to be invalid, was deemed to have been timely filed.
The preparation of a Florida postnuptial agreement was deemed
387transactional in Robbat v. Gordon. After reviewing Peat and Throneberg,
the court stated:
Read together, Peat, Marwick and Throneberg stand for the propo-
sition that knowledge of an adverse decision by a lower tribunal is
not sufficient to start the running of the statute of limitations in a
transactional malpractice claim where the client chooses to defend
the actions of the defendant on appeal, since to require the client to
pursue the malpractice claim while at the same time defending the
professional's actions on appeal would place the client "in the
wholly untenable position of having to take directly contrary posi-
tions in [the] two actions." 388
It was not until after the litigation involving the postnuptial agreement was
resolved that the statute of limitations began to run against the attorney who
provided advice regarding the post-nuptial.
385. 659 So. 2d 1134 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
386. Id. at 1136 (emphasis added).
387. 771 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
388. Robbat. 771 So. 2d at 636-37.
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3. Litigational Malpractice
The process of refining the accrual rule has been fraught with difficulty.
A practical review of the difficulty in determining when the statute of
limitations begins to run is set forth in the dissenting opinion in Silvestrone
v. Edell.389 "Unfortunately, in practice it is unclear in Florida case law
exactly when the statute of limitations begins to run in attorney malpractice
cases." 39° The majority opinion in the Fifth District's decision in Silvestrone
found that the statute begins to run before a final judgment is rendered. 39'
Due to various post trial motions, including the amount of attorney's fees
owed to the attorney for the prevailing party who later sued the attorney,
approximately two years expired between the return of the jury verdict in the
392
underlying federal antitrust action and the final judgment. The case turned
on the fact that the client had instructed his attorney not to appeal the jury
verdict, to request a new trial, or to seek additur.393 Thus, the court found
that the client "had all the information necessary to establish his cause of
action ' 394 when the jury returned its verdict. An alternative argument that
the cause of action should be tolled under the continuing representation
doctrine was not considered because it was not presented below, although
the court found that the argument had some "appeal. 395
In contrast to Silvestrone, the statute of limitations did not commence
until the day after the court rendered final judgment in Zakak v. Broida and
Napier, P.A.396 The court ordered the Zakaks to perform according to the
settlement made by their attorney despite the Zakaks' protest that the
attorney was not authorized to enter into such settlement.397 When they
refused to pay, the court ordered settlement and entered a final judgment
against them.198 The Zakaks initiated a legal malpractice suit within two
389. 701 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997), vacated by 721 So. 2d 1173 (Fla.
1998).
390. Id. at 94.
391. Id.
392. Id.
393. Id.
394. Silvestrone, 701 So. 2d at 91. See also Eldred v. Reber, 639 So. 2d 1086 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (holding statute of limitations began to run when opinion, not mandate,
was issued by appellate court).
395. Id. at 91-92; see infra the section on Resurrecting, Delaying & Tolling the Statute
of Limitations for a discussion of that doctrine.
396. 545 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
397. Id. at 381.
398. Id.
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years of the judgment, but more than two years after the order enforcing the
settlement.
In recognition of the conflict with Zakak, the Supreme Court of Florida
accepted Silvestrone v. Edell4w for review "on the issue of whether the two-
year statute of limitations for legal malpractice, in a litigation context, begins
to run when the verdict is rendered or when final judgment is entered." In
Silvestrone, the Supreme Court of Florida attempted to create a "bright line
rule"402 in order to "provide certainty and reduce litigation over when the
statute starts to run. 4°3  Since the law was "not clear as to when the
limitations period for legal malpractice, in a litigation-related context, begins
to run."404
The Supreme Court of Florida held in Silvestrone that there is a "bright
line" rule that requires commencement of a cause of action for litigation
legal malpractice within two years of the final conclusion of the underlying
litigation.40 5 The court held that the statute of limitations begins to run when
the final judgment becomes final.4°6 The Supreme Court of Florida did not
address the knowledge of harm as required by the statute. A review of the
facts from the Fifth District's opinion indicates "[t]here is no question that
Mr. Silvestrone knew about the alleged malpractice when the jury returned
an unsatisfactory verdict." 7 Thus, the client knew about the malpractice at
the time judgment became final. In footnote two of the Silvestrone decision,
the court distinguished Birnholz v. Blake408 because it involved transactional
malpractice.
Unlike the client in Silvestrone, the client in Pinkerton v. West 4  first
learned of her attorney's misadvice more than two years later from a
399. Id.
400. 721 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. 1998).
401. Id. at 1174.
402. Id. at 1176.
403. Id.
404. Id. at 1175.
405. Silvestrone, 721 So. 2d at 1175-76.
406. See Slapikas v. Llorente, 766 So. 2d 440, 441 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000)
(applying Silvestrone to determine if attorney's fees were properly awarded); Gaines V. Russo,
723 So. 2d 398 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (reversing a dismissal in reliance upon
Silvestrone); Hold v. Manzini, 736 So. 2d 138 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (holding
redressable harm cannot be established until an adverse final judgment has been rendered
against the client).
407. Silvestrone, 701 So. 2d at 91.
408. 399 So. 2d 375 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
409. 353 So. 2d 102 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
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California attorney. 4'° The attorney successfully argued before the trial
court that the statute of limitations had expired because the former client had
read an article contrary to the Florida lawyer's advice and wrote letters to the
attorney questioning his conduct more than two years before suit was
filed.4' In reversing the trial court's summary judgment in favor of the
attorney, Schetter v. Jordan,412 was cited for the following proposition:
The applicability of the statute of limitations to the plaintiffs' cause
of action for malpractice against the attorney-defendant is depend-
ent upon when the attorney's alleged act of negligence became
known to the client which matter is a question of fact to be deter-
mined by the trier of fact and not by the court in a summary pro-
ceeding.
413
Unlike a literal reading of the Supreme Court of Florida's decision in
Silvestrone, which ignores the statutory requirement of knowledge by the
client that the attorney committed malpractice, the Schetter approach is
consistent with the requirements of the statute.41 4
The Third District Court of Appeal, in Watkins v. Gilbride Heller &
Brown, P.A.,415 overturned the trial court's ruling that the statute of
limitations commenced after the district court of appeal's ruling was final,
rather than after any attempt to seek supreme court review was final. "[A]
final judgment is not final until a timely filed appeal to, or petition for• • ,,416
review by, the supreme court is resolved. However, due to the "recent
nature of Silvestrone and the rapid dispute over the bright line rule' 417 the
following question was certified to the Supreme Court of Florida:
WHERE REVIEW OF A DISTRICT COURT DECISION IN AN
ACTION UNDERLYING A LEGAL MALPRACTICE CLAIM IS
SOUGHT IN THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT, DOES THE
TWO-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS PERIOD OF
SECTION 95.1l(4)(A), FLORIDA STATUTES, BEGIN TO RUN
FROM THE DATE THE DECISION BECOMES FINAL BY
410. Id.
411. Id. at 103.
412. 294 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
413. Id. at 131.
414. Id.
415. 754 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
416. Id. at 762.
417. Id. at 763.
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THE SUPREME COURT'S RESOLUTION OF THAT REVIEW,
OR DOES THE PERIOD RUN FROM THE DATE OF THE
DISTRICT COURT'S MANDATE?
18
Judge Sorondo's concurring opinion in Watkins emphasizes the
importance of exercising caution in applying the statute of limitations
defense:
The statute of limitations is an onerous defense which should be
limited in its application to those cases where its applicability is
unavoidable. See Pezzi v. Brown, 697 So. 2d 883, 886 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1997) ("statutes restricting access to the courts must be nar-
rowly construed in a manner favoring access."); Angrand v. Fox,
552 So. 2d 1113, 1116 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) ("it is well established
that a limitations defense is not favored, ... and that therefore any
substantial doubt on the question should be resolved by choosing
the longer rather than the shorter possible statutory period."). This
Court has historically emphasized that "Florida policy dictates a
strong preference that cases be decided on their merits." City of
Miami v. Rivas, 723 So. 2d 393, 393 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999); Venero
v. Balbuena, 652 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995); Cinkat Transp.,
Inc. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 596 So. 2d 746 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992).
Where courts have discretion in determining the applicability of a
statute of limitations, such discretion should be exercised in favor
of affording the Florida Constitution's guarantee of access to courts
contained within Article I, Section 21.
The Supreme Court of Florida accepted review of Watkins,42 ° approved the
Third District Court of Appeal's ruling, and held "the statute of limitations
begins to run from the date the decision becomes final by this Court's
resolution of the case.
' 42
'
A transactional malpractice case that resulted in the client's litigation
with a third party ultimately puts the accrual of the cause of action, the
running of the statute of limitations, and five of the cases on the issues into
perspective. Taracido v. Perez-Abreu, Zamora & De La Fe, P.A. ,422
involved an allegedly improperly prepared contract for sale of corporate
418. Id.
419. Id. (Sorondo, J., concurring).
420. Watkins, 783 So. 2d at 225.
421. Id.
422. 705 So. 2d 41 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
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stock that later became the subject of litigation.423 The client filed the
malpractice suit within two years of the settlement of the litigation with the
third party.424 In reversing a summary judgment in favor of the attorneys, the
court stated:
The existence of legal malpractice is often difficult to ascertain. A
client should not be placed in the position of having to file a poten-
tially baseless claim prematurely fearing that otherwise an action
will be precluded by the statute of limitations. Thus we hold that a
cause of action for legal malpractice based upon a prior transaction
accrues at the conclusion of subsequent litigation between the cli-
ent and a third party.425
Taracido was accepted for review by the Supreme Court of Florida due
426to conflict with Edwards v. Ford, although Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.
42702
v. Lane found Edwards to be "clearly distinguishable. 428 In Edwards, the
law firm had drafted a contract for its clients and a third party that was later
asserted by the third party to be usurious. 429 The drafter allegedly agreed on
behalf of the law firm, sometime during 1963, to undertake corrective
measures without charge.430 The client filed the malpractice suit in 1968, in
response to a suit by the law firm, to recover its unpaid attorneys fees.4 3'
The client was unsuccessful as a result of the court's holding that the statute
432of limitations had expired. 3 The Edwards court quoted at length from the
case of Downing v. Vaine,433 in holding that "the event which triggers the
running of the statute of limitations is notice to or knowledge by the injured
party that a cause of action has accrued in his favor, and not the date on
which the negligent act which caused the damages was actually commit-
ted.' 4 3  The damages incurred in Edwards were only minimal at the time
their cause of action accrued.435
423. Id. at 42.
424. Id.
425. Id. at 43 (citations omitted).
426. 279 So. 2d 851 (Fla. 1973).
427. 565 So. 2d 1323 (Fla. 1990).
428. Id. at 1327.
429. Edwards, 279 So. 2d at 851.
430. Id.
431. Id. at 852.
432. Id.
433. 228 So. 2d 622 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
434. Edwards, 279 So. 2d at 853; see Zakak v. Broida & Napier, P.A., 545 So. 2d 380
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989); Diaz v. Piquette, 496 So. 2d 239, 240 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
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The Supreme Court of Florida in Perez-Abreu, Zamora & De La Fe,
P.A. v. Taracido43 approved the Third District Court of Appeal's decision
and receded from Edwards.437
Consistent with Peat, Marwick, we hold that, in the circumstances
presented here, a negligence/malpractice cause of action accrues
when the client incurs damages at the conclusion of the related or
underlying judicial proceedings or, if there are no related or under-
lying judicial proceedings, when the client's right to sue in the re-
lated or underlying proceeding expires. If a negligence/malpractice
action is filed prior to the time that a client's right to sue in the re-
lated or underlying judicial proceeding has expired, or if a negli-
gence/malpractice action is filed during the time that a related or
underlying judicial proceeding is ongoing, then the defense can
move for an abatement or stay of the claim on the ground that the
negligence/malpractice action has not yet accrued. The moving
party will have the burden of demonstrating that the related or un-
derlying judicial proceeding will determine whether damages were
incurred which are causally related to the alleged negli-
gence/malpractice. The determination of this will be for the trial
court. Similarly, if a party raises an affirmative defense that a neg-
ligence/malpractice action has expired, the party bringing the ac-
tion may file a reply asserting the avoidance of the statute of limita-
tions due to a related or underlying judicial proceeding.438
The court in Taracido held that "even though the related or underlying
judicial proceeding was not complete until 1967, the cause of action accrued
in 1963, and therefore the statute of limitations began to run at that time.,
439
The Supreme Court of Florida tied together the previous three most
significant cases dealing with the statute of limitations by stating,
"[m]oreover, this Court's decisions in Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. v.
Lane, Silvestrone v. Edell, and Blumberg were intended to: (1) provide
certainty and reduce litigation over when the statute starts to run and (2)
1986); Richards Enter., Inc. v. Swofford, 495 So. 2d 1210, 1212 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1986), cause dismissed, 515 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1987).
435. Edwards, 279 So. 2d at 853.
436. 790 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. 2001).
437. Id.
438. Id. at 1054 (citing Blumberg v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 790 So. 2d 1061, 1065 (Fla.
2001)).
439. Taracido, 790 So. 2d at 1054.
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prevent clients from having to take directly contrary positions in the two
actions. ' 'm °
4. Resurrecting, Delaying, & Tolling the Statute of Limitations
The appellate courts have disagreed as to whether an otherwise time-
barred action for legal malpractice may be resurrected as a counterclaim to
an action by the attorney against the former client to collect attorneys fees.
The First District Court of Appeal allowed affirmative relief against the
attorney in the guise of recoupment in Cherney v. Moody.44 ' However, in
non-legal malpractice cases, two other decisions only allow recoupment to
be used defensively as a set off rather than offensively as a counter claim. 442
An attorney who misleads his client as to his ability to cure a known
problem may also extend the time period in which a lawsuit may be brought.
In Burnside v. McCrary,"3 the attorney reassured the client that the attorn
could cure the dismissal of the client's cause of action by filing motions.
The court found that the claim of the attorney's reassurances was sufficient
to create an issue of material fact as to whether the malpractice action had
yet accrued.44 5 No such question as to the accrual of the cause of action was
evident in Howard v. Minnesota Muskies, Inc.446 Several years before he
filed the malpractice suit, the client learned that a judgment had been entered
against him allegedly because of his attorney's withdrawal from the case
without the client's knowledge or consent. " 7 The appellate court affirmed
the summary judgment in favor of the attorney."8
In a legal malpractice case, the statute of limitations does not
commence until after the attorney no longer represents the aggrieved client.
In Wilder v. Meyer,449 the court explained Florida's continuing representa-
tion doctrine:
440. Id. (internal citations omitted).
441. 413 So. 2d 866, 869 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
442. Allie v. Ionata, 503 So. 2d 1237, 1242 (Fla. 1987) (stating no affirmative right of
recovery, whether by recoupment or setoff, once it is barred by statute of limitations); Horace
Mann Ins. Co. v. DeMirza, 312 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
443. 382 So. 2d 75 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
444. Id.
445. Id. at 76; accord Smith v. Hussey, 363 So. 2d 1138 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
446. 420 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
447. Id. at 653.
448. Id.
449. 779 F. Supp. 164 (S.D. Fla. 1991).
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The Plaintiffs negligence and breach of fiduciary duty claims are
governed by a two-year statute of limitations applicable to profes-
sional malpractice claims. This two-year statute of limitations be-
gins to run from the date the cause of action is discovered or should
have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence.
However, this two-year statute of limitations is subject to the con-
tinuing representation doctrine. The continuing representation tolls
the statute of limitations as long as the attorney continues to repre-
sent the client.450
The Second District has confirmed the federal district court's
understanding of Florida law: "we note that in Florida the statute of
limitations for legal malpractice generally does not begin to run while the
attorney continues to represent the client."
45
'
"The continuing representation [doctrine] tolls the statute of limitations
as long as the attorney continues to represent the client. 4 52 The attorney-
defendant in Wilder provided advice on tax issues through the date of filing
suit.453 Therefore, the suit was timely filed.454 The impact of Silvestrone v.
Edell,455 holding that a litigation legal malpractice case must be commenced
within two years of the judgment becoming final, upon the continuous
.... 456
representation doctrine, is uncertain. It is unclear if the statute of
limitations is to be extended if an attorney were to continue to represent the
client more than two years after the final judgment becomes final.
The issue for determination in Garrido v. Markus, Winter & Spitale
Law Firm,457 was "whether the amended complaint relates back to the
original complaint so as to toll the statute of limitations. 458 The former
client sought to amend the legal malpractice complaint to add individual
partners of a law partnership after the statute of limitations had expired
against the individual partners.459 In finding that the statute of limitations
450. Id. at 169 (quoting Bimholz v. Blake, 399 So. 2d 375 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1981) (citations omitted)).
451. Abbott v. Friedsam, 682 So. 2d 597, 599 n. 1 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
452. Wilder, 779 F. Supp. at 169 (quoting Birnholz, 399 So. 2d at 375).
453. Id.
454. Id.
455. 721 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. 1998).
456. Id. at 1175.
457. 358 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
458. Id. at 579.
459. Id. at 578.
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barred the addition of the individual partners, the court stated that the
general rule for "relation back" of party defendants as follows:
"Corporations, partnerships, associations or individuals. Gener-
ally, whether an aniendmentof process or pleading, or both, will be
allowed which changes the description or characterization of a
party after the statute of limitations has run, from a corporation to
an individual, partnership, or other association, or vice versa,
seems to depend upon whether the misdescription or mischaracteri-
zation is interpreted as merely a misnomer or defect in the descrip-
tion or characterization, or whether it is deemed a substitution or
entire change of parties; in the former case an amendment will be
held to relate back to the commencement of the action, while in the
latter the amendment will be held to amount to the institution of a
new action. ' ' N
The court noted "a total absence of covert behavior" on the part of the
lawyers as to who the proper parties were and implied that such conduct
would have altered the result in the case.46' Under any circumstances, "[i]f
the face of the complaint does not show the cause is time barred, but the
defendant wishes to challenge the suit on that basis, the defendant must raise
the affirmative defense of statute of limitations in his answer.
4 62
5. The Premature Legal Malpractice Suit
The premature filing of a legal malpractice suit occurred in Zuckerman
v. Ruden, Barnett, McCloskey, Smith, Schuster & Russell, P.A.4 3 The law
firm had prepared a mortgage on which the client had to foreclose.4
However, the borrower contested the validity of the mortgage because the
property was homestead property and the wife did not join in the mort-
gage.46' The foreclosure proceeding was ongoing when the client filed a
legal malpractice suit.4 The appellate court reversed a summary judgment
460. Id. at 581 (quoting 51 AM. JUR. 2D Limitation ofActions § 295 (1970)).
461. Id. at 580.
462. Jelenc v. Draper, 678 So. 2d 917, 919 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (citations
omitted).
463. 670 So. 2d 1050 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
464. Id. at 1051.
465. Id.
466. Id.
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in favor of the attorneys premised upon the client's knowledge of the
potential defect more than two years before suit was filed.4 7
Here, unless Zuckerman is unable to foreclose on the mortgage, he
will not have suffered damages proximately caused by Ruden Bar-
nett's alleged failure to obtain the wife's signature on the mortgage.
Only when the foreclosure action has been entirely resolved will
468the statute of limitations on the malpractice action begin to run.
The filing of a legal malpractice suit was also found to be premature in
Bierman v. Miller,469 resulting in a stay until the underlying federal case was
finalized. 470 Miller sued his former lawyer, Bierman, during the pendency of
a lawsuit brought against Miller by a corporation with whom he had entered
into a severance agreement containing a covenant not to sue.471 The
corporation claimed the severance agreement was unenforceable because of
Miller's fraud, which induced the corporation to sign the severance
472
agreement. The viability of the severance agreement had not been
determined at the time Miller brought suit against his former attorney in
which he claimed that Bierman's negligence in drafting the severance
agreement permitted the corporation to sue him resulting in considerable
attorneys fees. 473 "Until the validity of the agreement is decided in federal
court there can be no determination in the malpractice action as to whether
Bierman was negligent in negotiating and drafting that agreement. 474 In
Greenberg, Traurig, Hoffman, Lipoff, Rosen & Quentel, P.A., v. Sun NLF
Ltd. , the client was also deemed to have been premature in having a stay
lifted prior to the resolution of the pending unjust enrichment action upon
476which the malpractice was based.
When there is a concern about the expiration of a statute of limitations,
a practical safety net is to enter into a tolling agreement with the potentially
467. Id.
468. Zuckerman, 670 So. 2d at 1051 (citations omitted).
469. 639 So. 2d 627 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994). See also Miller v. Lindback Constr.
Corp., 782 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (legal malpractice action severed and
abated, determination of redressable harm was premature).
470. Bierman v. Miller, 639 So. 2d 627, 628 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
471. Id. at 627.
472. Id. at 628.
473. Id.
474. Id.
475. 719 So. 2d 1029 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
476. Id.
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culpable attorney in which the parties agree that the statute of limitations
will not commence until a certain date. Alternatively, as suggested in
Birnholz v. Blake,477 the malpractice action can be stayed pending a
resolution of the claim giving rise to the malpractice action. 478 Dismissing
the malpractice complaint until the underlying case is resolved was found to
be an error in Bartlett v. Bennett.
479
E. Abandonment
"The circumstances in which a client's subsequent actions constitute an
abandonment of a legal malpractice claim, as a matter of law, are very
narrow. '' 8° A summary judgment in favor of an attorney was overturned in
Lenahan v. Russell L. Forkey, P.A., holding that the dismissal of a lawsuit in
Virginia did not preclude a malpractice suit in Florida.48' However, the
court stated that if proof of the viability of the Virginia lawsuit, independent
of the actions of the attorney in Florida, were sufficiently established, then
"the voluntary dismissal of the Virginia lawsuit may very well constitute an
intervening superseding cause.,
482
Abandonment can occur when the client settles the underlying action
while the malpractice action is pending. In Pennsylvania Insurance
483Guarantee Ass'n v. Sikes, an insurance company, which hired an attorney
to defend a client in a personal injury case, sued the attorney that it had hired
for malpractice, and then settled the personal injury case rather than appeal a
loss deemed to have been caused by judicial error, which "in all likelihood"
would have been corrected on appeal.484  Accordingly, the summary
judgment in favor of the attorney was affirmed. 485 "We hold, on the facts of
this case, that the settlement of the underlying personal injury case, while the
477. 399 So. 2d 375 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
478. A judicial stay was imposed upon the legal malpractice claims in Watts v. Buck
because the right to maintain the suit was suspended due to the plaintiffs status as a felon.
454 So. 2d 1079 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
479. 360 So. 2d 1144 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
480. Lenahan v. Russell L. Forkey, P.A., 702 So. 2d 610, 611 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1997).
481. Id. at 612.
482. Id.
483. 590 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991). Accord Bradley v. Davis, 777 So.
2d 1189 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
484. Sikes, 590 So. 2d at 1053.
485. Id.
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appeal was pending, constituted an abandonment of any claim that PIGA's
loss resulted from legal malpractice rather than judicial error., 4s6
Although not cited in Sikes, the Third District dealt with a similar issue
487two years before in Oteiza v. Braxton. Oteiza involved a summary
judgment in favor of an attorney who had been sued by his former doctor
client for failing to perfect an appeal of a final order by the Board of Medical
488Examiners. The standard for not timely filing an appeal was explained as
follows:
In order to recover damages for legal malpractice, a party who has
been denied his right to appeal due to an attorney's failure to timely
file a petition for review to the appropriate court must show that
but for the attorney's negligence, the appeal most probably would
have been successful.4 9
After examining what would have been the appellate issue, the Oteiza court
reversed the summary judgment holding that "but for the attorney's
negligence, the appeal most probably would have been successful. ' '490
The Third District, in Segall v. Segall,491 helped to clarify when a client
must file an appeal in order to perfect a later malpractice case, but it did not
adopt a bright line test.
Our cases should not be read to require every party who suffers a
loss and attributes that loss to legal malpractice to obtain a final
appellate determination of the underlying case before asserting a
claim for legal malpractice. The test for determining when a cause
of action for attorney malpractice arises remains when "the exist-
ence of redressable harm has been established." Diaz v. Piquete,
496 So.2d 239, 240 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), rev. denied, 506 So.2d
1042 (Fla. 1987). In some cases, redressable harm caused by errors
in the course of litigation can only be determined upon completion
of the appellate process. See Sikes, 590 So.2d at 1053. In other
cases, the failure to obtain appellate review should not bar an ac-
tion for malpractice. See, e.g., Zitrin, 621 So.2d 748 (where attor-
ney failed to include requested provisions in employment contract,
malpractice plaintiff not required to confirm attorney's error on ap-
486. Id.
487. 547 So. 2d 948 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
488. Id. at 949.
489. Id. (citations omitted).
490. Id. at 950.
491. 632 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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peal); Breakers of Fort Lauderdale, Ltd. v. Cassel, 528 So.2d 985
(Fla. 3d DCA 1988)(when attorney improperly failed to consum-
mate settlement of lawsuit, cause of action for legal malpractice ac-
crued when client learned that lawsuit was revived). We are unable
to establish a bright-line rule that complete appellate review of the
underlying litigation is a condition precedent to every legal mal-
practice action. To do so would, in many cases, violate the tenet
that the law will not require the performance of useless acts.492
Segall was somewhat unusual in that the court dismissed the appeal of
the underlying jury verdict for the plaintiff's failure to comply with
discovery orders.493  The deemed waiver of the malpractice case was
predicated upon the conduct that led to the appeal being dismissed which
"foreclosed any determination that judicial error rather than attorney
malpractice caused their loss in the underlying litigation.
' 494
The abandonment defense was narrowly construed in Parker v. Graham
& James.495 The malpractice plaintiffs had retained Graham & James to
prosecute a federal suit for crop loss. The verdict form in the federal suit
required the jury to itemize the damages under theories of contract,
negligence, and strict liability. The jury awarded $50,000 on the contract and
negligence theories and $6,800,000 on strict liability. The Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals remanded for a new trial on damages because of the
discrepancies in the verdict.496 The plaintiffs discharged Graham & Jones
and settled for $4,000,000. The clients sued Graham & Jones for malprac-
tice and sought damages for the attorneys' failure to submit a general verdict
form that requested a single damage amount on all three theories and for
failure to seek prejudgment interest. The trial court dismissed the case with
prejudice on the notion that the plaintiffs had abandoned their legal
malpractice suit when they settled the underlying case.
The Third District reversed the trial court since "the settlement did not
thwart any review process which could have cured the malpractice ....
After issuance of the Overseas Private Investment opinion, anything further
that plaintiffs could have done would only have served to mitigate their
damages. 497 Only considerations of appeal were viewed in this abandon-
492. Id. at 78.
493. Segall v. Downtown Assocs., 546 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
494. Segall, 632 So. 2d at 78.
495. 715 So. 2d 1047 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
496. See Overseas Private Inv. Corp. v. Metro. Dade County, 47 F.3d 1111 (11th Cir.
1995).
497. Parker, 715 So. 2d at 1048.
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ment analysis. The plaintiffs were not required to retry the case and obtain
the same, or even a larger verdict, than the first trial in order to avoid the
abandonment defense. Seemingly, the attorney-defendants would be able to
claim that no damages would have been suffered if a second trial had
occurred.
The directed verdict, based upon the abandonment defense, was
reversed in favor of the law firm in Hunzinger Construction Corp. v.
Quarles & Brady.498 Before an appeal was completed, Hunzinger settled the
underlying case in which the trial court held that a mechanic's lien was filed
late. During the malpractice case, the attorneys argued that the client could
not proceed on a malpractice claim because Hunzinger had not completed
the appeal. However, the client was successful because the appellate court
could not "say, as the court could in Sikes, that the mistake in the original
proceedings would 'in all likelihood' have been corrected on appeal.
In Eastman v. Flor-Ohio, Ltd.,500 the law firm urged the court to expand
the abandonment defense to require the filing and prosecution of an appeal
before filing a legal malpractice case based upon negligence occurring in the
underlying case. The following three policy reasons were set forth for not
extending the abandonment theory as requested:
Perhaps the least compelling reason is the negative effect such a
ruling would have on the work load of the appellate courts ....
[S]uch a ruling would also discourage parties from settling pending
appeals and would be inconsistent with the party's legal duty to
mitigate their damages .... A more important reason is that such a
ruling would require litigants to spend yet more of their resources
prosecuting an appeal to judicial conclusion even though they may
disagree with the theory of the appeal they would be required to
maintain. 5
0
IX. COLLECrBIlTY
The collectibility of the judgment that would have been recovered in the
underlying action may be an issue depending upon the circumstances. The
498. 735 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 4th Dist Ct. App. 1999). See also Coble v. Aronson, 647 So.
2d 968 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (reversing summary judgment since malpractice cause of
action was not eliminated by settlement of related lawsuit against third party).
499. Hunzinger Constr. Corp., 735 So. 2d at 595.
500. 744 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
501. Id. at 504.
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attorney who filed suit in Fernandes v. Barrs5°2 failed to do so in a timely
fashion against Lake Community College for personal injuries Sustained by
his client at the college campus. After an award of $398,670 rendered at the
conclusion of a bench trial, the attorney appealed claiming, in part, that
damages were limited by section 768.28 of the Florida Statutes, which caps
damages against state agencies at $100,000. The court indicated the "general
rule is that the client/plaintiff in a legal malpractice action must prove both
that a favorable result would have been achieved in the underlying litigation
but for the negligence of the attorney/defendant and that any judgment which
could have been recovered would have been collectible. 50 3  The policy
reason for this general rule is to prevent "a windfall to the client by
preventing him from recovering more from the attorney than he could have
actually obtained from the tortfeasor in the underlying action.
"The plaintiff may ordinarily satisfy this burden with evidence of the
original tortfeasor's financial status, insurance coverage, property owner-
ship, and so forth if such evidence can be obtained.",595 If such evidence
cannot be obtained because the negligence of the attorney makes it
impossible, then the burden shifts to the attorney to prove that the judgment
or any portion thereof was uncollectible.
X. IMMUNITY
In some situations, an attorney is immune to a malpractice suit by his
client. This is exemplified where an attorney represents the Department of
Revenue as a program attorney in child support proceedings and where an
attorney represents union members at the behest of a labor union. Mensh
and Macintosh, P.A. represented the Department of Revenue as program
attorneys in a child support proceeding for Donna Hand.5° Hand later sued
the law firm for malpractice in a complaint that alleged "many facts which
would be sufficient to support an action for negligence. 50 7 The case was
502. 641 So. 2d 1371 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994) disapproved by Chandris, S.A. v.
Yanakakis, 668 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1995).
503. Id. at 1375 (citing Hand v. Hustad, 440 So. 2d 518 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1983))
(reversing directed verdict in favor of defendant-attorney because plaintiff had offered
sufficient evidence of collectibility to present a jury question).
504. Id. at 1376.
505. Id.
506. Hand v. Mensh & Macintosh, P.A., 718 So. 2d 234 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
507. Id. at 235.
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dismissed with prejudice because of the immunity provisions set forth in
section 409.2564(6) of the Florida Statutes, which provides:
The department and its officers, employees, and agents and all per-
sons and agencies acting pursuant to contract with the department
are immune from liability in tort for actions taken to establish, en-
force, or modify support obligations if such actions are taken in
good faith, with apparent legal authority, without malicious pur-
pose, and in a manner not exhibiting wanton and willful disregard
of rights or property of another.
508
Donna Hand represented herself in the proceeding against her former
attorneys.5 9 She informed the trial judge that she was unable to amend her
complaint to avoid statutory immunity.5 0 This fact undoubtedly influenced
both the trial judge and appellate court in not allowing the complaint to be
further amended.
A Dade County School Board employee was denied the opportunity to
sue her attorney who represented her on behalf of the United Teachers of
Dade in an administrative dismissal proceeding in Stafford v. Meek.5 1 The
Stafford court cited to DeGrio v. American Federation of Government
Employees1 2 for the following proposition that "attorneys may not be held
individually liable for their malpractice in representing union members
where the union provides the attorneys' services as part of its duty of fair
representation to an employee in a grievance or termination proceeding. 51 3
Although the Stafford court acknowledged that the DeGrio court's language
was dicta, it provided the weight of persuasive authority in affirming a final
judgment in favor of the attorney. 514
The public defender has not escaped liability for malpractice under the
doctrine of judicial immunity. As stated in Windsor v. Gibson:515
Considerations which require that a judge and prosecutor be im-
mune from liability for the exercise of duties essential to the ad-
ministration of justice, do not require that the same immunity be
508. FLA. STAT. § 409.2564(6) (1995).
509. Hand, 718 So, 2d at 235.
510. Id.
511. 762 So. 2d 925 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
512. 484 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1986).
513. Stafford, 762 So. 2d at 926.
514. Id.
515. 424 So. 2d 888 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
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extended to the public defender. While the prosecutor is an officer
of the state whose duty it is to see that impartial justice is done, the
public defender is an advocate, who once appointed owes a duty
only to his client, the indigent defendant. His role does not differ
from that of privately retained counsel. 516
The Third District Court of Appeal, in Wilcox v. Brummer,51 7 quoted the
above language from Windsor and also held that the public defender's
exposure for malpractice is equal to that of private counsel. Both of the
courts' certified questions to the Supreme Court of Florida, concerning
whether a public defender is shielded from liability due to judicial immunity,
went unanswered.
XI. DAMAGES
A. Attorneys' Fees
In Florida, absent a contractual or statutory basis, attorneys' fees are not
compensable.518 However, if a client sues a third party to recover a portion
of the damages caused by the negligent attorney, the attorney's fees incurred
in suing the third party may be recovered pursuant to the Wrongful Act
Doctrine,51 9 which provides as follows:
One who through the tort of another has been required to act in the
protection of his interests by bringing or defending an action
against a third person is entitled to recover reasonable compensa-
tion for loss of time, attorney's fees and other expenditures thereby
suffered or incurred in the earlier action. 2°
The client in De Pantosa Saenz v. Rigau & Rigau, P.A. 52' alleged that
without her authorization, her attorney filled in a blank deed that she signed
at his request with the name of his mother-in-law in return for the mother-in-
516. d. at 889.
517. 739 So. 2d 1282 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
518. See generally Florida Patient's Comp. Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145, 1148 (Fla.
1985).
519. See State Farm v. Pritcher, 546 So. 2d 1060 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (stating
an attorney is not entitled to fees under the "wrongful act doctrine" against third party after
client dismissed malpractice action).
520. RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFTORTS § 914(2) (1977).
521. 549 So. 2d 682 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
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law's assumption of a mortgage. 522 The mother-in-law agreed to rescind the
transaction after reimbursement of her investment in the property.523 The
Second District permitted a claim for attorney's fees in the malpractice suit
for the attorney's fees incurred in the litigation against the mother-in-law.524
"Typically, a plaintiff has the right to recover attorneys' fees incurred in
litigation with a third party, as an element of compensatory damages, if that
litigation was caused by the defendant's breach of contract or wrongful
act.
, 525
In Espinosa v. Sparber, Shevin, Shapo, Rosen & Heilbronner, 6 the
court dismissed the complaint with prejudice for failure (and inability) to
plead the necessary privity requirement. The Third District Court of Appeal
affirmed, stating that the pretermitted heir could not maintain the malprac-
tice action; however, the court reversed as to the Estate.527 The appellate
court held that the law firm was responsible to the Estate for the costs of
defending the pretermitted heir's lawsuit holding that:
Clearly, the testator's estate should be entitled to a return of the at-
torney's fee paid by the testator to the lawyer, as well as any costs
and fees incurred in defending the estate against any action gener-
ated by the lawyer's negligence, such as an action brought by the
omitted beneficiary to receive a share of the estate.528
B. Prejudgment Interest
A malpractice plaintiff is entitled to prejudgment interest from the date
of loss. Since the amount of damages was disputed and there was no date
certain upon which such damages were owed, the First District Court of
Appeal upheld a trial court ruling denying prejudgment interest in Chadwick529
v. Corbin. The requirements for prejudgment interest were satisfied in
deManio v. Burns.53 ° "[Wihen a verdict liquidates damages on a plaintiffs
out-of-pocket, pecuniary losses, [the] plaintiff is entitled, as a matter of law,
522. Id. at 685.
523. Id.
524. Id.
525. De Pantosa Saenz, 549 So. 2d at 685.
526. 586 So. 2d 1221 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991), approved by Espinosa v. Sparber,
Shevin, 612 So. 2d 1378 (Fla. 1993).
527. Espinosa, 586 So. 2d at 1224-25.
528. Id. at 1223-24 (citations omitted).
529. 476 So. 2d 1366, 1368-69 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
530. 642 So. 2d 807 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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to prejudgment interest at the statutory rate from the date of that lOSS. ' ' 53"
The verdict in deManio awarded pecuniary losses as of a certain date.532
Therefore, the court awarded prejudgment interest. 533  The court also
awarded prejudgment interest in Fisher v. Ackerman534 and Tarleton v.
Arnstein & Lehr,535 since the jury awards had the effect of liquidating
damages as of a certain date.
C. Punitive Damages
An attorney who gives improper or erroneous advice to a client who
suffers damage as a result may be subject to a malpractice action for
compensatory damages. However, such negligence, if it exists, and even if
gross, does not warrant an award of punitive damages absent the necessary
allegations and proof of wantonness or reckless indifference.536 The fact
that an attorney who allegedly gave bad advice had listed his name with a
lawyer referral service as being proficient in that particular field of law, by
itself, does not rise to the level of wantonness or reckless indifference
required for punitive damages. 537 Similarly, an attorney's failure to file a
security interest with the Secretary of State was not sufficient to warrant
punitive damages in Chadwick v. Corbin.
53s
Another Florida case involving legal malpractice and punitive damages
is De Pantosa Saenz v. Rigau & Rigau, P.A.539 The former client sought
punitive damages, alleging fraud in the sale of certain real estate.54° The
Court stated, "[mioreover, the plaintiff seeks punitive damages against Mr.
Rigau. Assuming the plaintiff can establish facts warranting punitive
531. Id. (citing Argonaut Ins. Co. v. May Plumbing Co., 474 So. 2d 212,- 215 (Fla.
1985)).
532. deManio, 642 So. 2d at 807.
533. See also Gomez v. Hawkins Concrete Constr. Co., 623 F. Supp. 194 (N.D. Fla.
1985).
534. 744 So. 2d 582 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
535. 719 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
536. De Pantosa Saenz v. Rigau & Rigau, P.A., 549 So. 2d 682 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1989); Solodky v. Wilson, 474 So. 2d 1231, 1233 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985); see also
DeToro v. Dervan Investments Ltd. Corp., 483 So. 2d 717 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985)
(allowing evidence of punitive damages to be introduced against an attorney in a breach of
fiduciary duty lawsuit).
537. Solodky, 474 So. 2d at 1232.
538. 476 So. 2d 1366, 1367-68 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
539. 549 So. 2d 682 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
540. Id. at 684.
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damages, the previously received remedy of rescission would not bar an
additional award of punitive damages. 54'
Punitive damages were awarded against the attorneys in Stinson v.
Feminist Women's Health Center, Inc. The Court found that the trial
judge properly awarded punitive damages since the lawyers' behavior was
"egregious," "self-serving," and "unconscionable.3 The attorney's conduct
in Medel v. Republic National Bank of Miami544 was determined to be an
issue for trial rather than summary judgment.
Applying Florida law, federal courts have also found punitive damages
against attorneys to be warranted . 5 Florida law is clear: under appropriate
circumstances punitive damages can be awarded against an attorney in a
malpractice proceeding.
XII. ATrORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
Communications between attorneys and their clients are generally
protected from discovery. 4  However, there are at least three exceptions to
the attorney-client privilege that are relevant to a malpractice action: (1) the
defense exception, (2) the common interest exception, and (3) the fraud
exception. The defense exception to the attorney-client privilege found in
section 90.502(4)(c) of the Florida Statutes, provides "[t]here is no lawyer-
client privilege under this section when... [a] communication is relevant to
an issue of breach of duty by the lawyer to the client or by the client to the
lawyer, arising from the lawyer-client relationship.7
541. Id. at 685.
542. 416 So. 2d 1183, 1185 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
543. Id.
544. 365 So. 2d 782, 784-85 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
545. See, e.g., Singleton v. Foreman, 435 F.2d 962, 971 (5th Cir. 1970) (holding "that
Foreman's alleged conduct was sufficient to state an independent tort action, and, since that
alleged conduct was both oppressive and showed such a great indifference to the persons and
property rights of others, malice may be imputed, thus justifying punitive damages"); Gay v.
McCaughan, 272 F.2d 160, 162 (5th Cir. 1959) (holding that the action of the attorney would
form the basis on which a jury could award punitive damages).
546. Documents not related to any pending claim, defense, or that are not reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, as in all litigation, are also
protected. See Richard Mulholland & Assocs. v. Polverari, 698 So. 2d 1269, 1270 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
547. FLA. STAT. § 90.502 (4)(c) (2001).
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Exceptions to the attorney-client privilege have been interpreted very
narrowly.548  The case of Shafnaker v. Clayton549 is particularly illustra-
tive.55 ° In Shafnaker, the clients claimed the second law firm, which
represented them in a case involving a lawsuit against Orkin for negligent
application of hazardous chemicals, committed malpractice. 55' The
defendant law firm in the malpractice proceeding sought production of
552documents from the first law firm that had represented the clients. The
court held that the documents maintained by the first law firm were not
discoverable. 553  The law firm in Shafnaker claimed that the privileged
information was vital to their defense. The First District Court of Appeal
was not impressed with this argument and stated that the "mere possibility
that petitioners may not have been fully candid with respondents does not
constitute a waiver of attorney-client privilege with other attorneys. 555
However, if a party has introduced issues in the litigation that go to the very
heart of the litigation, discovery cannot be avoided because of the attorney-
client privilege.
548. Courville v. Promedco of S.W. Fla., Inc., 743 So. 2d 41, 42-43 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1999) (waiving the attorney-client privilege is limited to communications on the same
matter); see also Reed v. State, 640 So. 2d 1094, 1097-98 (Fla. 1994) (waiving privilege only
as to matters specifically at issue in court action); Del Prado v. Robert K. Estes, P.A., 532 So.
2d 1101, 1101 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (lacking any basis to claim privilege as to
requested documents for matter allegedly mishandled); Procacci v. Seitlin, 497 So. 2d 969,
969-70 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (finding that exception applies only to a particular
transaction which resulted in malpractice and not to any other aspect of the attorney-client
relationship).
549. 680 So. 2d 1109, 1110-11 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
550. See also Adelman v. Adelman, 561 So. 2d 671, 673 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990)
(holding that an ex-lawyer may only reveal confidential information necessary to defend
against malpractice claim).
551. Shafnaker, 680 So. 2d at 1110.
552. Id.
553. Id.
554. Id.
555. Id. at 1111 (citing Cuillo v. Cuillo, 621 So. 2d 460, 462 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1993)) (holding that the occurrence of privileged communications regarding a specific
transaction, which is later litigated, does not eliminate the privilege, even if there is a
possibility that the credibility of a party could be impeached by such communications); Long
v. Murphy, 663 So. 2d 1370, 1372 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that proof of
privileged communications to dispute reasonable reliance may well be relevant to the defense,
but that alone does not waive the privilege).
556. First S. Baptist of Mandarin, Fla., Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 610 So. 2d 452, 454
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
149
: Nova Law Review 27, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 2002
Trazenfeld
The Shafnaker decision was cited with approval in both Coyne v.
Schwartz, Gold, Cohen, Zakarin & Kotler, P.A. and Volpe v. Conroy,
Simberg & Ganon, P.A. 58 In both cases, decided less than one month apart,
certiorari review was sought of trial court orders seeking production of
communications between the plaintiffs and attorneys who were not
defendants in the malpractice proceeding.559 The defendant lawyers' claim
that communications with other lawyers were critical to the defense of the
plaintiffs' allegations did not override the attorney-client privilege. 560 "The
attorney-client privilege cannot be set aside simply because the opposing
party claims that the information held by the attorney is necessary to prove
the opposing party's case."56'
Interestingly, the clients obtained different relief in Volpe and Coyne.
In Coyne, the court remanded the case with instructions for the trial court to
hold an in camera inspection to determine the applicability of the privi-
562 563lege. The Volpe court merely quashed the trial court's order. The relief
afforded in Volpe seems more logical and promotes closure on the issue.
The Second District Court of Appeal in Barnett Banks Trust Co. v.
Compson564 was required to answer the question of "whether a trust
beneficiary who litigates a position adverse to the trust may obtain from the
trustee materials ordinarily protected by the attorney-client privilege and
work product doctrine. 565 The court responded negatively to the inquiry.56
The court found that the attorney-client privilege is paramount to section
737.303(3) of the Florida Statutes, which requires a trustee to provide any
vested beneficiary with relevant information about the assets of a trust
567
relating to administration. 56
The attorney in Ferrari v. Vining wanted to take the deposition in the
malpractice lawsuit of the prior counsel in the underlying action. 569  The
557. 715 So. 2d 1021, 1023 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
558. 720 So. 2d 537, 539 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
559. Coyne, 715 So. 2d at 1021; Volpe, 720 So. 2d at 538.
560. Id.
561. Volpe, 720 So. 2d at 539-40.
562. Coyne, 715 So. 2d at 1023.
563. Volpe, 720 So. 2d at 540.
564. 629 So. 2d 849 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
565. Id. at 849.
566. Id.
567. Id. at 851.
568. 744 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
569. Id. at 480-81.
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trial court allowed the discovery.570 In overturning the trial court's decision,
the Third District Court of Appeal cited to Adelman v. Adelman,57' and
stated:
Adelman supports the proposition that the attorney-client privilege
between Ferrari and Vining as to what they discussed pertinent to
the issue of Vining's alleged malpractice could be reached. That
does not mean the court could order the deposition and violation of
attorney-client privilege as to other counsel with whom Ferrari dis-
cussed Vining's performance.
572
The court in Ferrari went on to limit the client's waiver of the attorney-
client privilege to "confidential information relating to his representation
only to the extent necessary to defend himself.5 73 Therefore, an attorney
cannot disclose everything about the attorney-client relationship; he may
only respond to specific allegations.574
The common interest exception to the attorney-client privilege found in
section 90.502(4)(e) of the Florida Statutes reads as follows:
A communication is relevant to a matter of common interest be-
tween two or more clients, or their successors in interest, if the
communication was made by any of them to a lawyer retained or
consulted in common when offered in a civil action between the
clients or their successors in interest.
575
This "common interest exception" was examined in Cone v. Culver-
576house. The court held that the prism through which this exception must be
examined is "from the perspective of an objectively reasonable client, not
from a particular client's subjective expectations or from the attorney's
perspective. ' 5 " The client who sued her attorneys for negligence and
intentional infliction of emotional distress in Richard Mulholland and
Associates v. Polverari57s requested production of every "'authority to
represent"' agreement between the law firm and its clients for a five-year
570. Id. at 481.
571. 561 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
572. Ferrari, 744 So. 2d at 481-82.
573. Id. at 482.
574. See id. at 481-82.
575. FLA. STAT. § 90.502(4)(e) (2001).
576. 687 So. 2d 888, 891 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
577. Id. at 892.
578. 698 So. 2d 1269 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
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period. 579 The court issued a protective order in favor of the law firm since
the "representation agreements between... [the attorneys] and their other
clients are not related to any pending claim or defense, nor was the
information shown to be reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence.580
Finally, the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege was at
issue in State v. Marks.58' The court indicated that "the 'crime fraud'
exception to the attorney-client privilege is simply a shorthand expression
recognizing that the privilege may not be used to protect communications
with a lawyer for the purpose of receiving advice for the commission of a
future criminal fraud. 5 a  Once the privilege is asserted, "the state must
make an evidentiary showing plausibly implicating the possible application
of the exception." 5 3 The "party invoking [the] privilege has absolute right
to be heard by testimony and argument.",5  The criminal charges against the
attorneys in the case were dismissed because of ex parte communications
585between the prosecutor and the judge.
XIII. ACTION NOT ASSIGNABLE
A legal malpractice action is not assignable. The assignability of a
legal malpractice action in Florida was first raised in Washington v.
Fireman's Fund Insurance Co.586 The Washington court as a matter of
public policy agreed with the "majority of jurisdictions [which] prohibit the
assignment of such actions because of the personal nature of legal services
which involve highly confidential relationships. 5 87 .The Washington case
was cited with approval, but little discussion, in Mickler v. Aaron588 and
589Kozich v. Shahady. The Supreme Court of Florida delved into the
reasoning behind the prohibition of assigning a cause of action for legal
malpractice in responding to a certified question regarding the assignability
579. Id. at 1270.
580. Id.
581. 758 So. 2d 1131, 1132 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
582. Marks, 758 So. 2d at 1133 n.2 (citing United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 565
(1989)).
583. Id. at 1134.
584. Id.
585. Id. at 1133.
586. 459 So. 2d 1148 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
587. Id. at 1149.
588. 490 So. 2d 1343 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
589. 702 So. 2d 1289 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
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of a cause of action against an insurance agent in Forgione v. Dennis Pirtle
Agency, Inc.:590
As an Illinois appellate court noted in Christison v. Jones, 83
Ill.App.3d 334, 39 Ill. Dec. 560, 562, 405 N.E.2d 8, 10 (1980), the
duty breached in legal malpractice arises out of a contract for legal
services and the resulting injuries are pecuniary injuries to intangi-
ble property interests, rather than personal injuries in the strict
sense of injuries to the body, feelings, or character of the client.
While these aspects might indicate that legal malpractice falls
within the class of actions that are assignable, the Illinois court
concluded that legal malpractice is not subject to assignment be-
cause "the real basis and substance of the malpractice suit" is a
breach of the duties within the personal relationship between the
attorney and client. Id. Thus, it is "the unique quality of legal ser-
vices, the personal nature of the attorney's duty to the client[,] and
the confidentiality of the attorney-client relationship" that have led
other courts to conclude that legal malpractice claims are not sub-
ject to assignment. Goodley v. Wank & Wank, Inc., 62 Cal. App. 3d
389, 133 Cal.Rptr. 83, 87 (1976).591
The next opportunity to review the assignability doctrine was presented
in National Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Salter.592 Using a subrogation
theory in its malpractice action, National Union sued the attorneys who had
represented one of its insureds. The dismissal of the case was affirmed upon
a holding that the same analysis that prohibited the assignment of a legal
malpractice claim also prohibited "the subrogation of a debtor's legal
malpractice claim., 593 The fact that the actual client was not a party to the
lawsuit was critical to the court's holding which noted that the client "may
not even be interested or believe that it has a legal malpractice action against
its attorneys," and the attorneys might need to reveal the "work product" and
"confidences" of its client in order to properly defend its position.
After acknowledging that a cause of action for legal malpractice is not
assignable under Florida law, the court in Northcutt v. BankAtlantic
595
discussed whether or not a bankruptcy trustee could assign a legal
590. 701 So. 2d 557, 559 (Fla. 1997).
591. Id.
592. 717 So. 2d 141 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
593. Id. at 143.
594. Id.
595. 767 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
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596
malpractice claim. Without deciding the issue, the court cited to several
cases from other jurisdictions,597 suggesting that a tort action that arose
598during a bankruptcy proceeding could not be sold or assigned. Northcutt
went on to argue that if the assignment was void, the trustee had abandoned
the claim and the claim then reverted to Northcutt.599 The summary
judgment, which held that certain proceeds of a legal malpractice claim
could be garnished, was reversed due to a finding that there were issues of
material fact.60°
Northcutt was also involved in Northcutt v. Bryan,60 1 in which he
argued that the sale of his legal malpractice claim by the trustee appointed in
his bankruptcy case to the attorney he had sued was void because such a
claim was not assignable.60 2 Although the court held that Northcutt "may
well be correct on his theory that, because legal malpractice claims are not
assignable under Florida law, a bankruptcy trustee cannot assign a clam,0
since the bankruptcy order approving the sale was not appealed, he did not
have standing to bring his legal malpractice claim.605
XIV. EXPERT TESTIMONY
A trial court erred in determining that an affidavit as to breach of duty
or causation was sufficient to shift the burden of proof in a summary
judgment hearing to the client, notwithstanding the lack of any contrary
affidavit in Heitmeyer v. Sasser.6  The conclusory nature of the affidavit
was the underlying basis of the court's ruling. This ruling is in direct
contrast to Manner v. Goldstein Professional Ass'n,6°7 in which a summary
596. Id. at 564.
597. Id. See also Integrated Solutions, Inc. v. Serv. Support Specialties, Inc., 124 F.3d
487 (3d Cir. 1997); In re J.E. Marion, Inc., 199 B.R. 635 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1996); Baum v.
Duckor, Spradling & Metzger, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 703 (C. Ct. App. 1999).
598. Northcutt, 767 So. 2d at 564.
599. Id. (citing to In re Bennett, 13 B.R. 643 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1981)).
600. Northcutt, 767 So. 2d at 565.
601. 775 So. 2d 976 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
602. Id. at 977.
603. Id.
604. Id.
605. Id. at 978.
606. 664 So. 2d 358 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
607. 436 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1983). See also Dadic v. Schneider, 722
So. 2d 921 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (withholding comment as to the propriety of both
sides filing affidavits).
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judgment in favor of an attorney was upheld due to "an unrebutted affidavit
by a prominent member of the bar of this state on file stating that the action
of her counsel ...did not depart from the expected degree and care of
conduct of counsel for a mother of [sic, in] a domestic relation [sic]
matter.' '6 8 Under any circumstances, the court cannot review affidavits and
make a credibility judgment in a summary judgment context. 9 6
The case of Willage v. Law Offices of Wallace and Breslow, P.A.,6 1°
held that legal malpractice can not be inferred merely because of a
defendant's verdict in a slip and fall case.61' "Without expert testimony, a
lay jury could only speculate as to whether an attorney's conscious decision
not to call a purported witness constituted negligence, where in the
attorney's opinion, the witness on cross examination could have given
testimony damaging to plaintiff's case.",6 12 The plaintiff in Warwick, Paul &• 613
Warwick v. Dotter, sued his divorce lawyer for failure to attend a divorce
614trial on behalf of the husband. The attorney for the wife was called as an
expert in the malpractice proceeding and asked a "hypothetical question to
prove the possibility that a more financially favorable divorce decree could
have been obtained had not the firm been negligent.16 5 The court found
such testimony sufficient to establish the appropriate standard of care and
pointed out that with the exception of the chancellor, the wife's attorney was
"the most informed available person as to the facts and law involved in the
divorce case."616
Certain kinds of malpractice may be so apparent that expert testimony
is not mandatory. The client suffered a dismissal of his suit in Suritz v.
617Kelner, due to his attorney's failure to tell his client to respond to
interrogatories. 6 18 "In the instant case, if the jury finds the facts to be as
608. Manner, 436 So. 2d at 432.
609. Sierra v. Shevin, 767 So. 2d 524, 525 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (citations
omitted).
610. 415 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
611. Id. at 768.
612. Id. (citations omitted).
613. 190 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
614. Id.
615. Id. at 597.
616. Id. at 598.
617. 155 So. 2d 831 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
618. Id. at 832.
[Vol. 27:85
155
: Nova Law Review 27, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 2002
Trazenfeld
presented by the plaintiff, the negligence of the attorney may appear from
these facts without the need of expert testimony.''619
Galloway v. Law Offices of Merkle, Bright and Sullivan, P.A.,620
involves both an affidavit and the need for expert testimony. 62' A summary
judgment in favor of the attorney was obtained based upon the attorney's
622
unrebutted affidavit. Such affidavit "merely stated that appellant's file
was handled in accordance with the community standard of care, but the
affidavit nowhere attempts to explain why this case was not filed within the
• • .,623
statute of limitations as alleged in the complaint."2 The summary judgment
was reversed upon a finding that a counter affidavit was not necessary.624
The court went on to state, "[w]e think the unexplained failure to file within
a statute of limitations as described in this complaint is such an apparent
breach of a duty of care as to obviate the need for expert testimony from
appellant on a motion for summary judgment. ',625
XV. JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Florida Standard Jury Instruction 4.2(c) can be used in an attorney
626
malpractice case. Since all attorney malpractice proceedings involve a
"case within a case," the jury instructions often reflect the cause of action
from the underlying case. The plaintiffs theory against the lawyer in
Cunningham v. Koon,627 was that he drafted a note that was usurious.628 A
deficient jury instruction on usury resulted in the reversal of the verdict in
favor of the client.
629
630In Spaziano v. Price, the court discussed the distinction in jury
instructions between negligence and liability.631 Florida Standard Jury
619. Id. at 834. Without indicating the extent of expert testimony in the trial court, the
appellate court in Spaziano v. Price found the attorneys' conduct "clearly fell below a
reasonable standard of care." 763 So. 2d 1047 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
620. 596 So. 2d 1205 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
621. Id. at 1206.
622. Id.
623. Id. at 1207.
624. Id.
625. Galloway, 596 So. 2d at 1207.
626. See FLA. STD JURY INSTR. IN CIVIL CASES § 4.2(c) (1967) (amended 2001).
627. 762 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
628. Id.
629. Id.
630. 763 So. 2d 1047 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
631. Id. at 1050.
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Instruction (Civil) 3.1 (c) and 3.6(c) are to be used when negligence has been
determined either by admission or a directed verdict.632  This set of
instructions leaves open the question of whether the attorney's acts were the
cause of the injury. Florida Standard Jury Instruction (Civil) 3.1(d) applies
when there is a directed verdict on liability and only requires the jury to
633determine the amount of damages.
XVI. CONCLUSION
In Florida, a plaintiff in a legal malpractice action must prove that he is
in privity with the attorney or the third-party beneficiary to the attorney's
work, that the attorney neglected a reasonable duty, and that the attorney's
negligence proximately caused the plaintiff's loss. Further, the plaintiff may
have to prove that the judgment in the underlying transaction was collectible.
An attorney may be absolved of liability by the involvement of a subsequent
attorney, and the attorney's loss may be spread between or among others
sharing in the representation. Proving malpractice in criminal defense means
proving different elements and perhaps a higher standard of proof than in
transactional and civil litigational malpractice. Generally, the malpractice
plaintiff will need expert testimony to make his case. The malpractice
plaintiff may not assign his cause of action. The successful plaintiff is
entitled to compensatory fees and prejudgment interest; however, punitive
damages are limited in their availability.
The attorney defendant may affirmatively defend using various estoppel
defenses, comparative negligence, in pari delicto and fraud, statute of
limitations, and abandonment. Under some circumstances, the attorney may
affirmatively defend that the underlying judgment was not collectible. In
certain limited circumstances, the attorney may be immune to suit. Although
defense of a malpractice suit is a situation that allows invasion of the
attorney-client privilege, the invasion is not an unlimited one.
Revisiting Sir Thomas More's thoughts in A Man for All Seasons, "The
law is not a 'light' for you or any man to see by; the law is not an instrument
of any kind. The law is a causeway upon which so long as he keeps to it a
citizen may walk safely. 634 As with any other "citizen," the law provides an
attorney a causeway. If the attorney keeps to the causeway, he avoids
professional liability and legal malpractice.
632. Id.
633. Id.
634. Bolt, supra note 1.
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I. INTRODUCTION
ABC Excavating is a small construction firm specializing in site
preparation work.' The company has been successful for a number of years
on a small scale, providing a comfortable existence for the company's
1. Although the names of the parties are fictional, in all other respects this is a true
story. This case is ongoing. Disbarment proceedings may be public record, but revelation of
them would jeopardize client confidentiality in the present action against the attorney and his
partners.
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shareholders, Jack Brown and his wife. Early in 1999, the firm orally
contracted to perform some work in a South Florida county. As is
sometimes the case, the property owner paid the general contractor, and the
general contractor did not pay ABC Excavating. ABC Excavating filed a
lien against the property and, failing any response from either the owner or
the general contractor, ABC Excavating sought to foreclose. With that in
mind, the owners of ABC Excavating turned over all of their meager
paperwork to their attorney, Mike Pfenning of Rodriguez, Marko &
Pfenning, P.A. A year went by, and the statute of limitations for lien
foreclosure expired. Another year went by, and the statute of limitations for
suing on an oral contract expired. During this period, ABC Excavating was
regularly assured by Pfenning that he was filing pleadings and that
everything was going well.
However, nothing was going well. As Pfenning later said in his letter to
the Florida Bar, he was afflicted with a mental disorder that made him put all
of his work into various desk drawers and then forget about it.2 Pfenning
would spend the remainder of his days staring out of the windows of his
office, or would simply not show up for work. His partners were aware of
his behavior but were reluctant to intervene. They were even more reluctant
to inform his clients. Pfenning's partners let their malpractice insurance
lapse. Ultimately, they dissolved the partnership. Since then, Pfenning has
been disbarred. All three partners have liquidated their assets or moved
them into the names of others. Two of the three partners have filed for
bankruptcy and the third is not far behind. ABC Excavating is now seeking
to recover from the attorneys personally, but the bankruptcy actions have all
but eliminated their chances for recovery.
Although the incidence of mental illness and drug abuse among
attorneys is far from negligible, stories this egregious are, fortunately, not
played out every day. Several questions raised by this case include the
following:
What could the Browns have done to mitigate the damage caused
by their attorney?
What could the attorney have done to mitigate or prevent the dam-
age his illness has caused?
What were the responsibilities of the partners to the clients, to the
mentally ill partner, and to the Florida Bar?
2. Incredibly, the original complaint to the bar was filed by a client of Pfenning's for
whom he was prosecuting a malpractice suit against another attorney for neglecting a client's
case.
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The purpose of this article is to look at the factors involved in these
questions and to attempt to frame answers that may be useful to both clients
and attorneys in looking at the effect mental illness can have on the attorney-
client relationship and on the parties thereto.
Mental illness is a subset of a broad range of conditions of unfitness,
which could preclude an attorney from practicing law. It may, in and of
itself, render an attorney unfit for practice, or it may be the catalyst for other
conduct that violates the rules of professional responsibility.
The overriding issue regarding the conduct precipitated by an attorney's
illness lies in the public policy concern that attorneys act in the public
interest; the public is entitled to a presumption that an attorney licensed to
practice is fit to do so. 4  Failure of this presumption is a failure of the
public's trust,5 and the consequences of such a failure may be far-reaching.
Given that the public policy concern revolves around the attorney's
inability to carry out his or her professional duties, a mental illness that does
not prevent an attorney from effective practice is not at issue here. The fact
that it does not noticeably affect a lawyer's performance makes the incidence
of such illness difficult to track. Such "non-actionable" mental illnesses
3. FLA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4-8.4 cmt. (1988).
Many kinds of illegal conduct reflect adversely on fitness to practice law, such as
offenses involving fraud and the offense of willful failure to file an income tax return.
However, some kinds of offense carry no such implication. Traditionally, the distinc-
tion was drawn in terms of offenses involving "moral turpitude." That concept can be
construed to include offenses concerning some matters of personal morality, such as
adultery and comparable offenses, that have no specific connection to fitness for the
practice of law. Although a lawyer is personally answerable to the entire criminal law,
a lawyer should be professionally answerable only for offenses that indicate lack of
those characteristics relevant to law practice. Offenses involving violence, dishonesty,
or breach of trust or serious interference with the administration of justice are in that
category. A pattern of repeated offenses, even ones of minor significance when con-
sidered separately, can indicate indifference to legal obligation.
Id.
4. Gregory G. Sarno, Annotation, Mental or Emotional Disturbance as Defense to or
Mitigation of Charges Against Attorney in Disciplinary Proceeding, 26 A.L.R. 4th 995,
1006-07 (1983).
[Iun disbarment, unlike criminal prosecution or a civil suit for recovery of money based
on an offense or quasi-offense, consideration of the interest and safety of the public os
[sic] of the utmost importance... [it would be wrong] to permit such a person to
continue as an officer of the court and to pursue the privilege of engaging in the
honorable legal profession when he, by his misconduct, has exhibited a lack of integ-
rity and common honesty. And it matters not whether the dishonest conduct stems
from an incapacity to discern between right and wrong... the public has a right to
protection against his activities in the practice of law.
Id.
5. Id.
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would include many of the disorders formerly labeled as neuroses by the
American Psychiatric Association.6
Mental illness is more difficult to detect in others-and in oneself-
than a physical illness such as hepatitis or tuberculosis.7 To the casual lay
observer, as most of us are, a mental illness will generally manifest itself
through conduct outside of the generally accepted norm; it will become
cause for concern or investigation when it violates the Rules of Professional
Conduct.'
Attorneys are not subject to disciplinary action for being mentally ill,
only for conduct which violates the rules.9 On the other hand, violations of
the rules are not evidence of mental illness, and those attorneys who plead
such illness as the cause of their violations must show that it directly caused
the misconduct.1 ° When a showing of causation is made, disciplinary action
6. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 9-10 (3d ed. 1980). In 1980, the American Psychiatric Association omitted the
former major class of disorders called "neuroses" from its diagnostic manual and replaced it
with several categories such as "affective, anxiety, somatoform" and so on. Id. The rationale
for this change was the absence of a general consensus on the definition of neuroses. Id. For
the purposes of this article, the old adage that neurotics build castles in the sky and psychotics
actually live in them will provide an adequate, if folkloric, distinction.
7. Hepatitis C "[s]ymptoms may include fever, fatigue, abdominal pain, jaundice,
and elevated liver enzymes." HCV Advocate Glossary, at http://www.hepatitis-c-advocate.org
/hepatitis-c-symptoms.htm (last visited Sept. 12, 2002). Tuberculosis consists of constant
coughing fits along with spitting up blood; common symptoms of this illness include fever,
inflammation, headache, soreness of throat, palate, breast and lungs. (Tuberculosis, at
http://www.aidsmeds.com/OIs/TB2.htm (last visited Sept. 12, 2002)). On the other hand, the
Canadian Mental Health Association states that the symptoms of depression include feelings
of worthlessness, helplessness or hopelessness, difficulty with concentration or decisions,
avoidance of other people, overwhelming feelings of sadness, and thoughts of death or
suicide, which are also among the symptoms of manic depression. Depression & Manic
Depression Symptom Questionnaire, at http://www.truehope.com/nononline_forms/
forms3.htm (last visited Sept. 12, 2002).
8. Id.
9. However, evidence of mental illness may be a bar to admission. Since the
introduction of the Americans with Disabilities Act in 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213, the
profession's methods of regulating attorney fitness where mental health is an issue have come
under attack as violative of the ADA. This is particularly true with regard to mental health
questions posed on bar applications. See, e.g., Erica Moeser, Yes: The Public Has the Right
to Know About Instability, A.B.A.J., Oct. 1994, at 36; Kathi Pugh, No: Mental Health
Treatment Should Not Block a Career, A.B.A.J., Oct. 1994, at 37.
10. In order for an attorney's alleged illness to be taken into account as a mitigating
circumstance in a disciplinary proceeding, the attorney must "establish any causal link
between his health problems and his 'pattern of serious professional misconduct." In re Stein,
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will ensue, and the illness will often be treated as a mitigating factor in the
imposition of sanctions." Sanctions will range from disbarment 2 to
censure,13 but will often include suspension pending effective treatment for
the attorney's disorder.'
4
There are certain primary participants in the attorney-client relation-
ship: the client, the attorney, and, under the imputed knowledge doctrine of
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, the attorney's firm. 15  The
remainder of this article will review the various ways the attorney's mental
illness affects these participants and what, if anything, may be done to
mitigate the effects of the illness on the attorney's work.
11. THE CLIENT
What risks do clients run if they are among those whose cases are
affected by the mental or emotional instability of their attorney? They run
many of the same risks that the Browns encountered in their relationship
with Mr. Pfenning of the earlier example. The possible permutations of
attorney misconduct are numerous, running the gamut from loss of the action
due to statute of limitations problems, to simple cases of inadequate
settlement due to attorney carelessness. 6
Before continuing, it is worth noting that the risk of a client being an
actual victim of an attorney's mental or emotional instability is extremely
low. Although some fifteen-percent of Florida's attorneys will suffer from
career-affecting mental illness or addiction at some point in their lives, 17 the
number of cases these attorneys will negatively affect will probably be small.
596 N.Y.S.2d 8, 9 (App. Div. 1993) (quoting In re Kurtz, 580 N.Y.S.2d 1 (App. Div. 1992));
see also 7 N.Y. Jua. 2d Attorneys at Law § 405 (1997).
11. See Fla. Bar v. Musleh, 453 So. 2d 794, 797 (Fla. 1984); Fla. Bar v. Budish, 421
So. 2d 501, 503 (Fla. 1982); Fla. Bar v. Larkin, 420 So. 2d 1080, 1081 (Fla. 1982).
12. Fla. Bar v. Horowitz, 697 So. 2d 78, 83 (Fla. 1997) (holding that an attorney may
be disbarred for neglect of clients and for failure to respond to communications from the Bar
despite attorney's clinical depression).
13. Fla. Bar v. Price, 348 So. 2d 887, 890 (Fla. 1977) (punishing the attorney with a
public reprimand and thirty-day suspension).
14. Fla. Bar v. Poplack, 599 So. 2d 116, 118 (Fla. 1992) (suspension for thirty days
and eighteen-month probation); Fla. Bar v. Carbonaro, 464 So. 2d 549, 551 (Fla. 1985)
(three-year suspension continuing until rehabilitation proved).
15. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.10 (2002); see also Sears, Roebuck & Co.
v. Stansbury, 374 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
16. See infra Part ll.
17. See infra Part ll.
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To try to establish some order of magnitude, assume that an attorney
practices thirty years, handles 250 matters per year (a number that may vary
greatly depending on the branch of the law in which one practices), and that
each mentally or emotionally unstable attorney ruins five cases. There are
some 70,000 attorneys in Florida. 1 Using the figures just mentioned, the
mentally or emotionally unstable attorneys will cause problems with some
52,000 matters. Fifty-two thousand matters may sound like the makings of a
plague or a scourge, until one considers that during that same period of time,
some 700,000,000 matters will be handled normally.' 9 In other words, the
chances of one's case being among those negatively affected by the mental
state of the attorney could well be less than one in thirteen thousand.2°
A. Client Responsibilities to the Attorney and the Court
Although the client is the raison d'tre of the attorney's representation,
there is very little in the Rules of Professional Conduct governing responsi-
bilities of the client for his or her case. By their very nature, the rules cannot
directly address client conduct, and what rules there are concern only an
attorney's responses to the implied duties of the client. These implied duties
include a client's candor to the attorney2' and to the tribunal, a client's
obligation to pay for services,23 and a client's obligation to assist in
determining the scope of the representation.24
Despite its strong fiduciary overtones, the relationship between an
26attorney and a client is nevertheless essentially a contractual relationship,
18. Fla. Bar Organization, available at http://www.flabar.org (listing approximately
70,000 attorneys as members of the Florida Bar) (last visited Sept. 7, 2002); see Richard B.
Marx, Impaired Attorneys and the Disciplinary System, 11 FLA. B.J. 14 (Dec. 1999).
19. This hypothetical assumes a forty-year-long career for each of Florida's 70,000
attorneys and 250 cases per attorney per year.
20. In the year ending August 1, 2001, the Florida Bar spent $7,915,314 of the
$12,859,897 it collected in dues on disciplinary matters. In the same time period, there were
38 disbarments, 155 suspensions and 57 public reprimands. The number of bar complaints
filed was 9280 for the period, or one complaint for, approximately, every seven attorneys. The
Florida Bar, updated August 1, 2001, as reported in Christopher C. Copeland, Disciplinary
Proceedings, Practical Legal Issues in Florida: Issues and Answers, National Business
Institute, Inc., 2001.
21. See generally, MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2002).
22. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16(c) (2002).
23. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1. 16(b)(5) (2002).
24. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2002).
25. THE FLA. BAR, FLORIDA CIVIL PRACTICE BEFORE TRIAL § 1.38 (6th ed. 2000)
[hereinafter FLA. CIVIL PRACTICE BEFORE TRIAL]; see also, Gerlach v. Donnelly, 98 So. 2d
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and both sides of the relationship have duties and obligations. The
obligations of clients, other than for payment and the implied duties
mentioned above, revolve primarily around selecting an attorney with whom
27they are comfortable. The word "vibe" is regularly used when selecting an
28
attorney. A general feeling of competence and caring (and reasonableness
of fees) is desirable, as well as a sense that honest communication will flow
in both directions.29 Often, novice or distraught clients will look to the
lawyer as much more than merely legal counsel and will transfer to counsel
"dependencies for guides to conduct in strange circumstance, for nonlegal
advice, and often for approval. 0 0 A lawyer is not one's minister, psychic
advisor or friend. A lawyer is no more than an advisor or advocate in legal
matters.3 '
493, 498 (Fla. 1957) ("[N]o relationship between individuals.. . involves a greater degree of
trust and confidence than that of attorney and client."); In re Clifton, 155 So. 324, 326 (Fla.
1934) ("The relation of attorney and client is that of master and servant in a limited and
dignified sense, and involves the highest personal trust and confidence."); Pilkington v. Rose,
102 So. 751, 752 (Fla. 1925) (Courts will enforce "the utmost good faith and fair dealing on
part of the attorney" in dealings with client.); 610 Lincoln Road, Inc. v. Kelner, P.A., 289 So.
2d 12, 14 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1974) ("[Vialidity and fairness [of initial agreement between
attorney and client establishing relationship] is generally measured by the ordinary rules
applicable to other contracts." The rule does not establish "that where a controversy arises
between an attorney and client the burden is on the attorney to demonstrate that he has taken
no undue advantage of the client."); Smyrna Developers, Inc. v. Bornstein, 177 So. 2d 16 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
26. The terms of the contractual relationship are governed by the express terms of the
written agreement between the attorney and the client, insofar as they do not violate the Rules
Regulating the Florida Bar themselves, the by-laws adopted thereunder, the Code of
Professional Responsibility, Chapter 454 of the Florida Statutes, the Oath of Admission, case
law which has developed and elucidated these rules, relevant opinions promulgated by the
Professional Ethics Committee of the Florida Bar, and "the attorney is under a duty at all
times to represent his client and handle his client's affairs with the 'utmost degree of honesty,
forthrightness, loyalty and fidelity."' Smyrna Developers, 177 So. 2d at 18; see also Singleton
v. Foreman, 435 F.2d 962, 970 (5th Cir. 1970); Gerlach, 98 So. 2d at 498.
27. BERTRAM HARNET, LAW, LAWYERS AND LAYMEN: MAKING SENSE OF THE
AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich) 187 (1984).
28. Id.
29. Id. See also FLA. CIVIL PRACTICE BEFORE TRIAL, supra note 25, § 1.
30. HARNETT, supra note 27, at 206.
31. "A lawyer, as a member of the legal profession, is a representative of clients, an
officer of the legal system and a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of
justice." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, PREAMBLE 9 (2002); see also HARNET', supra
note 27, at 206.
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B. Potential Harms Caused by the Attorney's Mental Illness
From a client's perspective, an attorney may ruin a client's case in two
ways, either through his or her negligence, or through no clearly provable
fault of the attorney. In the case of clear attorney negligence, cases may be
lost for the following reasons:
The attorney lets the statute of limitations lapse.32 Failing alterna-
tive causes of action, rare in the type of straightforward cases
making up the vast majority of legal work, the client's recourse
against the hoped-for defendant simply no longer exists.
33
The attorney fails to file responsive pleadings. If the attorney
fails to file an answer to an adversary's complaint, the client is
faced with a default judgment; 35 failure to comply with discover7
requests or court orders can similarly lead to default judgments.
In these cases, recourse against the erstwhile adversaries is ex-
tremely difficult and may be barred by resjudicata.
The attorney simply fails to prosecute diligently or intelligently.37
The risk of default is heightened if the attorney fails to appear for
hearings or is persistently late, if the attorney neglects to prosecute
the case, or if he or she forgets straightforward but vital elements
32. FLA. STAT. § 95.011 (2001) (failing to initiate an action within the time
limitations defined by the statute is a complete defense, regardless of the cause of the failure.)
A civil action or proceeding, called "action" in this chapter, including one brought by
the state, a public officer, a political subdivision of the state, a municipality, a public
corporation or body corporate, or any agency or officer of any of them, or any other
governmental authority, shall be barred unless begun within the time prescribed in this
chapter or, if a different time is prescribed elsewhere in these statutes, within the time
prescribed elsewhere.
Id.
33. Id.
34. FLA. R. CIv. P. 1.110(e). Failure to respond to a complaint is tantamount to a
failure to deny. "Averments in a pleading to which a responsive pleading is required, other
than those as to the amount of damages, are admitted when not denied in the responsive
pleading." Id.
35. FED. R. CIv. P. 55(a) (2000). "When a party against whom a judgment for
affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by these rules
and that fact is made to appear by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk shall enter the party's
default." Id.
36. See, e.g., FED. R. Ctv. P. 16(e), (b)(2)(C) (2000).
37. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3.
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such as service of process, lis pendens notices in property dis-
putes, or notices of appearance.
Although the experienced client might have enough familiarity with the
law to understand statutes of limitations and responsive pleadings, and thus
know to ask appropriate questions of the attorney, the third scenario is
largely beyond the client's ability and control. In cases where attorney
negligence is not at all clear, cases may be lost in three ways:
On the merits;
39
Through actions of the attorney where the client is unaware that
these actions constitute malpractice; 4°
Through actions of the attorney where the client will be unable to
• • • 41
show that the actions constitute malpractice.
Client recourse against the attorney in these cases is very limited. In the
42
case of a loss on the merits, there would (or should) be no action. If the
client is unaware of the malpractice, then there would be no recourse
38. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.0700). Failure to serve a complaint on a defendant within the
prescribed 120 days and absent "good cause or excusable neglect" will result in a court order
for service within a prescribed time, "dismiss[al] [of] the action without prejudice," or
dismissal from the action of the defendant who was not timely served. Id. A notice of lis
pendens preserves to litigants the status of property involved in litigation and "place[s]
persons who may have an interest in the property on notice of a claim against ... [said]
property." FLA. CIVIL PRACTICE BEFORE TRIAL, supra note 25, § 9-5. See FLA. STAT. § 48.23
(2001).
39. In the absence of malpractice, a loss on the merits is a loss based on the
substantive issues of the case. The merits are the elements or grounds of a claim, the
substantive considerations to be taken into account in deciding a case, as opposed to
extraneous or technical points, especially of procedure. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1003 (7th
ed. 1999). A trial on the merits is a trial on the substantive issues of the case, as opposed to
motion hearing or interlocutory matter. Id. at 1512.
40. If the client is unaware of the Rules of Professional Conduct and the Rules of
Civil Procedure (see, e.g., discussion supra notes 32-38), it follows that the client will be
unaware of any violations of these Rules by an attorney.
41. Steele v. Kehoe, 747 So. 2d 931, 933 (Fla. 1999). "[IUn a claim for legal
malpractice, a plaintiff must plead and prove the following elements: (1) the attorney's
employment; (2) the attorney's neglect of a reasonable duty; and (3) the attorney's negligence
was the proximate cause of the client's loss." Id. See, e.g., Companion v. McClin, 645 So. 2d
1109, 1110 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994); Bolves v. Hullinger, 629 So. 2d 198, 200 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Freeman v. Rubin, 318 So. 2d 540, 542 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1975);
Weiner v. Moreno, 271 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
42. If a case is lost on the merits and there has been no malpractice by the attorney,
the client would have no grounds for a malpractice claim.
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because the client did not know there was a basis for a claim. 43 The third
scenario requires the client to show that, had the former attorney been sober,
diligent, timely or sane, the client would not have lost the case."4 Such a suit
involves, in essence, retrying the underlying case, while at the same time
showing that the former attorney's actions materially affected the outcome.45
This is expensive, often lengthy, and almost always unpleasant. Further-
more, chances of success may be low.
46
C. Protecting Oneself as the Client
How can clients protect themselves if they suspect their attorney is
emotionally or mentally unstable? The answer to that lies in the comments
43. A basic requirement of recourse is the ability to state a cause of action. FED. R.
CIv. P. 12 (b)(6). If, as is postulated in supra note 40, the client is unaware of possible
malpractice because of a lack of knowledge of procedural fundamentals, it follows that the
client lacks the requisite knowledge to formulate a cause of action.
44. Steele v. Kehoe, 747 So. 2d 931, 933 (Fla. 1999). "In a claim for legal
malpractice, the plaintiff must plead and prove following elements: (1) the attorney's
employment; (2) the attorney's neglect of a reasonable duty; and (3) the attorney's negligence
was proximate cause of client's loss." Id. See, e.g., Companion v. McClin, 645 So. 2d 1109,
1110 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994); Bolves v. Hullinger, 629 So. 2d 198, 200 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 1993); Freeman v. Rubin, 318 So. 2d 540, 542 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Weiner
v. Moreno, 271 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
45. Joseph H. Koffler, Legal Malpractice Damages In A Trial Within A Trial-A
Critical Analysis Of Unique Concepts: Areas of Unconscionability, 73 MARQ. L. REv. 40, 41
(1989) [hereinafter Koffler].
In a legal malpractice action, where a client alleges damage resulting from an attorney's
failure to properly prosecute or defend an action, the client may be required to prove
that he or she would have been successful in prosecuting or defending the underlying
action, if not for the attorney's negligence or other improper conduct. This has resulted
in placing the burden upon the client in a legal malpractice action to prove a "case
within a case", and as it has been described, participate in a "trial within a trial."
Id.
46. Id.
[W]itnesses and records may be difficult to obtain or unavailable and memories may
have faded by the time the legal malpractice action is tried. Legal malpractice actions
are frequently predicated upon an attorney's failure to commence an underlying action
within the time prescribed by the statute of limitations, making difficulties such as
these, because of long lapses in time, significant probabilities. Similar problems exist
where the plaintiff in the legal malpractice action was the defendant in the underlying
action and is required to establish that there was a meritorious defense to the underly-
ing action.
Id. See also Gautam v. De Luca, 521 A.2d 1343, 1348 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987)
(explaining that "it is often difficult for the parties to present an accurate evidential reflection
or semblance of the original action").
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made by Harnett regarding the selection of the attorney.47 Once the "vibe" is
gone, the client needs to give very serious consideration to changing
48 49
attorneys. No reason need be given. If the client pulls out of the
attorney-client relationship prior to adjudication, the case could possibly be
set back on track by a competent new attorney.
If the client has something more specific than the loss of "vibe" or loss
of trust, such as instances of attorney conduct that violate the law or the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, the attorney should be reported to the
appropriate authorities. 50  The state bar associations are by and large self-
policing, but do not have a "police force" of any kind.5' The very nature of
attorney-client privilege prevents the bar from, for example, conducting
audits of attorney conduct or attorney effectiveness among randomly
selected clients.52 Without client complaints regarding an attorney's failures,
the bar will never know.53
47. HARNEMr, supra note 27, at 187-89.
48. Id. at 187. "Trust is a key client attitude. Without it, the relationship is never
good and the results are often suspect." Id. at 189.
49. FLA. CIVIL PRACTICE BEFORE TRIAL, supra note 25, §1.48. "A client may
discharge the attorney at any time, with or without cause, subject to liability for payment of
any outstanding attorneys' fees." Id.
50. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.3 (2002) requires that attorneys report
such misconduct, but no such requirement exists for clients. See id. However, for the reasons
stated, this writer would urge clients to do so if the conduct of their attorney caused damage to
them or to their case.
51. Commentary by Robert B. McKay, former Dean of New York University Law
School, The Lawyer's Professional Independence, An Ideal Revisited, John B. Davidson, Ed.,
American Bar Association, Tort and Insurance Practice Section, p. 35.
The legal profession has been and remains remarkably free from external control.
Somehow we have arrogated for ourselves the right of self-regulation from admission
to law school... to the practice of law... and on to discipline as conducted by
lawyers and judges, all of whom are law-trained. It's a self-contained world. The
public can take over if the profession overreaches itself... and if the profession does
not regulate itself in ways that are satisfactory to the public .... The obligation is to
keep our house in order .... We must make sure that we [regulate] in behalf of the
public trust.
Id.
52. Although attorneys, and not clients, are bound by the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, this author believes that any audit of this kind would risk exposing aspects of the
attorney-client relationship meant to remain protected by the confidentiality doctrines
expressed in MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6, Canon 4 (Rev. 1984).
53. See infra part II. Egregious conduct toward the court or in court may warrant
judicial complaints.
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.M. THE ATFORNEY
The mentally disordered attorney may be psychotic, neurotic, alcoholic,
drug dependent, merely emotionally unstable, or some combination of these.
Alcoholism is widespread in this country and is said to be the third most
serious public health problem, after cancer and heart disease.54 One third of
all suicides involve alcohol as a contributory factor.55  Although problem
drinkers account for about eight percent of the general population,56
alcoholism and other addictions will impair approximately fifteen percent of
the members of the Florida Bar "at some time during their careers. 57 This
figure does not include impairment due to mental illness that is not
manifested through addiction, nor does it include the emotional problems
that harm an attorney's ability to practice effectively.
8
A. The Attorney's Responsibility
An attorney who finds himself or herself sufficiently impaired by any of
these factors has several responsibilities. On a personal level, the first
responsibility should be to seek help.59 Professionally, the first responsibil-
54. Mary-Anne Enoch, M.D., M.R.C.G.P., & David Goldman, M.D., Problem
Drinking and Alcoholism: Diagnosis and Treatment, at http://www.aafp.org/afp/20020201/
441 .html (Feb. 1, 2002) [hereinafter Enoch and Goldman].
Alcohol misuse is associated with considerable morbidity and mortality (100,000
deaths annually), social and legal problems, acts of violence, and accidents. Alcohol-
ism is among the most common psychiatric disorders in the general population: the
lifetime prevalence of alcohol dependence, the severe form of alcoholism, is 8 to 14
percent. The ratio of alcohol dependence to alcohol abuse is approximately two to one.
The incidence of alcoholism is still more common in men, but it has been increasing
in women, and the female to male ratio for alcohol dependence has narrowed to one to
two.... Nearly all alcoholics have a comorbid psychiatric disorder, most commonly
anxiety and mood disorders in women and drug abuse and antisocial personality
disorders in men.
Id.
55. DAVIDSON AND NEALE, ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY: AN EXPERIMENTAL CLINICAL
APPROACH 297 (3d ed. 1982).
56. Enoch and Goldman, supra note 54, at http://www.aafp.orglafp/20020201/441.
html.
57. Marx, supra note 18, at 14.
58. See id.
59. This author believes that an attorney has a duty to her or himself, to family, and to
colleagues to seek to cure, treat, or at least minimize the potentially debilitating effects of
impairment.
[Vol. 27:157
169
: Nova Law Review 27, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 2002
Klingen
ity should be to the attorney's clients,6° then to the attorney's employers or
partners,6' and finally, to the bar.62 Rule 1.16 (a)(2) of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct requires that an attorney terminate the attorney-client
relationship if "the lawyer's physical or mental condition materially impairs
the lawyer's ability to represent the client., 63 Failure to do so violates other
rules, including the requirement of competence, 64 candor to the tribunal,65
and "truthfulness in statements to others."66 By not revealing the impair-
ment, however, the lawyer runs the greater risk of misconduct and of being
found out. The problem is thus doubled because, in addition to an illness or
addiction to overcome, a misconduct violation may lead to sanctions fatal to
67the lawyer's career.
This last thought calls attention to an important distinction: an attorney
suffering from an addiction or a mental illness is not necessarily unable to
68practice law effectively. Neither the courts nor the bar examiners have
ever been able to prove that fitness to practice is directly related to an
absence of mental illness or addiction.69 Many attorneys with emotional
problems are effective, sometimes excellent, attorneys; many with no
diagnosable mental disorders are disciplined for misconduct.7° Unfitness to
practice manifests itself primarily through conduct.7
Cessation or suspension of practice because of mental disorder could be
accomplished either voluntarily or involuntarily: the attorney may
understand that he or she cannot continue without treatment, or may engage
in actionable misconduct.72 The private nature of the former necessitates adearth of research and statistics, but the latter and its consequences have
60. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT 1.16(a)(2) (Rev. 2002). Inability to
effectively represent a client or failure to withdraw from representation when an attorney's
mental condition affects his or her capabilities are violations of the Model Rules. Id.
61. Failure to inform an employer of an incapacity affecting the ability to practice law
may result in liability to the firm. See infra part IV.
62. R. Regulating Fla. Bar. 3-7.13. An attorney may seek inactive status during
rehabilitation. Id.
63. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16 (2002).
64. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2002).
65. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2002).
66. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.1 (2002).
67. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4 (2002).
68. Phyllis Coleman and Ronald A. Shellow, Fitness to Practice: A Question of
Conduct, not Mental Illness, May, 1994, Fla. Bar J. 71.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at73.
72. Id. at71.
2002]
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produced a wealth of cases and articles." Attorney disciplinary proceedings
are a matter of public record,74 and a Florida suspension or disbarment
requires an appearance before the Supreme Court of Florida."
1. Voluntary Removal
Attorneys who, despite the nature of their illness or addiction, have the
presence of mind and the courage to temporarily remove themselves from the
practice of law ma voluntarily seek treatment, apply to the bar for place-ment
on inactive status, or seek hospitalization. Seeking hospitalization carries
with it the risk of an involuntary adjudication of incompetence." Attorneys
who voluntarily seek treatment are luckier today than they were just ten years
ago. Several counseling organizations exist to assist drug or alcohol dependent
professionals, 78 and the stigma of mental illness, while still strong, is much less
than it once was. 79  Dramatic improvements in med-ications over the last
decade permit many psychological problems to be treat-ed on an outpatient
basis. 8 More serious problems may often be taken care of on an outpatient
basis after an initial inpatient observation and treatment.81 The same is true for
73. See generally Fla. Bar v. Horowitz, 697 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 1997); Fla. Bar v.
Clement, 662 So. 2d 690 (Fla. 1995); Fla. Bar v. Grigsby, 641 So. 2d 1341 (Fla. 1994); Fla.
Bar v. Condon, 632 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 1994); Fla. Bar v. Marcus, 616 So. 2d 975 (Fla. 1993);
Fla. Bar v. Poplack, 599 So. 2d 116 (Fla. 1992). See, e.g., 7 AM. JUR. 2D Attorneys at Law
§71 (1997); Sarno, supra note 4, at 995.
74. Not only are the proceedings before the Supreme Court available through the
Court Reporter and legal databases, but many of the sanctions imposed have a public aspect to
them. For example, among the requirements of a suspension is that attorneys send a copy of
the suspension to each of their clients. Marx, supra note 18, at 16.
75. "Article V, section 15 (of the Florida Constitution] provides that '[tlhe supreme
court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the admission of persons to the practice of
law and the discipline of persons admitted."' State v. Palmer, 791 So. 2d 1181, 1183 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
76. R. Regulating Fla. Bar 3-7.13.
77. Id. "A lawyer who has been adjudicated insane or mentally incompetent.., under
the Florida Mental Health Act shall be [placed on an inactive list] and shall refrain from the
practice of law." Id.
78. In addition to the various "Anonymous" groups such as Alcoholics Anonymous,
Florida Lawyers Assistance (FLA) provides rehabilitation assistance. It is the organization to
which the Supreme Court of Florida sends attorneys if rehabilitation is a condition of their
probation. Marx, supra note 18, at 16.
79. "Fortunately, for almost 20 years the Florida Supreme Court has ... looked
favorably on a lawyer's efforts at rehabilitation." Id.
80. See text infra note 146.
81. Id.
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addiction problems. Any absences due to inpatient treatment will often entail
filing notices of unavailability in an attorney's active cases, s2 and will
require informing all clients of the unavailability. Also, if the length of
treatment will affect the requirement for expeditious litigation,84 cases may
be assigned to other attorneys in the firm. Solo practitioners may file
requests for substitution of counsel and transfer their cases to outside
85counsel. Explanation of the reasons for such a temporary retirement need
86
not be made public. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct require
termination only in the case of material impairment of the ability to represent
the client. 87 Out-patient treatment and continuing in practice will not create
a conflict unless the materiality requirement is met.88 An attorney should be
entitled to no less privacy than an ordinary citizen, at least until the ability to
practice is impaired.
Voluntary treatment carries with it the heavy burden of self discipline.
The attorney should continue treatment as directed by his or her doctors and
must have the wherewithal to return to treatment in case of a relapse. In-
house counseling and support may not be available on a formal basis in most
firms. However, candor with one's employers may elicit informal support,
an allowance for needed time off, and most importantly, the respect and
gratitude of the partnership for coming forth with the concerns before a
manifestation by misconduct.
82. The notice of unavailability is a legal nullity, but is regularly filed as a matter of
courtesy. Said notices are often taken into consideration in setting hearing and docket dates,
but not always.
Requests to change the time or place of oral argument are disfavored ... [clounsel
normally are expected to reschedule their other obligations to eliminate any conflicts.
Nevertheless, counsel faced with an irreconcilable conflict may request a change in the
date or time of oral argument. But they must make a showing of good cause before the
court will grant the requested change. [Circuit Rule 34-2]. Advance notice of unavail-
ability: Counsel should apprise the court by letter before the argument date is set if a
potential conflict (e.g., a prolonged absence from the country) is known.
CHRiSTOPHER A. GOELZ & MEREDrrH J. WATrS, CALIr)RNtA PRACInCE GUIDE; FEDERAL NINTH
CIRcurr CtvIL APPELLATE PRACTCE, Ch. 9. Oral Argument: 9-B. Setting Cases For Argument
(d) [9:79-80].
83. Failure to do so would violate MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4 (1983-
2001).
84. MODEL RULES OF PRO'L CONDUCT R. 3.2 (Rev. 1984).
85. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16 (Rev. 1984).
86. Nowhere in the Model Rules is there a requirement that an attorney reveal
personal matters to clients. Only when such personal matters may impair the ability of the
attorney's duties towards clients do the Model Rules come into play. See id. at 1.16(a)(2).
87. Id.
88. Id.
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2. Inactive Bar Status
An attorney may also apply to the Bar for placement on inactive
status. 89 The Florida Bar provides that an attorney who has not been
adjudicated incompetent, but who is incapable of practicing law because of
physical or mental illness, may be classified as an inactive member.9 Once
so classified, the lawyer is required to refrain from the practice of law even
though there have been no allegations of misconduct. 91  Proceedings
regarding inactive members are processed under the Rules of Discipline in
the same manner as proceedings involving misconduct.92 Inactive members
may be reinstated upon petition to and approval by the Board of Governors,
and if such a petition is rejected, it is subject to review by the Supreme Court
of Florida.
93
To take such a step is certainly more drastic than the voluntary
treatment described above. First, it prevents the attorney from practicing
and, in so doing, takes away his or her livelihood. The inability to earn a
living may have serious consequences on the attorney's personal life, which
may in turn exacerbate the very reasons he or she requested inactive status in
the first place. Second, inactive status is a matter of public record.94 The
attorney will have exposed the most private of concerns to the world at large,
and be subject to greater scrutiny from the bar and colleagues than in the
case of voluntary treatment.95 Finally, the attorney runs the risk of not being
able to be reinstated.96
89. R. Regulating Fla. Bar 3-7.13(a).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Attorney status is provided along with the attorney's name on the Florida Bar's
website at http://www.flabar.orgl.
95. Although the Florida Board of Bar Examiners asks bar applicants a series of
questions relating to mental illness (see Coleman & Shellow, supra note 68), this author has
found no requirement that practicing attorneys keep the Bar abreast of the status of their
mental or physical health, as long as any problems remain below the materiality threshold in
MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16(a)(2). Even compliance with Rule 1.16(a)(2)-
voluntary withdrawal from representation-has no reporting requirement. In the absence of a
reporting requirement, an attorney's private concerns would remain private. There would be
no scrutiny because no one would (or should) know that the attorney has sought treatment.
96. Reinstatement is by petition to and approval by the Board of Governors, subject to
Supreme Court review. R. Regulating Fla. Bar 3-7.13.
[Vol. 27:157
173
: Nova Law Review 27, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 2002
20021 Klingen
B. Adjudication of Insanity or Mental Illness
Adjudication of insanity or mental illness will assure an attorney of
inactive status.97 Even in the absence of misconduct, the courts will suspend
the license of an attorney found to be mentally incompetent. In The Florida
Bar v. Worthington,9" the court stated that Article I1 of the Florida Bar's
Integration Rule" requires that "a lawyer who has been adjudged mentally
incompetent shall be suspended from the practice of law... subject to any
rights he may have to apply for reinstatement at the proper time and upon
proper showing."l1°
If the attorney waits until the illness or addiction manifests itself
through misconduct, the costs might increase dramatically. Although mental
illness may be considered a mitigating factor in the severity of the discipline
meted out, m  the defense of NGRI (not guilty by reason of insanity) appears
not to exist when applied to the rules of professional conduct. The various
state bars appear to have applied the equivalent of a doctrine of strict
liability regarding attorney compliance, especially regarding the handling of
trust funds.10 2 Even innocent negligence resulting in no damage to any party
may be grounds for suspension or disbarment.l
0 3
The Supreme Court of Louisiana declared that "mental defects [which
render] an [officer] of the [court] incapable of distinguishing between right
97. A lawyer who has been adjudicated insane or mentally incompetent under the
Florida Mental Health Act shall be placed on an inactive list and shall refrain from the practice
of law. R. Regulating Fla. Bar 3-7.13(b).
98. 276 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 1973).
99. FLA. STAT. § 32 (1999). Superseded. The superseding provisions to the Bylaws
Under the Integration Rule of the Florida Bar may be found in Chapter 2, Bylaws of the
Florida Bar of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar.
100. Worthington, 276 So. 2d at 39-40.
101. For example, "disbarment may be excessive discipline when mitigating evidence
of mental or substance abuse problems cast doubt upon the intentional nature of the attorney's
misconduct." Fla. Bar v. Condon, 632 So. 2d 70, 72 (Fla. 1994). See generally Sarno, supra
note 4, at 995.
102. "[M]isuse of trust account funds is one of the most serious offenses a lawyer can
commit and disbarment is normally presumed to be the appropriate discipline." Condon, 632
So. 2d at 71.
103. Mark Sturman, a former attorney in North Miami, opted for a voluntary
resignation of five years rather than face possibly greater discipline. Controls over his firm's
trust account were weak. Although all parties were paid, and there was no hint of deliberate
impropriety, some parties were paid later than they should have been, which precipitated the
original complaint and the Bar's subsequent action. From a presentation by Mr. Sturman at
Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad Law Center in April, 2002.
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and wrong [may] exempt him from criminal responsibility... or
even.., civil liability for a tort."' 0'4  However, such defects will not
"exonerate a lawyer from the consequences of his professional miscon-
duct."'105  While it might "not be humane to punish by" incarceration a
person unable to understand the wrongfulness of his acts, "it is quite another
matter to permit such a person to continue as an officer of the court."'
°6
Unlike the considerations of punishment or restitution in criminal or civil
matters, the interest and safety of the public are of the utmost importance in
disbarment proceedings.' °7 The public has a right to protection from a
lawyer who, regardless of the cause, exhibits a lack of integrity and common
honesty. 108
A New Jersey court believed that the' public also had a right to
protection from attorneys who abused the potential promise of mitigated
punishment for misconduct available to the mentally impaired. 09 The court
expressed concern over the growing number of attorneys charged with
misconduct who admitted themselves to hospitals for treatment of depression
or anxiety, and then used the excuse of temporary mental disorder as the
cause of their misconduct.'" 0
C. Mitigation
Regardless of the form of mental disorder, any mitigation of discipline
for misconduct will be contingent upon a showing of causation."'I  The
attorney will be required to demonstrate to the satisfaction of the court that,
but for the mental disorder, the attorney would not have engaged in the
misconduct. 1 2 Further, an attorney must show that he or she is actively
seeking treatment, or that he or she has been rehabilitated." 3
104. La. State Bar Ass'n v. Theard, 62 So. 2d 501, 503 (La. 1952) (citations omitted).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 504.
108. Id.
109. In re McManus, 381 A.2d 352, 353 n.l (N.J. 1978).
110. Id.
111. 7 N.Y. JUR. 2d Attorneys at Law § 405 (1997). On the other hand, in Clement, the
Florida Bar disbarred an attorney where it was shown that his "misconduct was not a direct
result of his bipolar disorder." Fla. Bar v. Clement, 662 So. 2d 690, 700 (Fla. 1995).
112. Clement, 662 So. 2d at 700.
113. See, e.g., In re Berkowitz, 730 N.Y.S.2d 118, 121 (App. Div. 2001). Sanction of
less than disbarment, given an attorney's "expressed remorse, the absence of venal
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Gregory G. Sarno, author of several articles dealing with mental illness
and attorney discipline, divides his review of the relevant cases intofive
categories: 4 alcoholism, drug dependence, neuroses, psychoses, and other
disorders. 15 Addiction to alcohol and other drug dependencies are often
included in discussions of mental illness, in part because they are considered
mental disorders in and of themselves, and also because they are often
symptomatic of, or comorbid with, some other mental disorder."
1. Alcoholism
It has generally been held that alcoholism is not an excuse for unethical
behavior,' 7 but courts differ as to whether it should be considered a
mitigating factor in discipline." 8 The courts must weigh the public policy
factors of a disapproval of alcohol addiction against the counterproductive
effect on the goal of sobriety which a lengthy suspension would have on the
affected attorney."I9
Attorneys asserting alcoholism as a defense to charges of professional120
misconduct have been met with varying degrees of success. Punishments
have ranged from disbarment 121 to reprimand, 122 the severity predicated more
on the nature of the misconduct than on its cause. For example, Thomas
intent... [and the] commencement of psychotherapy to combat his depression." Id. at 121; In
re Milloy, 571 N.W.2d 39 (Minn. 1997).
[P]sychological disability will mitigate discipline if the attorney proves by clear and
convincing evidence that five factors are met: (1) the attorney has a severe psychologi-
cal problem; (2) the psychological problem was the cause of the misconduct; (3) the
attorney is undergoing treatment and making progress; (4) the recovery has arrested the
misconduct; and (5) the misconduct is not apt to recur.
Milloy, 571 N.W.2d at 46 (citing In re Weyrich, 339 N.W.2d 274, 279 (Minn. 1983)).
114. Sarno, supra note 4, § 1.
115. 46 AM. JUR. 2d Proof of Facts 563 (1986).
116. "Nearly all alcoholics have a comorbid psychiatric disorder, most commonly
anxiety and mood disorders in women and drug abuse and antisocial personality disorders in
men." Enoch and Goldman, supra note 54, at http://www.aafp.orglafp1/20020201/44l.htm.
117. Id. See, e.g., People ex. rel. 11. State Bar Ass'n v. Tracey, 145 N.E. 665, 666 (111.
1924).
118. Sarno, supra note 4, § 9(a); see, e.g., In re Houtchens, 555 S.W.2d 24 (Mo. 1977)
(mitigation considered); In re Laury, 706 P.2d 935 (Or. 1985) (mitigation not considered).
119. See Sarno, supra note 4, § 2.
120. Id.
121. See, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Silva, 633 P.2d 538 (Haw. 1981); People v.
Moore, 561 P.2d 340 (Colo. 1977).
122. See, e.g., La. State Bar Ass'n v. Mundy, 423 So. 2d 1126 (La. 1982); In re
Johnson, 322 N.W.2d 616 (Minn. 1982).
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Larkin was suspended by the Florida Bar for failing to appear at the
continuation of a trial, and for neglecting other legal matters, after it was
shown that the misconduct was "totally from [the] effects of alcohol
abuse." 123 His willingness to seek rehabilitation resulted in a suspension of
ninety-one days and until such time as rehabilitation was established to the
satisfaction of the Bar.124 Similarly, Ray Hill125 and William Blalock' 26 were
indefinitely suspended from practice until restitution was made for the fees
collected from the clients who were affected by their misconduct as well as
for the cost of the proceedings against them, and until they were able to
convince the court of their rehabilitation.1 7 In New Jersey, Mr. Gilliam's
misappropriation of client funds was grounds for disbarment, given that his
comprehension and will power were not sufficiently impaired by his alcohol
addiction to excuse his misconduct. 128
2. Drug Dependence
Drug dependence as a defense to misconduct has been met with
responses similar to those found in cases where alcoholism was asserted as a
defense, except there are no reported cases of discipline being reduced to
mere censure or reprimand. 29 There is no evidence to indicate if this is
because drug-dependent attorneys commit more egregious ethical violations
than their alcoholic counterparts, whether the courts have less sympathy for
drug abuse than for alcohol abuse, or if the courts believe that rehabilitation
from drug dependency is more arduous than recovery from alcohol
dependency. In any event, the least severe punishment rendered against an
attorney for misconduct linked to drug abuse was suspension for a definite
time. 13 However, disbarment is not uncommon. 131 Remorse, rehabilitation,
123. Fla. Bar v. Larkin, 420 So. 2d 1080, 1081 (Fla. 1982).
124. Id.
125. In re Hill, 298 So. 2d 161, 163 (Fla. 1974).
126. Fla. Bar v. Blalock, 325 So. 2d 401, 404 (Fla. 1976).
127. Hill, 298 So. 2d at 163.
128. In re Gilliam, 524 A.2d 810 (N.J. 1987).
129. Sarno, supra note 4, § 9.
130. Id.
131. Disbarment was the proper discipline for an attorney who was convicted for drug
abuse, misappropriated client's funds, neglected his duties as executor of estate, and ignored
orders of probate court and court hearing disciplinary matter. Disciplinary Counsel v.
Connaughton, 665 N.E.2d 675, 675-76 (Ohio 1996); "Addiction to... drugs will not excuse
conduct on the part of the attorney warranting disbarment." In re Abney, 447 S.E.2d 848, 850
(S.C. 1994); In re Schlesinger, 607 N.Y.S.2d 462 (App. Div. 1994) (disbarring attorney,
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full restitution, and a willingness to help others recover from addiction will
assist the attorney in mitigating punishment. 32  Alan Larkin avoided the
presumptive sanction of disbarment for misappropriation of client funds in
this way.133  The Supreme Court of Florida overruled the Florida Bar's
request for disbarment and held that Larkin's misconduct was directly
caused by his addiction. 34 It noted that his remorse, subsequent rehabilita-
tion and his efforts to help others militated in his favor, and reduced the
proposed punishment to a three-year suspension.
135
3. Anxiety and Dissociative Disorders
Neurosis is no longer considered a distinct category of mental disorder
by the American Psychiatric Association 36 due to the absence of consensus
regarding its meaning. 37  The classification has been replaced by several
categories, including affective, anxiety, somatoform, dissociative, and
psychosexual disorders. 38  However, in lay terms, "neurotics" can be
notwithstanding indication that attorney suffered from drug addiction, was "being treated by a
physician and [was] willing to participate in.. . [bar association] program for lawyers").
132. See, e.g., In re Berkowitz, 730 N.Y.S.2d 118, 121 (App. Div. 2001); In re Milloy,
571 N.W.2d 39 (Minn. 1997).,
133. Larkin, 420 So. 2d at 1081.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Sarno, supra note 4, § 2.
137. "Some clinicians limit the term to its descriptive meaning [as indicating a painful
symptom in someone with intact reality testing] whereas others also include the concept of a
specific etiological process," an unconscious conflict arousing anxiety, leading to maladaptive
use of defense mechanisms, and resulting in symptom formation. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N,
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 9 (3d ed. 1980).
138. Sarno, supra note 4, § 2.
Mood disorders (affective disorders): A group of heterogeneous, typically recurrent
illnesses including unipolar (depressive) and bipolar (manic-depressive) disorders that
are characterized by pervasive mood disturbances, psychomotor dysfunction, and
vegetative symptoms; [Anxiety disorders: Excessive, almost daily, anxiety and worry
for greater than six months about a number of activities or events.] Somatoform
disorders: A group of psychiatric disorders characterized by physical symptoms that
suggest but are not fully explained by a physical disorder and that cause significant
distress or interfere with social, occupational, or other functioning; Dissociative
disorders: Failure to integrate one's memories, perceptions, identity, or consciousness
normally; Psychosexual disorders include sexual dysfunctions, the most common form
of psychosexual disorder seen by the practicing physician; gender identity disorders;
and paraphilias.
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distinguished from "psychotics" by their general ability to maintain insight
and to be less affected in their day-to-day living.'39 Attorneys invoking one
of the neuroses as a defense or a mitigating factor to their professional
misconduct have been disbarred or suspended, sometimes indefinitely,
sometimes until rehabilitated. 14  Probationary terms often accompany a
suspension.141
4. Psychosis
A diagnosis of psychosis would at one time have been the death knell
for an attorney's career. Traditionally, the term psychosis has been used to
denote mental disorders so severe that the affected individual is out of touch
with reality. 142  Psychoses are profound, sweeping mental disorders
characterized by severe disturbances of perception, thought processes,
feelings and behavior, and often include a retreat from, or perversion of,
social relationships and a disintegration of the personality structure.
43
Fortunately, recent advances in psychiatric treatment and medication allow
some psychotics to lead much improved lives, and the promise of more
complete recoveries may be possible as research continues in this rapidly
developing field. 144 Other than disbarment or suspension, further types of
discipline for attorneys claiming psychosis as a mitigating factor in
THE MERCK MANUAL OF DIAGNOSIS AND THERAPY § 15, ch. 186-89, 192 (Mark H. Beers &
Robert Berkow eds., 17th ed. 1999), available at http://www.merck.com/pubs/mmanual/
sections.htm (hereinafter MERCK MANUAL].
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Sarno, supra note 4, § 2.
143. Id.
144. During the 1990s there have been some dramatic advances in the treatment of
schizophrenia. Just as the serotonin re-uptake inhibitor (SRI) class of antidepressants has
largely replaced the older and more problematic tricyclic antidepressants (based in large part
on safety and side-effect considerations), a shift in the treatment of schizophrenia is now
taking place. Some quite recent studies indicate that newly available treatments for
schizophrenia may offer substantial clinical advantages over the older standard antipsychotic
(or "neuroleptic") medications. In September 1996, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
approved another new atypical antipsychotic, olanzapine, for use in schizophrenia, and
quetiapine was approved in September 1997. Several additional atypicals are currently in
large-scale clinical trials and/or pending FDA approval, including sertindole and ziprasidone.
David Shore, M.D., Editor-in-Chief, Recent Developments in Atypical Antipsychotic
Medications, Schizophrenia Bulletin, accessed at http://mentalhealth. about.com/library/drugs/
blatyp-d.htm.
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misconduct have included the ability to continue practicing subject to
compliance with the recommendation of voluntary psychiatric aid and
consultation for several years.145
5. Other Disorders
Samo's final category of mental disorder is labeled "Other Disorders,"
and includes "burn-out" and emotional distress brought on by trauma or by
severe family or financial difficulties. 146 Suffering from intense emotional
upheaval, precipitated by the dissolution of his marriage, saved Val Patarini
from disbarment after he hired a "muscle man" to threaten his ex-spouse and
inflict harm on his ex-spouse's counsel. 47 Although the court seriously
considered disbarment, it found that the attorney's long, unblemished record
combined with the severity of the distress caused by the divorce was
sufficient to preclude a more serious punishment than the one-year
suspension it imposed.148
Actual misconduct or findings of misconduct are not always a
prerequisite to suspension. 149  In 1973, the Florida Bar temporarily
suspended M. C. Scofield for being intoxicated in open court, denying ever
having seen clients who had given him a retainer, and pulling a pistol on
clients. 150 The court stopped short of finding him guilty of specific acts of
misconduct, perhaps as a kindness in view of his advanced age' 51 and
perceived senility. 152 In making its decision, the court relied on the
Integration Rule,153 which provides that an attorney not adjudicated
incompetent or accused of misconduct shall be placed on the inactive list
(suspended) when it is shown that he or she is incapable of practicing law.'
If inability to practice is suspected by conduct unrelated to the practice of
law, the court may order a psychiatric evaluation with an emphasis on
determining the attorney's competence.' 55 Failure to comply with a request
145. Id.
146. Sarno, supra note 4, § 7.
147. Fla. Bar v. Patarini, 548 So. 2d 1110, 1111 (Fla. 1989).
148. Id.
149. See Fla. Bar re. Arthur, 22 Fla. L. Weekly S551 (Sept. 4, 1997); Fla. Bar v.
Hughes, 504 So. 2d 751 (Fla. 1987); Fla. Bar v. Scofield, 287 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 1973).
150. Scofield, 287 So. 2d at 285.
151. Id. at 287. He was admitted to the Florida Bar in 1916.
152. Id.
153. R. Regulating Fla. Bar, 11.02.
154. Scofield, 287 So. 2d at 286.
155. Hughes, 504 So. 2d at 751.
2002]
180
Nova Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 1 [2002], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol27/iss1/1
Nova Law Review
for such an evaluation will result in suspension until the evaluation is
performed. 156  In Florida Bar re Arthur,157 attorney's petition for her
removal from suspension was denied while she still refused to comply with
the evaluation request.158
6. The Effect of the ADA in Attorney Misconduct Proceedings
Attempts by some attorneys to invoke the ADA 159 as precluding
punishment for mental disorders have failed.' 6° In The Florida Bar v.
Clement,16 the court held that, although Clement's bipolar disorder was a
disability under the ADA, the ADA did not prevent the court from
sanctioning Clement for misconduct. 162 Furthermore, the court found that
the misconduct was not caused by Clement's disorder and that ADA
protection was therefore not available. 163 The court went on to point out
that, even if the disorder were the direct cause of Clement's misconduct, and
given that Clement suffered from a recognized disability, he was not a
"qualified" individual under the definition of the ADA.' 64 The court held
that Clement was not qualified to be an attorney "because he committed
serious misconduct and reasonable accommodations were not possible."'
165
Three years later, the Supreme Court of Ohio cited Clement in finding that
the ADA does not preclude disbarment of an attorney with bipolar disorder
for misappropriation of client funds. 166
Malpractice insurance is unlikely to protect the mentally disordered
attorney from the pecuniary consequences of misconduct. 167  Misconduct
156. Id.
157. 22 Fla. L. Weekly at S551.
158. Id.
159. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12131 (2002).
160. The first of these cases was In re Wolfgram, 7 Nat'l Disability Law Rep. (NDLR)
45, 149 (Cal. Bar Ct. Aug. 22, 1995). See also State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Busch, 919
P.2d 1114 (Okla. 1996); Fla. Bar v. Clement, 662 So. 2d 690 (Fla. 1995).
161. 662 So. 2d at 690.
162. Id. at 699-700.
163. Id. at 700.
164. Id. See 42 U.S.C. § 12131. The ADA requires that employers make "'reasonable
modification' for individuals who are otherwise qualified to perform the demands of a certain
job (in the case of mental disorder, an employer may grant the employee permission to seek
treatment during working hours). Clement, 662 So. 2d at 700.
165. Clement, 662 So. 2d at 700.
166. Cincinnati Bar Ass'n v. Komarek, 702 N.E.2d 62, 67 (Ohio 1998).
167. Prasad v. Allstate Ins. Co., 644 So. 2d 992 (Fla. 1994). Intentional act exclusions
are typical for all insurance policies, and professional liability insurance is no exception. Id.
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caused by mental illness is generally viewed by insurance carriers even more
narrowly than it is viewed by the Bar. 68  Any act which the attorney
commits is considered intentional, and the concept of mens rea is inapplica-
ble to the insurance adjuster's analysis.' 69
IV. THE ATrORNEY'S FIRM
Mental disorders may have severe consequences for attorneys and
clients, but the structure of the Model Rules and their progeny is such that
The Supreme Court of Florida held that the actions of the insane are not "accidents" and are
thus not exempt from intentional act exclusions. Id.
[W]e hold that an injury inflicted by an insured who is psychotic is not an 'accident'
and is an intentional act within the meaning of the policy provisions at issue if the
insured intends to cause the injury even if the insured's conduct is the result of the
insured's mental condition.
Id. at 992.
[A] second line of authority concludes that an injury inflicted by an insane person is
intentional if the actor understands the physical nature and consequences of the act.
This is true even if the actor is unable to distinguish right from wrong. This second line
of authority is embraced by a number of other state supreme courts. See Shelter Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Williams, 248 Kan. 17, 804 P.2d 1374 (Kan. 1991) (an injury inflicted by
an insured who is mentally ill is intentional within the meaning of the policy provision
excluding coverage for intentional acts of the insured if the insured understands the
nature and quality of his acts and intends to cause the injury, even though the insured
may have been unable to recognize his conduct as wrongful); ... Economy Preferred
Ins. Co. v. Mass, 242 Neb. 842, 497 N.W.2d 6 (Neb. 1993) (shooter who was found
not guilty in criminal trial by reason of insanity still "intended" the results of his
actions because he knew he was shooting a gun; however, if he thought he was peeling
banana at the time he fired the gun, insanity might preclude application of intentional
injury exclusion clause); Johnson v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 350 S.E.2d 616 (Va. 1986)
(coverage of mentally ill insured who shot and injured friend was precluded by inten-
tional injury exclusion clause where insured was aware of fact that he was shooting
friend, but believed God ordered him to do so); Municipal Mutual Ins. Co. v. Mangus,
443 S.E.2d 455 (W.Va. 1994) (coverage under an intentional injury exclusion clause
may be denied when the one who commits a criminal act has a minimal awareness of
the nature of his or her act; the test for criminal insanity is appropriate only in a crimi-
nal trial and has no applicability to the interpretation of this issue). We agree with the
latter line of authority because we find that a person who is considered insane may still
be capable of entertaining the intent to commit certain acts, even if that intent is the
consequence of a delusion or affliction. For instance, an insane or mentally ill person
can still make plans to harm another, going so far as to obtain the weapon to be used
and to seek out the victim. By any stretch of the imagination, the person "intended"
the act against the victim, even if the person did not fully understand what he or she
was doing at the time of the crime.
Id. at 994-95.
168. See Prasad, 644 So. 2d at 995.
169. Id.
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the attorney's firm will not be immune from repercussions either. The
following section discusses the far-reaching consequences of mental disorder
and misconduct for the attorney's employers or partners.
Will the misconduct of the mentally disordered attorney give rise to
liability on the part of his or her employer? The firm employing the
mentally disordered has two duties in this regard. The Rules of Professional
Conduct provide that law firms must have in place managerial controls
reasonably designed to give "reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the
firm conform to the Rules."' 7 ° Secondly, a lawyer having knowledge that
another lawyer has conmuitted a violation of the rules which is to "a
substantial question as to that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as
a lawyer in other respects [is required to] inform the appropriate professional
authority."'' In other words, law firms are responsible for catching,
reporting, and correcting the misconduct of their associates and partners, and
failure to do so may lead to sanctions against the partners.
The use of the word "reasonable" in Chapter Five of the Model Rules
implies a recognition that no amount of office procedures could catch every
instance of misconduct.172 A determined attorney could conceal misconduct
for quite some time without giving rise to a Rule 5.1 violation on the part of
the firm. There have, nevertheless, been limits to the court's willingness to
interpret what is reasonable. 73 In a case cited three times for the same issue,
Florida's Court of Appeal for the Fifth District held that "presumed access
of a partner [in a law firm] to confidential information imputes knowledge of
that information to others in [the] firm,"174 implying that only deliberate
efforts at concealment by the wrongdoer will excuse a firm's lack of
knowledge and thus, shield it from liability. 1
75
170. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.1 (a) (1983).
171. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.3 (a) (1983).
172. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.1(a) (Rev. 1984). "A partner in a law
firm shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving
reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm conform to the Rules of Professional
Conduct." Id.
173. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stansbury, 374 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1979).
174. Id. at 1053.
175. Id. Courts appear to be split on this issue. For example, Florida and Illinois
impute knowledge to partners, but South Carolina requires actual knowledge. See Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 374 So. 2d at 1051. The Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, in In re Georgou, 145 B.R. 36 (Bankr. N.D.Ill. 1992), cited the Illinois Partnership
Act as controlling the vicarious liability of partners in a law finn: §13, Partnership Bound by
Wrongful Partner's Act states as follows:
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A. The Attorney's Duty to Mitigate
The comments to Florida's Rule 4-5.1, modeled after the ABA's rule
5.1, state that "[t]he supervisor is required to intervene to prevent avoidable
consequences of misconduct if the supervisor knows that the misconduct
occurred."' 176 The comments add that, "if a supervising lawyer knows that a
subordinate [has] misrepresented a matter to an opposing party in negotia-
tion, [both] the supervisor [and] the subordinate ha[ve] a duty to correct the
resulting misunderstanding."' 177 Thus, beyond the duty to report misconduct,
which will be discussed below, it should be clear that supervisory attorneys
and, by extension, law firms, have an affirmative duty to mitigate the
damage to the client and to the judicial process as a whole.
In this author's opinion, there is also an additional duty found nowhere
in the rules. It is a duty toward a coworker that is both professional and
humanitarian. In the event a coworker exhibits signs of mental disorder, but
has not yet committed misconduct, it should be incumbent upon the partners
to recommend counseling and to assist to the extent possible. Such
assistance may include reassigning the attorney's cases so as to put them out
of reach of the potential for damage through misconduct. It may also include
bar or firm sponsored rehabilitation programs, or simply mandating time off
to seek treatment. No matter what form it may take, or however painful,
early intervention is vastly preferable to the harm caused to all parties by
preventable misconduct.
There are some nuances to the extent that liability will accrue to a law
firm for the misconduct of one of its members. While the general rule is that
Where, by any wrongful act or omission of any partner acting in the ordinary course of
business of the partnership or with the authority of his copartners, loss or injury is
caused to any person, not being a partner in the partnership, or any penalty is incurred,
the partnership is liable therefore to the same extent as the partner so acting or omitting
to act.
Id. South Carolina emphasized the need for actual knowledge of wrongdoing in In re
Anonymous Member of South Carolina Bar, 552 S.E.2d 10 (S.C. 2001). It cited Rule
5.1(c)(1) and (2) of the state's Rules of Professional Conduct. These sections provide:
(c) A lawyer shall be responsible for another lawyer's violation of the Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct if: (1) The lawyer orders or, with knowledge of the specific conduct,
ratifies the conduct involved; or (2) The lawyer is a partner in the law firm in which the
other lawyer practices, or has direct supervisory authority over the other lawyer, and
knows of the conduct at a time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but
fails to take reasonable remedial action.
Id.
176. FLA. RULES OFPROF'LCONDUCT R. 4-5.1 cmt. (1988).
177. Id.
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a "firm is liable for the attorney/drafter's misconduct to the same extent as
he is,"1 78 an agency relationship must exist between the attorney and the firm
in order for the firm to incur liability. 179 Moreover, liability will not extend
beyond the attorney if the attorney is "of counsel" and not held out as acting
on behalf of the firm."8 This holds true even if the attorney's name is on the
firm letterhead. 81  Attempts by plaintiffs to extend "of counsel" liability to
the firm on the theory of agency by estoppel have also failed.182 Recognizing
generally accepted practices in partnership law, some courts have stated that
firms may not be liable for the misconduct of attorneys acting outside of the
scope of their authority. 183 In David v. Schwarzwald, Robiner, Wolf & Rock
Co.,184 the Ohio Eighth District Court of Appeals held that the determination
of the attorney's scope of authority was a question for the finder of fact, and
refused to hold the respondent law firm liable for the actions of its employee,
pending further investigation. 185
B. Duty to Report Another Attorney's Misconduct
While there is some latitude and interpretation permitted concerning the
duty to prevent misconduct, there is none at all regarding its reporting once
misconduct has been found. Cases such as Himmel186 and Skolnick v.
178. In re Klenk, 612 N.Y.S.2d 220, 222 (App. Div. 1994) (citations omitted).
179. Trimble-Weber v. Weber, 695 N.E.2d 344, 347 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997). "The Code
of Professional Responsibility does not define 'of counsel,' but does provide that '[a] lawyer
may be designated 'Of Counsel' on a letterhead if the lawyer has a continuing relationship
with a lawyer or law firm, other than as a partner or associate."' Id. (citing DR 2-102(A)(4)).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 347-48.
183. In Salit v. Ruden, McClosky, Smith, Schuster & Russell, P.A., 742 So. 2d 381, 385
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999), the Fourth District Court of Appeal stated:
The law firm's liability in this case turns on the plaintiffs' ability to attribute [its
employee's] actions to the firm. An employer is responsible for the wrongful acts of its
employee if the conduct of the employee is within the scope of his employment, which
includes acts "of the kind he is employed to perform" and that conduct "occurs sub-
stantially within authorized time and space limits and ... is activated at least in part by
a purpose to serve the [employer]."
Id. See Kane Furniture Corp. v. Miranda, 506 So. 2d 1061, 1067 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1987); Whetzel v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 266 So. 2d 89, 91 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1972);
Gates v. Utsey, 177 So. 2d 486, 488 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1965); see also David v.
Schwarzwald, Robiner, Wolf & Rock Co., 607 N.E.2d 1173 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992).
184. 607 N.E.2d 1173 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992).
185. Id. at 1183-84.
186. 533 N.E.2d 790 (Ill. 1988).
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Altheimer & Gray'87 are an indication of the gravity with which the courts
regard the reporting of misconduct. The courts have consistently held that
the requirement to report misconduct is absolute, 188 leaving attorneys to
wander about in a minefield where reporting is required, but where the
determination of what constitutes misconduct remains open for interpreta-
tion.
Comments to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 8.3 read as
follows:
If a lawyer were obliged to report every violation of the Rules, the
failure to report any violation would itself be a professional of-
fense. Such a requirement existed in many jurisdictions but proved
to be unenforceable. This Rule limits the reporting obligation to
those offenses that a self-regulating profession must vigorously en-
deavor to prevent. A measure of judgment is, therefore, required in
complying with the provisions of this Rule. The term "substantial"
refers to the seriousness of the possible offense and not the quan-
tum of evidence of which the lawyer is aware.189
Generally speaking, the type of misconduct to be reported is no surprise:
misappropriation of client funds, bribery, blatant violations of confidential-
ity, fraud, forgery of a client's signature, and so on.190 Difficulties arise
when the misconduct is not so clearly defined,' 9' where the reporting
187. 730 N.E.2d 4 (111. 2000).
188. "Ten states follow the Model Code of Professional Responsibility's formulation
that requires reporting of all ethical violations including technical infractions. (Alabama,
Colorado, Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa, Illinois, Louisiana, Nebraska, Ohio and Vermont). The
majority of states including Texas, follow the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which
requires a substantial violation." Bruce A. Campbell, To Squeal or Not to Squeal: A Thinking
Lawyer's Guide to Reporting Lawyer Misconduct, 1 FLA. COASTAL L.J. 265, 268 n.12 (1999)
[hereinafter Campbell]; see also Skolnick, 730 N.E.2d at 14.
189. MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.3 cmt. (2002).
190. Campbell, supra note 188, at 274.
191. For example, in Attorney U v. The Mississippi Bar, 678 So. 2d 963, 972 (Miss.
1996), the Supreme Court of Mississippi held that U did not have sufficient knowledge of S's
misconduct to require him to report it. In so holding, the court stated:
[t]hat standard must be an objective one, however, not tied to the subjective beliefs of
the lawyer in question. The supporting evidence must be such that a reasonable lawyer
under the circumstances would have formed a firm opinion that the conduct in ques-
tion had more likely than not occurred and that the conduct, if it did occur, raises a
substantial question as to the purported offender's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness to
practice law in other respects. Id.
Additionally, Bruce Campbell states:
186
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attorney notices a pattern of incidents that as a group are reportable but
individually are not,192 and particularly, where the reporting attorney must
make a judgment call and knows he or she could be mistaken. 193 This is
further exacerbated by the feeling that reporting is "squealing."' 194 To quote
Campbell: "Few rules... stir more emotion and potential controversy than
the 'squealer' or 'snitch' rule .... [t]he 'schoolyard' refrain of tattletale still
rings... in our minds." 195 Tattletale or not, failure to "squeal" can be costly.
A Texas attorney was suspended for thirty-nine months for violating "rules
regarding candor toward the tribunal [for failing] to report another lawyer's
misconduct."196
If one covers for a partner at a hearing once because the partner was
still intoxicated from the previous night's activities, does the intoxication
raise a substantial question as to the partner's fitness? If one covers for the
partner a second, a third, or a fourth time? Who decides when conduct
becomes reportable misconduct? An attorney confronted with such a
situation may consult the state's ethics committee for guidance, 19' but the
final determination rests with the state's highest court of appeal.19' if the
ethics committee and the court differ in an interpretation, the court prevails
and the attorney may9 face sanctions despite his reliance on the ethics
committee's opinion.
See Nebraska Ethics Op. 89-4; "Because knowledge in the reporting rule means more
than a suspicion, a lawyer need not report mere suspicions of code violations." Id.
New Mexico's position is that the mandatory obligation to report occurs "when a
lawyer has a substantial basis for believing a serious ethical violation has occurred,
regardless of the source of that information." New Mexico Ethics Op. 1988-8 (un-
dated). The Committee on Professional Ethics of the Association of the Bar of the City
of New York Bar states that a "reporting lawyer must be in possession of facts that
clearly establish a violation of the disciplinary rules." New York City Ethics, Op.
1990-3 (1990). The District of Columbia Bar Ass'n has concluded that a lawyer is
compelled to report "only if she has a clear belief that misconduct has occurred, and
possesses actual knowledge of the pertinent facts." District of Columbia Bar, Op. 246
(Revised 1994).
Campbell, supra note 188, at 277.
192. See Attorney U, 678 So. 2d at 972.
193. Id.
194. Campbell, supra note 188, at 265.
195. Id.
196. Bruce A. Campbell & Ruth A. Kollman, The Lady or the Tiger? Opening the
Door to Lawyer Discipline Standards, 1 Fla. Coastal L.J. 231, 248 (1999) (citing Grievance
Disciplinary Actions, 61 Tex B.J. 281, 283 (1998)).
197. See, generally, Campbell, supra note 188; Attorney U, 678 So. 2d at 963.
198. Id.
199. Id.
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C. Risks of Reporting
Reporting misconduct is a two-edged sword. Those who fail to report
run afoul of the state's disciplinary authorities. 200 Those who report run the
risk of expulsion from the partnership, and with it, attendant loss of work,
financial hardship, and dubious reputation as a whistleblower. 201 Although a
fiduciary duty exists between partners in a law firm, such a duty "does not
encompass a duty to remain partners. 2 °2 Despite arguments that such an
extension of a partner's duty is necessary to prevent retaliation against a
partner who in good faith reports suspected misconduct, the court in Bohatch
held that "Ulust as a partner can be expelled... over disagreements about
firm policy... a partner can be expelled for accusing another partner of
[misconduct] without subjecting the partnership to tort damages. 2 3 The
court's majority understood the dissent's concern that "retaliation against a
partner... virtually assures that others will not take these appropriate steps
in the future, ' 2°4 but stated that a lawyer's "duties sometimes necessitate
difficult decisions ... " and that "[t]he fact that the ethical duty to report
may create an irreparable schism between partners [does not] excuse the
failure to report." 0
A mentally disordered attorney may be in a difficult professional
position, but failure to take action on his or her own behalf places partners in
a more difficult position. The partners will likely agonize over decisions
forced on them when the illness or addiction reaches the point where it
impairs the ability to practice. The firm may, as mentioned above, suggest
counseling or threaten expulsion, but once the illness manifests itself by
misconduct, it will be forced to report him or her. The interpersonal
difficulties that such action poses may well be fatal to the survival of the
firm, especially in a small partnership where the principals share something
more than just a professional relationship.
The partnership discussed in the opening anecdote chose to do nothing.
It stood by, wringing its collective hands, as Pfenning's cases dissolved into
a collection of nonactionable disputes, whose statutes of limitations had long
since passed. There is plenty of blame to go around here. Although
200. The watershed case here is In re Himmel, 533 N.E.2d 790 (I11. 988). See
discussion of this and other issues related to "whistleblowing" in Campbell, supra note 188.
201. See Bohatch v. Butler & Binion, 977 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. 1998).
202. Id. at 546.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 547 (quoting Spector, J., dissenting).
205. Bohatch, 977 S.W.2d at 547.
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Pfenning had ultimate responsibility for his conduct, illness or not, the
inaction of his partners exacerbated an arguably correctible situation. Their
inaction ruined them and, more importantly, ruined the cases of their clients
and made a mockery of the judicial process.
V. CONCLUSION
Although the incidence of malpractice due to mental illness is
statistically not high,2° such a revelation is of small comfort to those clients
forever prevented from pursuing their claims because of unanticipated
attorney misconduct. Of the three parties to an attorney's mental illness-
the client, the attorney, and the law firm-the client is least able to protect
him or herself, and the most likely to suffer damage in the professional
setting.2 °7
Measures in place to arrest lawyer misconduct before it has irremedi-
able consequences are necessarily inadequate to guarantee complete security
for clients. Nevertheless, clients should have some responsibility for their
own cases. This responsibility should never be abdicated in the expectation
that the attorney is some form of savior. Greater client vigilance in
selecting, monitoring, and where necessary, abandoning an attorney may
have prevented many unhappy endings and malpractice suits.
The second party in the trial is the attorney. The justice system will be
well served if the disordered attorney is able to seek help or withdraw from
practice before the consequences of misconduct damage reputations and
lives. This is an impossible step for some attorneys, and is where the third
party comes into play.
It is understood that attorneys have a duty to abide by the Rules of
Professional Conduct, and to seek treatment or removal when they are
unable to do so. It is also clear that no attorney works in utter isolation-
even solo practitioners generally have family or friends. The attorney's
employers or partners are the next line of defense, and they have a moral and
ethical duty to protect the interests of all of their clients. They also have a
duty to protect their mentally disordered colleague from further damage to
self and to the profession.
209
206. See discussion infra notes 18-19.
207. Other parties might include family, friends, spiritual advisors, medical personnel,
personal creditors of the attorney, and whomever else the attorney's conduct affects in the
normal course of living.
208. See infra part III.
209. Id.
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Mental illness rarely gives rise to the same measure of compassion as
physical illness or damage. A diagnosis of influenza or a broken leg in a
partner elicits compassion; a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia may still
elicit suspicion, fear, and flight. This must change for two reasons: moral
and pragmatic. The moral question is deeply personal, but the pragmatic
question points straight to the Rules of Professional Responsibility. Failure
to address the existence of a mental disorder in a colleague leads to disaster
for clients, for the attorney, and quite rightly, for the law firm. The spineless
response of Pfenning's partners hurt them all.
Appropriate action by the law firm at the first substantial hint of a
problem or misconduct may be painful, but the consequences of cowardice
are so great that a de facto decision to do nothing is impossible to justify.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Supermarkets in the United States annually spend $450 million to
defend slip-and-fall claims.' In Florida, slip-and-fall cases are one of the
most common types of premises liability suits. 2 Under Florida law, premises
owners, such as supermarkets, owe a duty toward invitees , such as shoppers,
4to exercise reasonable care in the safe maintenance of their premises.
Traditionally, invitees who slipped and fell on a transitory foreign
substance,5 such as a banana peel, were required to prove that the premises
owner had actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition.7
Constructive knowledge could be established by circumstantial
evidence, such as the length of time a substance had been on the floor, or
that spills occurred frequently such that the premises owner should have
known about them.8 Thus, the invitee bore the burden of proof. However,
the court's holding in Owens v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc.,9 changed morethan thirty years of Florida law by eliminating the need to prove actual or
1. Susan R. Miller, Shifting Burden of Proof. Florida Supreme Court's Rule Change
in Slip-and-Fall Cases Gladdens Plaintiff Bar, Infuriates Defense Lawyers and Business
Groups, MIAMI Bus. DAILY REV., Dec. 10, 2001, at 6 [hereinafter Miller I].
2. 6 THOMAS D. SAWAYA, FLORIDA PERSONAL INJURY AND WRONGFUL DEATH
ACTIONS, § 10.13, at 601 (West Group 2001-2002 ed.) (2001).
3. "Invitee" generally refers to "someone who entered the premises of another for
purposes connected with the business of the owner or occupier." Id. at 563 (citations omitted).
4. Owens v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 802 So. 2d 315, 320 (Fla. 2001) (citing
Everett v. Rest. & Catering Corp., 738 So. 2d 1015, 1016 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999)).
5. Transitory foreign substance is referred to as "any liquid or solid substance, item,
or object located where it does not belong ... [a] substance found ... where it is not supposed
to be found." Id. at 317 n.1 (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 660 (7th ed. 1999)).
6. Owens, 802 So. 2d at 317.
7. 6 SAWAYA, supra note 2, § 10.12, at 598.
8. Publix Super Mkt., Inc. v. Sanchez, 700 So. 2d 405, 406 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1997) (citations omitted); Brooks v. Phillip Watts Enter., Inc., 560 So. 2d 339, 341 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
9. 802 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 2001).
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constructive knowledge and shifting the burden of proof from the invitee to
the premises owner.10 As a result of this ruling, the Florida Retail Federa-
tion, representing 6000 retailers statewide, began damage control and formed
the Banana Peel Coalition in seeking legislative redress." In 2002, Florida's
legislature unanimously rpassed Senate Bill 1946,12 also known as the
Banana Peel Legislation,' creating section 768.0710 of the Florida Statutes,
that will codify the burden of proof in slip-and-fall cases. 14 The bill, in part,
retained the decision in Owens by eliminating the requirement of actual and
constructive knowledge.' 5 However, the burden of proof essentially shifted
back from the premises owner to the invitee,' 6 thus undoing the Supreme
Court of Florida's ruling in Owens.
This article will examine the Owens decision, its effect, and the effect
of Senate Bill 1946. Beginning with Part 11, this article will review Florida's
old slip-and-fall law by examining the general rule, elements, burdens of
proof, and applicable liability theories. Part I will present an overview of
the facts and the court's analysis in Owens, outlining how the court came to
its decision. Part IV will examine the impact of Owens by discussing how
the ruling has changed Florida's slip-and-fall law regarding the duties of
both the plaintiff shopper and the defendant supermarket. Part V will
examine the business community's response to Owens, and the Florida
Legislature's approval of Senate Bill 1946. Part VI will examine the effect
of Senate Bill 1946 by discussing whether the plaintiff shopper and the
defendant supermarket have been equally placed regarding the burden of
proof. Part VII will conclude that although Senate Bill 1946 has settled the
burden of proof in slip-and-fall actions, the plaintiff shopper remains in a
disadvantaged position when compared to that of the defendant supermarket,
because the plaintiff shopper's burden of proof remains great and arguably
difficult to satisfy. Further, in accordance with the Supreme Court of
Florida's notation in Owens, the defendant supermarket is in a superior
10. John Kennedy, Court's Banana-Peel Act is No Joke, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Nov.
16, 2001, 2001 WL 28423739 [hereinafter Court's Banana-Peel Act Is No Joke].
11. A Slippery Slope, Florida Ruling Could Trigger an Avalanche of Slip-and-Fall
Suits, CHMAN STORE AGE, Mar. 1, 2002, at 104, 2002 WL 11205724 [hereinafter A Slippery
Slope].
12. Act effective May 30, 2002, Ch. 2002-285, 2002 Fla. Sess. Law Rep. 873 (to be
codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.0710).
13. Banana Peel Coalition Legislation Passes Committee, Feb. 22, 2002, at
http://www.flchamber.con/home/FBAR_020222.asp (last visited July 05, 2002).
14. Ch. 2002-285, 2002 Fla. Laws 2125 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.0710).
15. See id. § 1(2)(b).
16. See id. § 1(2).
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position because it has immediate access to its own reports, records, and in
today's supermarkets, surveillance of the premises. '
7
II. FLORIDA'S SLIP-AND-FALL LAW BEFORE OWENS V. PUBLIX
SUPERMARKETS, INC.
Prior to the court's decision in Owens, Florida's slip-and-fall law was
clear: in order for a premises owner to be liable for an invitee's injuries, the
injured invitee had to prove the premises owner had actual or constructive
knowledge of the dangerous condition. 1
A. Actual and Constructive Knowledge Required in Slip-and-Fall Actions
Under Florida law, a premises owner owes a legal duty to exercise
reasonable care in the maintenance of his or her premises against dangerous
conditions.' 9 The exercise of reasonable care toward an invitee includes:
[Tiwo legal duties .... First... [the premises owner shall] ascer-
tain that the premises are reasonably safe for invitees [includ-
ing] ... reasonable care to learn of (i.e. to acquire actual knowl-
edge as to) the existence of any dangerous conditions on the prem-
ises. Secondly, the premises [owner] has a... legal duty to use
reasonable care to protect invitees from dangerous conditions of
which the [premises owner] has actual knowledge.20
If a premises owner had actual knowledge of a dangerous condition,
such as a slippery substance on the floor, then the premises owner had a
21legal duty to remedy the condition. If a premises owner lacked actual
knowledge of a slippery substance on the floor, but the substance was there
for a sufficient length of time, the premises owner could be charged with
22constructive knowledge. Thus, premises owners were required to conduct
timely inspections in order to discover those dangerous conditions of which
23they did not actually know. Constructive knowledge could be established
17. Owens v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 802 So. 2d 315, 330 (Fla. 2001).
18. Id. at 320.
19. Id.
20. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Marcotte, 553 So. 2d 213, 214 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1989) (citations omitted).
21. 6 SAWAYA, supra note 2, § 10.6, at 566.
22. Id.
23. Id.
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by circumstantial evidence. 24  Sufficient circumstantial evidence shows
either, "(1)... the dangerous condition existed for such a length of time that
in the exercise of ordinary care, the [premises owner] should have known of
the condition.., or (2)... the condition occurred with regularity and was
therefore foreseeable."25
In the former situation, whether the length of time a transitory foreign
substance remained on the floor was sufficient to establish constructive
26knowledge depended on the facts and circumstances of each case.
27However, the general guideline has been fifteen to twenty minutes.
Typically, the length of time would be determined by the slip-and-fall
plaintiff's ability to describe the condition and appearance of the sub-
28
stance. However, Florida appellate courts have differed on whether the
description was sufficient to charge the premises owner with constructive
knowledge. The Third District has held that the description of transitory
foreign substance as "'very dirty,' 'trampled,' 'containing skid marks, scuff
marks' ... 'chewed up,"' is sufficient circumstantial evidence to establish a
jury question of constructive knowledge. 29 For example, evidence of water
around a bag of peas lying on the floor in the frozen food section could be
enough for a jury to conclude that the water was a result of the bag of peas
thawing out over some time, and thus the defendant supermarket was put on
notice of the dangerous condition.3 ° Still, other Florida appellate courts have
held the description ' of the substance, without more, as insufficient
circumstantial evidence to charge the defendant supermarket with construc-
tive knowledge. 3' For example, if a shopper slipped and fell on a piece of
cake on the floor and the shopper could not describe the condition of the
24. Montgomery v. Fla. Jitney Jungle Stores, Inc., 281 So. 2d 302, 306 (Fla. 1973);
Woods v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 621 So. 2d 710, 711 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Brooks
v. Phillip Watts Enter., Inc., 560 So. 2d 339, 341 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Nance v.
Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 436 So. 2d 1075, 1076 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Amended
Petitioners Initial Brief on Merits at 14, Owens v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 802 So. 2d 315
(Fla. 2001) (No. 95, 667) (citations omitted).
25. Brooks, 560 So. 2d at 341 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
26. 6 SAWAYA, supra note 2, § 10.13, at 603 (citations omitted).
27. Teate v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 524 So. 2d 1060, 1061 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1988); Winn Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Williams, 264 So. 2d 862, 864 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1972).
28. Woods, 621 So. 2d at 711.
29. Id.
30. Teate, 524 So. 2d at 1061.
31. Publix Super Mkt., Inc. v. Sanchez, 700 So. 2d 405, 406 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1997); Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc v. Marcotte, 553 So. 2d 213, 214 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1989).
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cake to suggest its length of time on the floor, the issue of constructive
knowledge would be precluded from the jury.32 Yet, the Second District has
held that, even if the description of the transitory foreign substance was
available to suggest its length of time on the floor, the description was still
insufficient circumstantial evidence.
Florida courts have also held that constructive knowledge may be
34
established under the theory of foreseeability. Foreseeability is based on
the idea that when an occurrence or spill occurs with regularity, the
occurrence is foreseeable, and the premises owner is charged with a legal
duty to reasonably inspect the premises so as to determine whether a
substance has been spilled.3' For example, the Second District noted that, in
a supermarket setting, it is foreseeable that shoppers will handle fruits and
vegetables, will open packages, and will drop parts of those items on the
36floor. Because such occurrences are foreseeable, the supermarket owes a
duty toward shoppers to reasonably inspect the floors in order to discover the
presence of hazards, such as slippery substances. 37 Reasonable inspection of
38the floors would prevent a shopper from falling and sustaining injury.
B. Negligent Mode of Operation Theory
The negligent mode of operation theory is an alternative method
available to meet the requirement of constructive knowledge for injured
parties who slipped and fell as a result of a transitory foreign substance on
the floor. 39 This method is most crucial in cases where the timespan in
which a transitory foreign substance had been on the floor cannot be
32. Sanchez, 700 So. 2d at 406.
33. Bates v. Winn-Dixie Supermarkets, Inc., 182 So. 2d 309, 311 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1966).
34. Marcotte, 553 So. 2d at 215; Cain v. Brown, 569 So. 2d 771, 772 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1990); Nance v. Winn Dixie Stores, Inc., 436 So. 2d 1075, 1077 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1983); Amended Petitioners Initial Brief at 14-15, Owens (No. 95, 667); 6 SAWAYA,
supra note 2, § 10.13, at 602.
35. 6 SAWAYA, supra note 2, § 10.13, at 603.
36. Cain, 569 So. 2d at 772.
37. 6 SAWAYA, supra note 2, § 10.13, at 602.
38. Id.
39. John H. Hickey, Slip and Fall Cases: Alternative Theories of Liability or Using
the Negligent Method of Operation and Negligent Maintenance Theories, ATLA ANNUAL
CONVENTION REFERENCE MATERIALS, MOTOR VEHICLE COLLISION, HIGHWAY, AND PREMISES
LIABILITY SECTION, 779 (July 2001).
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established. 40 Rather, liability rests on the idea that the premises owner
created a dangerous condition through his or her own repeated conduct.4'
A negligence action based on the mode of operation theory requires the
injured party to prove "1) either the method of operation is inherently
dangerous, or the particular operation is being conducted in a negligent
manner; and 2) the [dangerous] condition of the floor was created as a result
of the negligent method of operation."
42
One commentator explained the application of the two-prong test in a
supermarket setting.43 If grocery items are being served in open bins and are
likely to drop on the floor and thus cause a fall, the method of operation is
inherently dangerous and thus the first prong of the test is satisfied." If the
injured party could then show that the grocery item on the floor was in close
proximity to where it was shelved or being served, the second prong of the
test should also be satisfied4 5 However, Florida courts have been reluctant
to accept the negligent method of operation theory in a supermarket setting,
primarily because displays are not inherently dangerous.4
The negligent mode of operation theory has been more easily applied to
public amusement places.47 More than fifty years ago, the Supreme Court of
Florida was faced with the application of this theory in Wells v. Palm Beach
48Kennel Club. In that case, large groups of individuals went to the
racetrack.49 The racetrack sold bottled beverages but failed to provide any
bins to dispose of the empty bottles.50 The patrons threw the empty bottles
on the floor.5' A patron tripped and fell on an empty bottle in one of the
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. 6 SAWAYA, supra note 2, § 10.13, at 603-04.
43. Hickey, supra note 39, at 3.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Owens v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 802 So. 2d 315, 324 (Fla. 2001) (citing
Publix Super Mikt. Inc. v. Sanchez, 700 So. 2d 405, 406-07 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997)
(rejecting cake sample display as inherently dangerous or negligently maintained)); Rowe v.
Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 714 So. 2d 1180, 1181 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (rejecting
application of negligent mode of operation to the supermarket setting); Schaap v. Publix
Supermarkets, Inc., 579 So. 2d 831, 834 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (rejecting store's
cookie program as negligently maintained or inherently dangerous).
47. Wells v. Palm Beach Kennel Club, 35 So. 2d 720, 721 (Fla. 1948).
48. 35 So. 2d 720 (Fla. 1948)
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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aisles and sued the racetrack. 2 Based on the negligent mode of operation
theory, the court held it was for the jury to decide whether the racetrack was
negligent in the manner in which it sold its bottled beverages. 3 Thus, the
issue for the jury was whether the racetrack's failure to provide garbae bins
for the disposal of its empty bottles created a dangerous condition. If a
jury found that the racetrack implemented a negligent method of operation,
then it follows that it was the creator of the dangerous condition. 5
Therefore, constructive knowledge is not an issue.
5 6
iH. OWENS V. PUBLIX SUPERMARKETS, INC.
A. Owens v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc.: A Plaintiff's Attorney's Dream
Come True
Because the Supreme Court of Florida was faced with the issue of
whether the condition of a transitory foreign substance in a slip-and-fall
action is, alone, sufficient to charge the premises owner with constructive
knowledge in two cases,57 the court consolidated these cases into one
opinion.
1. Facts of Owens v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc.
Evelyn Owens ("Owens") was a part-time employee of Publix
Supermarkets, Inc.5 9 After finishing her day at work, Owens decided to do
some grocery shopping. 6 While walking down an aisle and looking at the
61. 62
shelved merchandise, Owens slipped and fell. At trial, Owens testified
52. Id.
53. Wells, 35 So. 2d at 721.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Owens v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 802 So. 2d 315, 323 (Fla. 2001).
57. Owens v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 729 So. 2d 449 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1999) (en banc); Soriano v. B & B Cash Grocery Stores, Inc., 757 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1999).
58. Owens, 802 So. 2d at 317 n.2.
59. Amended Petitioners Initial Brief on Merits at 1, Owens v. Publix Supermarkets,
Inc., 802 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 2001) (No. 95, 667).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Owens, 802 So. 2d at 317.
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63that she did not see what caused her to slip and fall. However, a witness in
close proximity to Owens at the time of the incident testified that Owens had
slipped on a small piece of slightly discolored banana.6 Although the
witness could not testify as to the length of time the banana had been on the
floor, she was able to describe it as "'a piece of banana' without the
peel.., about an inch or longer and 'kind of mushed... where she hit
it. . . kind of squashed down.' ... It wasn't black, but it was dark. 65 It
was undisputed b6 Publix that Owens was an invitee at the time of her slip-
and-fall incident. As a result of Owens's fall, she was transported to the
hospital, treated and released, but was unable to work for several weeks.67
Owens provided two theories charging Publix liable for her injuries: "[1] the
length of time the substance was on the floor [and] ... [2] foreseeability and
4,8failure to warn. Through discovery it was revealed that, on average,
Publix experienced one or more slip-and-falls per month,69 in the nine
months prior to Owens's incident. On the day of trial, but before
presenting testimony, Owens asked the court's permission for a jury
demonstration to show the length of time it would take a small piece of fresh
peeled banana to discolor.7' Owens reasoned that, "'[the] banana ... must
have been sitting there for a while, because it takes more than a few minutes
for it to turn brown.', 72 Nevertheless, the court denied the request because
the "[demonstration] didn't matter: There was insufficient evidence to show
Publix was liable.,
73
At the end of Owens's case-in-chief, Publix moved for a directed
verdict.74 Publix argued Owens failed to present evidence that it had actual
or constructive knowledge of the banana peel on the floor.75 The trial court
76relied on Bates v. Winn-Dixie Supermarkets, Inc., because the facts in that
63. Id.
64. Amended Petitioners Initial Brief at 1, Owens (No. 95, 667).
65. Owens, 802 So. 2d at 317.
66. Amended Petitioners Initial Brief at 1, Owens (No. 95, 667).
67. Id.
68. Id. at4.
69. Id.
70. Owens, 802 So. 2d at 318 n.3.
71. Amended Petitioners Initial Brief at 6, Owens (No. 95, 667).
72. Court's Banana-Peel Act Is No Joke, supra note 10.
73. John Kennedy, Slip-and-Fall Plaintiffs Will Have Day in Court, SUN-SENTINEL,
Nov. 16, 2001, at 6B, 2001 WL 29955409.
74. Owens, 802 So. 2d at 318.
75. Id.
76. 182 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
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case were similar to the facts in Owens. In that case, a shopper also fell on
a banana peel described as "'dark,' 'over ripe,' 'black,' 'old,' and 'nasty
looking."" 8 The Bates court ruled in favor of the premises owner, holding
that the color and condition of the banana peel, as the only evidence, would
require a jury to impermissibly stack inferences.79 In other words, the jury
would be required to "stack a second inference (because of the color of the
item the premises owner should have known of its existence) upon the first
inference (the item was not that color when it was placed on the floor). 80
Thus, applying the holding in Bates to Owens, the trial court concluded that
the condition of the banana was insufficient evidence to hold Publix liable. 8,
82Therefore, the trial court granted the directed verdict in favor of Publix.
Owens appealed.
83
On appeal, the Fifth District reversed the directed verdict but upon
rehearing en banc, it affirmed the trial court's decision8 4 In doing so, the
Fifth District framed the issue to be: "'Does the fact that a piece of
discolored banana is found on the floor give rise to an inference that [it] had
been there long enough to give this critical constructive knowledge?"' 85 The
court's response was "'it depends on the other circumstances of the case.
' 86
Reviewing the circumstances in Owens, the Fifth District pointed out two
possible theories as to how the banana got on the floor.87 First, the aging of
the banana may have occurred on the floor; second, the aging of the banana
may have occurred in the store's fruit bin from which a shopper took it and
gave it to an infant being pushed in a shopping cart, who then dropped it on
the floor just prior to Owens walking down the aisle in which it lay.88 In
77. Owens v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 729 So. 2d 449, 450 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1999) (en banc).
78. Bates v. Winn-Dixie Supermarkets, Inc., 182 So. 2d 309, 310 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1966).
79. Id.
80. Motion for Rehearing En Banc at 2, Owens v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 802 So.
2d 315 (Fla. 2001) (No. 95,667).
81. Owens, 729 So. 2d at 450.
82. Id.
83. Owens, 802 So. 2d at 318.
84. Id.
85. Id. (citing to Owens, 729 So. 2d at 449).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Owens, 802 So. 2d at 318.
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order for Publix to be charged with constructive knowledge, the Fifth
District would have had to agree with the former theory and not the latter.s9
The Fifth District held that because there were two possible theories as
to how the banana got on the floor, Owens bore the burden of proof in
regards to where the aging of the banana actually occurred. 9° In reaching its
conclusion, the Fifth District relied on Montgomery v. Florida Jitney Jungle
Stores, Inc.,9 1 where the plaintiff provided the court with "additional
circumstances" to establish the length of time the transitory foreign
substance was on the floor. 92 These additional circumstances included 1) the
time span the plaintiff was in the area of the fall prior to the accident; 2)
whether other individuals were in the area of the fall; 3) whether store
employees swept the floor during that period; 4) whether store employees
were in the area of the fall; and 5) the description of the transitory foreign
substance.93 Thus, when comparing the evidence in that case with the
Owens's case, the Fifth District, in a 6-2 vote, concluded that there were no
"additional circumstances" to justify the inference that Publix had
constructive knowledge.
94
Judge Sharp, in his dissenting opinion, agreed that the Montgomery
court was not faced with the issue of whether the condition of the item, by
itself, was sufficient to create a jury question on constructive knowledge.
However, Judge Sharp stated that the decision in Montgomery should not be
extended to include the proposition that additional evidence is needed other
than the condition of the substance for an injured party to withstand a
directed verdict.96 In Owens, Judge Sharp stated that Owens presented
sufficient evidence to charge Publix with constructive knowledge even
though Owens did not see what caused her fall.97 More specifically, Judge
Sharp pointed out that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence because
there was a witness who testified that she was 1) in close proximity to where
Owens fell; 2) saw what caused Owens's fall; 3) described the substance as a
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. 281 So. 2d 302 (Fla. 1973).
92. Owens, 802 So. 2d at 318 (citing Montgomery, 281 So. 2d at 306).
93. Montgomery, 281 So. 2d at 303. In Montgomery, the transitory foreign substance
was collard leaves that the slip-and-fall plaintiff described as "old, wilted and dirty looking."
Id.
94. Owens v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 729 So. 2d 449 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1999).
95. Id. at 452.
96. Id.
97. Id. at451.
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piece of banana that was discolored, kind of mushed, squashed down, and
dark; and 4) that it looked like it was there for a while. 98
2. Facts of Soriano v. B & B Cash Grocery Stores, Inc.
99
Elvia Soriano ("Soriano") was a frequent shopper at B & B Cash
Grocery Stores, Inc. ("B & B Grocery").'m After finishing her Sunday
afternoon of shopping at B & B Grocery, she proceeded to the store's exit,
and while pushing her shopping cart, she slipped and fell to the ground.' 0 '
After a store manager helped Soriano get up, he pointed out that she had
slipped and fallen on a banana peel and scraped it off the sole of her shoe.10 2
Soriano described the piece of banana peel as "brown with very little yellow
on it,"'0 3 and stated, "it looked like a rotten banana because of the condition
of the peel."' °4 At trial, Soriano was able to testify to the description of the
banana peel but unable to testify to the length of time the banana peel was on
the floor. °5 In an attempt to rebut the inference that the banana peel was
rotten because it was on the floor for a sufficient length of time, B & B's
store manager, Jose Alvarez ("Alvarez"), testified "the store sold only clean,
nice, yellow bananas.., not... darkened, browned out bananas, since
customers generally do not like to buy brown bananas."' 6 Alvarez also
testified that, based on his knowledge, the length of time a banana takes to
turn from yellow to brown is one to two days. 10 7 However, he also stated
that it was not uncommon for shoppers to eat the store's grocery items while
shopping and then drop some of the item on the floor. 18 Further, he testified
"that he considere[d] a banana on the floor a hazard... [and] something he
would want picked up 'immediately."'' 9
98. Id.
99. 757 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
100. Brief on Merits of Petitioners at 1, Soriano v. B & B Cash Grocery Stores, Inc.,
757 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (No. 96, 235).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. However, it was revealed that Soriano did not see the banana nor did she
know how long it had been on the floor. Brief of Petitioners at 1 n. 1, Soriano (No. 96, 235).
105. Id. at 2.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Brief of Petitioners at 3, Soriano (No. 96, 235).
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Although B & B Grocery required employees to make an hourly
inspection of the store's premises and fill out a report after each inspection,
Alvarez admitted that these reports were only completed at one time-rather
than hourly or even daily-by the assistant manager on duty on Saturday
nights. 0  Furthermore, none of the reports ever indicated that any
substances or debris were found on the floor. Based on Alvarez's
admission, these reports were being falsified." 2 Apparently, falsified reports
were common practice among all B & B Grocery stores.' 3 Although an
assistant manager filled out an accident report on the day of Soriano's
accident, the report failed to describe the color of the banana or indicate
whether an employee had been in the area of the accident shortly before
Soriano fell."14 This information might have made a critical difference in the
outcome of Soriano's case. As a result of the accident, Soriano sustained a
fractured kneecap and sued B & B Grocery for her injury based on two
theories. " 5
Soriano alleged, first, that B & B Grocery had constructive knowledge
that the banana peel was on the floor because it was there for a sufficient
length of time, and second, that B & B Grocery had a negligent method of
operation." 6 The trial court granted a directed verdict for B & B Grocery
and the Fourth District affirmed." 7 The Fourth District held that Soriano's
contention that B & B Grocery had constructive knowledge was based upon
an impermissible stacking of inferences. 18 Also, the Fourth District held
that the condition of the banana peel, by itself, was insufficient evidence."9
Rather, the Fourth District held that additional evidence like "cart tracks,
footprints, dirt, or even grit," 2° was necessary to establish that the banana
peel had been on the floor for a sufficient length of time necessary to charge
B & B Grocery with constructive knowledge. 21 As to Soriano's contention
that B & B Grocery was negligent in its mode of operation, the Fourth
District rejected the application of this theory to a supermarket setting as an
110. Id. at 3.
111. Id. at 3-4.
112. Id. at4.
113. Id.
114. Brief of Petitioners at 5, Soriano (No. 96,235).
115. Id. at 6.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Brief of Petitioners at 6-7, Soriano (No. 96,235).
120. Id. at 7.
121. Id.
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alternative to the traditional requirement of establishing actual or construc-
tive knowledge in a slip-and-fall action.
22
B. Analysis of Owens: An Overview of the Law as it Was
In analyzing Owens, the Supreme Court of Florida's forty-two page
opinion began with an overview of Florida's slip-and-fall law by first
targeting the required element of actual or constructive knowledge as related
to transitory foreign substance cases,123 followed by a review of the mode of
operation theory, 124 and ending with an examination of what other
jurisdictions have done. 125
1. Plaintiffs Traditionally Required to Prove Actual or Constructive
Knowledge
In the Supreme Court of Florida's decision to eliminate the required
element of actual or constructive knowledge, the court first considered the
type of circumstantial evidence that is sufficient to create a jury issue. 21 In
doing so, the court referred to its decision almost thirty years ago in
Montgomery v. Fla. Jitney Jungle Stores, Inc.12 7
In that case, the plaintiff had slipped and fallen on a collard leaf. The
evidence presented was that
[1] she had been in the area of the fall for fifteen minutes before
falling; [2] no other shoppers were in the area when she fell; [3] no
employee swept the floor while she was there; [4] two employees
were nearby when the accident occurred; [5] the collard leaf upon
which she slipped was old, wilted and dirty looking; and [6] water
was on the floor where she fell. 129
In Montgomery, the Supreme Court of Florida was not faced with the
issue of whether the condition of the collard leaf, by itself, was enough to
122. Id.
123. Owens v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 802 So. 2d 315, 320 (Fla. 2001).
124. Id. at 323.
125. Id. at 324.
126. Id. at 320.
127. Id. (citing Montgomery v. Fla. Jitney Jungle Stores, Inc., 281 So. 2d 302, 303
(Fla. 1973).
128. Montgomery, 281 So. 2d at 303.
129. Owens, 802 So. 2d at 321 (citing Montgomery, 281 So. 2d at 303).
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charge the premises owner with constructive knowledge.' 30  Rather, the
Montgomery court noted that circumstantial evidence could be used, and
because there was conflicting evidence as to the timespan the collard leaf
was on the floor, the issue was for the trier of fact.
131
Acknowledging the unclear standard set by the court in Montgomery,
Florida appellate courts were left with little guidance. 132 To illustrate the
effect of the ruling in Montgomery, the court cited to those appellate courts
that have held the description of the transitory foreign substance as
sufficient. 133 For example, the First District held in favor of the injured par
who described the substance as partially melted butter with lumps in it.'
Likewise, the Third District held the description of a substance as "'ver
dirty,' 'trampled,' 'containing skid marks, scuff marks' and 'chewed up,"
and "ice cream [that] was thawed, dirty, and splattered,"'' 36 as sufficient. The
Fourth District has also agreed that the description of the substance was
enough where the plaintiff described the substance to look like "sauerkraut
[that] was 'gunky, dirty and wet and black,"",137 or where the plaintiff
described the substance as "'old, nasty' and 'looked liked [it] had been there
for a quite a while. '" 138 Hence, if a plaintiff were unable to provide the trial
court with at least the description of the transitory foreign substance so as to
establish the length of time it was on the floor, appellate courts have
' 39
affirmed the trial court's ruling in favor of the premises owner.
130. Id. (citing Owens, 729 So. 2d at 451 (Sharp, J., dissenting)).
131. Id. (citing Montgomery, 281 So. 2d at 303).
132. Id. (stating that since Montgomery, Florida appellate courts have been split on
whether the condition and description of the transitory foreign substance are sufficient
circumstantial evidence to create a jury issue of constructive knowledge).
133. Id.
134. Owens v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 802 So. 2d 315, 321 (Fla. 2001) (citing
Ramey v. Winn Dixie Montgomery, Inc., 710 So. 2d 191, 192-93 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1998)).
135. Id. (quoting Woods v. Winn Dixie Stores, Inc., 621 So. 2d 710, 710-11 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1993)).
136. Id. (citing Canina v. Parliament Ins., Co., 417 So. 2d 1093, 1094 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1982)).
137. Id. (quoting Ress v. X-tra Super Food Ctrs., Inc., 616 So. 2d 110, 110-11 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993)).
138. Id. (quoting Washington v. Pic-N-Pay Supermarket, Inc., 453 So. 2d 508, 509
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1984)).
139. Owens, 802 So. 2d at 321-22. The following cases were provided as illustrations
where the issue of constructive knowledge was precluded from the jury because the plaintiff
could not describe the substance:
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Conversely, the court noted that even in those cases where the plaintiff
offered some evidence of the transitory foreign substance's aging or
deterioration, one appellate court nevertheless affirmed the trial court's
holding in favor of the premises owner."40 To illustrate this decision, the
court utilized the Bates case relied on by the majorities in Owens and
Soriano.141 In that case, the shopper slipped and fell on a banana peel, just
as in Owens and Soriano.42 As evidence of the supermarket's constructive
knowledge, the shopper offered the description of the banana peel as "'dark,
over ripe, black, old and nasty looking."",143 Even with the description of the
banana peel as evidence of its aging, the Second District affirmed the trial
court's holding in favor of the supermarket because the inference drawn
from the color and condition of the banana (i.e. the length of time it was on
the floor) would first have to be drawn from the inference that it was not
already deteriorated when it first fell to the floor.' 44  The Second District
stated, "'that this is the type of mental gymnastics [that is] prohib-
ited.., since the latter inference.., is not to the exclusion of all other
reasonable inferences."",1
45
However, that holding was rejected by the Third District in Teate v.
146Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., where the shopper provided the description of the
substance on the floor so as to charge the supermarket with constructive
knowledge. 47 In Teate, the shopper
Publix Super Market, Inc. v. Sanchez, 700 So. 2d 405, 406 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1997) (a piece of cake was on the floor, but there was no evidence as to how long it
had been on the floor); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. King, 592 So. 2d 705, 707 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (slippery, oily, clear substance, but no evidence of "signs of age,
such as skid marks, smudges, or the like"); Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Marcotte, 553
So. 2d 213, 21(41 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (slippery substance, but no evidence as
to how or when it got on the floor, or the length of time it was there before the fall);
Winn Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Gaines, 542 So. 2d 432, 432 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989)
(loose dried rice and beans, but no evidence that they appeared old or were ground into
the floor or crushed, and no evidence of broken packages).
Id. at 322.
140. Id. at 322 (citing Bates v. Winn Dixie Supermarkets, Inc., 182 So. 2d 309, 310
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1966)).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. (quoting Bates, 182 So. 2d at 309).
144. Id. (citing Bates, 182 So. 2d at 311).
145. Owens, 802 So. 2d at 322 (quoting Bates, 182 So. 2d at 311) (citations omitted)
(emphasis added).
146. 542 So. 2d 1060 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
147. Owens, 802 So. 2d at 322 (citing Teate v. Winn Dixie Stores, Inc., 542 So. 2d
1060, 1061 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1988)).
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presented evidence that there was some water on the floor around
the peas... contend[ing] that the water was there because the peas
had been on the floor for some time and had thawed. The jury
could believe this and find that the peas had been on the floor for a
sufficient time to put Winn Dixie on notice of the dangerous condi-
tion. Winn Dixie counter(ed] that the water was a result of "perma-
frost" or ice crystals on the bag of peas that instantly melted when
it hit the floor. The jury could choose to believe this argument,
find the peas had fallen perhaps only seconds before the fall, and
decide there was insufficient notice.
Because there was conflicting evidence as to how the water around the peas
resulted, the Third District held the issue was for the trier of fact to
determine and rejected the supermarket's contention that the jury would be
impermissibly stacking inferences. 149  To explain its holding, the Third
District stated that the existence of the water on the floor was for the jury to
decide based on the direct evidence offered by the plaintiff shopper and the
defendant supermarket. 150 Based on that direct evidence, the jury was only
required to make one inference.'
5
'
In reviewing the required element of actual and constructive knowl-
edge, the court recognized that case law has created constructive knowledge
as the linchpin of liability. 5 2 Thus, an injured party's likeliness of surviving
a directed verdict or summary judgment depended on the injured party's
ability to actually see the condition of the transitory foreign substance that
caused his or her fall.'
5 3
2. Negligent Mode of Operation Theory Historically Restricted from the
Supermarket Setting
In reviewing the mode of operation theory as an alternative to the
required element of constructive knowledge, the court recognized it had
never extended the mode of operation theory to a supermarket setting.'5
Rather, the court explained that this theory had been more easily applied to
business premises such as racetracks where a large number of people
148. Id. (quoting Teate, 542 So. 2d at 1061) (alteration in original).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 322 (citing Teate, 542 So. 2d at 1061).
151. Id. at 323.
152. Owens, 802 So. 2d at 323.
153. Id.
154. Id.
2002] 207
207
: Nova Law Review 27, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 2002
Nova Law Review [Vol. 27:191
congregate by invitation. 155 In such a scenario, the court stated that by the
very nature of the business or its mode of operation, the required element of
constructive knowledge is irrelevant.
156
"Although [the] court has never extended the mode of operation theory
to a supermarket... setting, neither has th[e] [c]ourt... rejected [it]."' 1
The court reflected back to its decision over fifty years ago in Carls Markets,
Inc. v. Meyer,158 where it stated that if the premises owner was the creator of
the dangerous condition, logic dictates that the creator had knowledge of the
dangerous condition, and would thus be liable for the creation of it, as was
the case in Wells. 159
3. Overview of Other Jurisdictional Approaches in Slip-and-Fall Cases
Struggling with what to make of Florida's precedence on constructive
knowledge in slip-and-fall cases, the Supreme Court of Florida examined
how other jurisdictions have handled transitory foreign substance actions.'0
The court noted that other jurisdictions, such as Kansas, have acknowledged
155. Id.
156. Id. In Wells, the court rejected the racetrack's contention that the patron failed to
prove actual or constructive knowledge holding that a heightened standard of reasonable care
is applied to places of public amusement where thousands of people are invited, and the
premises owner sells bottled beverages and fails to provide a place for their disposal causing
the bottles to be thrown anywhere on the premises. Therefore, the failure to provide a place of
disposal for the empty bottles charged the premises owner with negligence as to its mode of
operation. Owens, 802 So. 2d at 323 (citing Wells, 35 So. 2d at 721 (citations omitted in
original)).
157. Owens, 802 So. 2d at 323.
158. 69 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 1953).
159. Owens, 802 So. 2d at 324 (citing Carls Mkts., Inc. v. Meyer, 69 So. 2d 789, 791
(Fla. 1953)). The court referred to the following listed examples rejecting the negligent mode
of operation theory in supermarket settings: Rowe v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 714 So. 2d
1180, 1181 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (rejecting the application of the negligent mode of
operation theory to a supermarket holding that the supermarket was not the creator of a
dangerous condition by having an unattended seafood salad display where another customer
spilled the salad causing another shopper to slip-and-fall); Publix Super Mkt., Inc. v. Sanchez,
700 So. 2d 405, 406 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (rejecting application of negligent mode of
operation theory to supermarket where supermarket had an unattended cake sample table,
against store policy, at time plaintiff slipped and fell); Schaap v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc.,
579 So. 2d 831, 833-34 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (rejecting the application of negligent
mode of operation theory to supermarket that implemented a "cookie program" giving out free
cookies to children where plaintiff alleged supermarket's program was inherently dangerous
causing plaintiff's slip-and-fall on what was described as a small piece of cookie).
160. Owens, 802 So. 2d at 324.
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the principles of premises liability as traditional, thus requiring "a broad
[modem] trend toward liberalizing the rules restricting recovery by one
injured on the premises of another."16 1 In taking a modem approach, the
court stated that other jurisdictions first identified historical observations and
policy considerations. 62 Borrowing from other jurisdictions, the Supreme
Court of Florida provided four policy considerations to justify a liberal trend
away from the traditional principles of premises liability law:
[1] the evolution of modem merchandise marketing techniques, in-
cluding self-service, have increased the likelihood of spills and
breaks occurring. 163 [2] [A] store adopting the self-service tech-
nique should reasonably anticipate certain types of accidents and
therefore is already on notice .... 164 [3] [B]ecause the self-service
technique allows for lower overhead and greater profits, the busi-
nesses that adopt [this] ... technique are in a better position to pre-
• • 165
vent and attend to the risks involved. [4] [I]t is unfair to place
the burden on the customer to establish actual or constructive no-
tice of the condition on the part of the premises owner or operator
when the defendant is in control of its own premises and the evi-
dence on which notice is based.'
66
Giving great weight to these policy considerations, the Supreme Court
of Florida stated that other jurisdictions have, as a result, shifted the burden
of proof from the injured party to the premises owner, and extended the
mode of operation theory to a supermarket setting in transitory foreign167
substance actions. The Supreme Court of Florida found holdings in other
jurisdictions justifying the burden-shifting analysis based on the premises
owner being in a superior position to know of how the dangerous condition
161. Id. at 324-25 (quoting Jackson v. K-Mart Corp., 840 P.2d 463, 467 (Kan. 1992)
(citations omitted)).
162. Id. at 325.
163. Id. (citing Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Smith, 658 P.2d 255, 257 (Colo. 1983);
Gonzales v. Winn Dixie La., Inc., 326 So. 2d 486, 488 (La. 1976)).
164. Id. (citing Chiara v. Fry's Food Stores of Ariz., Inc., 733 P.2d 283, 286 (Ariz.
1987)).
165. Owens, 802 So. 2d at 325 (citing Gump v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 5 P.3d 418, 434
(Haw. Ct. App. 1999), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 5 P.3d 407 (Haw. 2000) (citations omitted
in original); Pimentel v. Roundup Co., 666 P.2d 888, 891 (Wash. 1983) (citations omitted in
original)).
166. Id. at 325 (citing Wollerman v. Grand Union Stores, Inc., 221 A.2d 513, 514-15
(N.J. 1966)).
167. Id.
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was created when compared to the position of customers.16  In addition,
self-service stores, by their very nature, display items on the shelves that
may likely be dropped by customers.169 Therefore, stores are required to
minimize that risk through reasonable care by conducting timely inspections
and cleanups.170  This consideration, as the Owens court stated, lead the
Supreme Court of Louisiana to create a rebuttable presumption of negli-
gence, thus shifting the burden of Proof from the customer to the storeowner
to prove that it was not negligent.' Even if the dangerous condition was the
created by a third party, the Supreme Court of Louisiana still held that the
burden was on the storeowner to prove that it exercised reasonable care by
conducting timely inspections, because in supermarket settings, it is
foreseeable that spills and breaks will occur.172 However, subsequent to the
Supreme Court of Louisiana's holding, the Louisiana Legislature codified
"the requirement of actual or constructive knowledge into [the state's]
statute," thus overruling that court's ruling.
173
Likewise, the Supreme Court of Colorado was in accordance with
Louisiana and New Jersey in recognizing an exception to the requirement of
constructive knowledge in cases where the store's mode of operation created
dangerous conditions, and were thus foreseeable. 74 Referring to Safeway
Stores, Inc. v. Smith, 75 the Supreme Court of Florida stated that the Supreme
Court of Colorado found that in supermarkets a customer's access to shelved
items carries with it the increased risk of spills and breaks, thus creating a
dangerous condition. 76  As such, actual or constructive knowledge is
inconsequential. 77 In considering the evidence presented in Smith, the court
gave great weight to the testimony of the store manager who had over
eighteen years of experience. 178 In his testimony, he stated that spills were
168. Id. (citing Wollerman, 221 A.2d at 514-15 (citations omitted)).
169. Id. at 326 (citing Gonzales, 326 So. 2d at 488).
170. Owens, 802 So. 2d at 326 (citing Gonzales, 326 So. 2d at 488 (citations omitted)).
171. Id. (citing Kavlich v. Kramer, 315 So. 2d 282, 285 (La. 1975) (citations omitted
in original) (affirming that once the plaintiff establishes that the piece of banana was there and
that he or she slipped and fell because of it, the burden shifts to the premises owner to rebut
the presumption of negligence)).
172. Id. at 326-27 (citing Gonzales, 326 So. 2d at 488-89).
173. Id. at 326 n.9.
174. Id. at 327 (citing Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Smith, 658 P.2d 255, 257 (Colo. 1983)
(citations omitted)).
175. 658 P.2d 255 (Colo. 1983).
176. Owens, 802 So. 2d at 327 (citing Smith, 658 P.2d at 257 (footnote omitted)).
177. Id. at 328.
178. Id. at 327-28 (citing Smith, 658 P.2d at 257 n.3).
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common, and the existence of substances on the floor was not unusual. 179
Further, the Smith court stated that it would be unreasonable to place the
burden on the plaintiff to prove that the store was negligent when it was
within the store owner's own knowledge whether the store took reasonable
steps to discover the dangerous condition.18°
In surveying other jurisdictional approaches in premises liability cases,
the Supreme Court of Florida noted that although not all jurisdictions have
adopted a burden-shifting analysis, other jurisdictions have instead extended
the negligent mode of operation theory to the supermarket setting, thereby
eliminating the requirement of constructive knowledge.' 8' The Supreme
Court of Florida referred to Chiara v. Fry's Food Stores of Arizona, Inc.,182
where the Supreme Court of Arizona stated, "[t]he 'mode-of-operation' rule
looks to a business's choice of a particular mode of operation and not events
surrounding the plaintiff's accident. Under this rule, the plaintiff is not
required to prove notice if the proprietor could reasonably anticipate that
hazardous conditions would regularly arise."'
8 3
That holding was consistent with, and accepted by, other jurisdictions
that have also held that, because storeowners implement self-service systems
as its mode of operation, the storeowners are imputed with the knowledge of
their customers' conduct;184 and where the store's mode of operation creates
the dangerous condition, the dangerous condition is thus foreseeable and the
element of notice is irrelevant.
85
The Supreme Court of Florida continued by noting that other
jurisdictions, such as Wisconsin and Vermont, that are reluctant to eliminate
constructive knowledge, have at least made it easier for a plaintiff to meet
the requirement by first eliminating the burden of proving that the substance
existed for a sufficient amount of time prior to the fall and the failure of the
storeowner to provide evidence of reasonable care.is6
Overall, the Supreme Court of Florida noted that there is
"clearly... [a] modem jurisprudential trend of departing from the traditional
179. Id. at 328.
180. Id. (citing Smith, 658 P.2d at 258 (citations omitted in original)).
181. Owens, 802 So. 2d at 328.
182. 733 P.2d 283, 285 (Ariz. 1987).
183. Owens, 802 So. 2d at 328 (quoting Chiara v. Fry's Food Stores of Ariz., Inc., 733
P.2d 283, 285 (Ariz. 1987)) (citations omitted).
184. Id. (quoting Dumont v. Shaw's Supermarkets, Inc., 664 A.2d 846, 849 (Me.
1995)).
185. Id. (quoting Pimentel v. Roundup Co., 666 P.2d 888, 893 (Wash. 1983) (citing
Jackson v. K-Mart Corp., 840 P.2d 463, 470 (Kan. 1992)).
186. Id. at 328-29 (citations omitted).
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rule of premises liability when a plaintiff slips and falls on a transitory
foreign substance. 1 87 The Supreme Court of Florida reiterated the fact that
other jurisdictional case law has recognized the unfairness placed on
plaintiffs by requiring them to meet the element of constructive knowledge
particularly in a supermarket setting where items regularly fall and the risk
of slips are foreseeable. 1
88
C. Outcome of Owens: A Drastic Departure from Florida's Precedent
After the Supreme Court of Florida's in-depth overview of Florida's
precedent and other jurisprudential trends, it decided that today's supermar-
ket settings in Florida required a little change in premises liability law
involving transitory foreign substance actions.
1. Proof of Actual and Constructive Knowledge Eliminated
The Supreme Court of Florida reached several conclusions in both
Owens and Soriano. 89 First, the court held that the directed verdicts granted
to the defendant supermarkets were erroneous because even under prior case
law the plaintiffs offered sufficient evidence, that is, the condition of the
banana peel, which gave rise to a reasonable inference that the aging
occurred on the floor. 19° Thus, the Supreme Court of Florida rejected the
holdings of other appellate courts regarding the theory of impermissible
inference stacking.191 Rather, the Supreme Court of Florida agreed with the
Third District's holding in Teate where the court stated "the mere fact that
there may be alternative explanations inconsistent with the deterioration
occurring on the floor does not render the circumstantial evidence of
constructive knowledge fatally deficient."' 192 Moreover, the Supreme Court
of Florida stated that the appropriate analysis in these cases is that of
Montgomery and held that the substance's condition gave rise to a
reasonable inference that it aged on the floor.' 93  Further, the issue of
whether the dangerous condition was a result of the store's failure to make
187. Id. at 329.
188. Owens, 802 So. 2d at 329.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. (citing Teate, 524 So. 2d at 1061).
193. Owens, 802 So. 2d at 329.
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timely inspections and discover it is a question for the jury to decide.' 94
Therefore, the Supreme Court of Florida rejected the appellate court's
reliance on Bates and approved Judge Sharp's dissenting opinion in
Owens,195 where Judge Sharp stated that the condition of a substance is
sufficient to create a jury issue on constructive knowledge. 9%
Based on premises liability case law and its interpretation and
application of traditional rules, the Supreme Court of Florida believed that
prior case law had improperly deviated its focus from the duty of premises
owners to exercise reasonable care in the maintenance of their premises to an
injured party's ability to prove actual or constructive knowledge. 197 The
effect of doing so left the success of plaintiff's case being tried dependent on
whether the plaintiff could essentially provide an exact description of the
condition of the transitory foreign substance.198 Further, the court observed
that premises owners were unjustly benefiting from their own lack of record-
keeping because plaintiffs, as in Owens and Soriano, are often unable to
prove when the floors were last maintained.199
In Soriano, the injured customer produced evidence of 1) the condition
of the banana peel; 2) the supermarket's lack of record-keeping establishing
the stores inability to know when the area was last maintained; and 3) the
testimony of the store manager who stated that it was common for customers
to eat and drop food on the floor.2° Thus, the issue considered by the court
was whether the store's lack of record-keeping should give rise to an
inference that the store failed to exercise the degree of care proportionate to
the foreseeable risk of injury.2°! Because the store manager testified that it
was common for shoppers to eat and drop grocery items on the floor, the
court noted it was foreseeable that such hazards would occur.2°2
Reiterating that premises owners owe a legal duty to maintain the
premises in a reasonably safe condition, the Supreme Court of Florida held
that a transitory foreign substance on the floor is an unsafe condition.2 °3
194. Id.
195. Owens v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 729 So. 2d 449 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1999) (en banc) (Sharp, J., dissenting).
196. Owens, 802 So. 2d at 330.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Owens, 802 So. 2d at 330.
202. Id.
203. Id.
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204Therefore, the court concluded that supermarkets, particularly nowadays,
should be aware of potentially unsafe conditions created as a result of the
operation in which the supermarket is carried out.2°5 The court explained
that today's supermarket shoppers are forced to focus on items that are
shelved and are thus distracted from the floor on which they walk.206
Moreover, because supermarkets are in a superior position to show when the
premises were last maintained, they are also in a better position to know
what actually happened by instigating an immediate investigation including
interviews with witnesses and taking photographs. 2°7 Based on these factors,
the court concluded that the burden-shifting analysis, as adopted by other
jurisdictions, is appropriate for Florida's transitory foreign substance
cases.
208
Thus, the court placed the burden on the storeowner to prove that he or
she exercised reasonable care under the circumstances. 209 As a result, the
shopper's obligation to prove that the storeowner had actual or constructive
knowledge of the unsafe condition was eliminated. 2 '0 Therefore, in
transitory foreign substance cases the plaintiff's burden is substantially
diminished because the plaintiff, in addition to proving the premises owner
owed a duty, is now only required to prove 1) a substance was on the floor;
2) the plaintiff slipped on the substance and fell; and 3) the plaintiff suffered
211injuries. Once the plaintiff establishes these elements, "a rebuttable
presumption... arises" and shifts the burden to the storeowner to prove, "by
the greater weight of evidence, that it [did] exercise reasonable care in the
maintenance of the premises. 212  The court justified its adoption of the
burden-shifting analysis from a policy perspective stating that premises
owners, as a result of this decision, will adopt or increase the "protective
measures [necessary] to prevent foreseeable risks. 213 The basic effect is to
allow a jury to make the ultimate factual determination of "whether the
204. Id. (including self-service marts, cafeterias, fast food restaurants and similar
businesses).
205. Id.
206. Owens, 802 So. 2d at 330.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 331.
209. Id.
210. Id. (finding a plaintiff's burden to establish the length of time a substance was on
the floor as artificial).
211. Owens, 802 So. 2d at 331.
212. Id. (holding that "circumstances could include the nature of the... hazard and the
nature of the... [premises owner's] business").
213. Id.
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premises owner ... exercised reasonable care" in the maintenance of its
premises.214
As a result, the Supreme Court of Florida held that because in both
Owens and Soriano the condition of the banana peel was sufficient
circumstantial evidence to establish the supermarket's constructive
knowledge, both cases were remanded where a jury would decide whether
the aging occurred before or after the banana fell to the floor.215 In addition,
each supermarket will bear the burden to rebut the presumption that it failed
to maintain its floors in a reasonably safe manner.
2. Negligent Mode of Operation Theory Extended to Supermarket Settings
In regard to the mode of operation theory and its traditionally restricted
application to a supermarket setting, the Supreme Court of Florida rejected
its restriction and acknowledged the theory as one of "continued viabil-
ity.,'217 The issue under this theory would be "whether the specific method of
operation was negligent and whether the accident occurred as a result of that
,,2 219
negligence. 218 Thus, actual or constructive knowledge is not an issue.
Rather, the plaintiff need only produce evidence of a "specific negligent
mode of operation such that the premises owner could reasonably" foresee
220
an unsafe condition arising because of that method. In other words, a
supermarket "must prove [it] exercised reasonable care" by inspecting and
"cleaning up spills rather than requiring injured [shoppers] to prove [that
the] store employees were negligent., 22'
However, the Owens court rejected the application of the negligent
mode of operation theory in Soriano because Soriano only produced
evidence establishing that the supermarket employees failed to sweep as
222required by store policy and timely fill out inspection reports. The courtfound Soriano's allegation to be a "general claim of negligence" in
214. Id.
215. Id. at 332.
216. Owens, 802 So. 2d at 319, 332.
217. Id. at 332.
218. Id. (emphasis added).
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Mark Albright, Florida's High Court Places Burden of Proof on Grocers in Slip-
and-Fall Cases, ST. PETMSBURG TimEs, Nov. 16, 2001, 2001 WL 30267234.
222, Owens, 802 So. 2d at 332.
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maintaining the floors rather than a "specific claim of negligent mode of
operation.
Chief Justice Wells emphasized in his concurring opinion that the duty
owed by premises owners toward invitees to "maintain [their floors] in a
reasonably safe condition" is the real issue, rather than, whether the
premises owner had "constructive knowledge of an unsafe condition."
224
Moreover, Chief Justice Wells noted that evidence of establishing lack of
actual knowledge and issues of care are determinations based on apportion-
225ment of fault and not duty. Because these issues focus on facts, Chief
Justice Wells concluded that these factual issues are for the jury and not the
judges. 226 Although Chief Justice Wells concurred with the Owens majority,
he disagreed with the majority's opinion concerning the viability of the
227
negligent mode of operation theory as applied to supermarkets.
In addition, Justice Harding concurred with the majority, however, he
disagreed with the majority's discussion on "the shortcomings of traditional
premises liability" law, finding that the majority unnecessarily rewrote
Florida's slip-and-fall law.228
IV. IMPACT OF OWENS
Plaintiffs' attorneys were ecstatic, defense attorneys were stunned, and
business premises owners were in a panic. Legal experts labeled the Owens
decision a landmark case because the Supreme Court of Florida did away
with Florida's traditional slip-and-fall standard established in Montgom-
229
ery. Prior to the decision in Owens, a shopper had to prove the supermar-
ket had constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition, that is, the
supermarket "knew or should have known that the treacherous mess was on
,,230the floor and still failed to clean it up, an almost impossible burden. As a
result of the Owens ruling, the shopper is merely required to prove that he or
231
she slipped and fell and was injured. At that point, the supermarket must
223. Id.
224. Id. at 333 (Wells, C.J., concurring in result only).
225. Id. (Wells, C.J., concurring in result only).
226. Id. (Wells, C.J., concurring in result only).
227. Owens, 802 So. 2d at 332 (Wells, C.J., concurring in result only).
228. Id. at 333-34 (Harding, J., concurring in result only).
229. Kennedy, supra note 10.
230. Susan R. Miller, Legislature Passes Bill on Slip-and-Fall Cases, MIAMI DAILY
BUS. REV., Mar. 26, 2002, at 7 [hereinafter Miller H].
231. Owens, 802So. 2dat331.
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prove that it exercised reasonable care to keep the premises safe.232 The
rebuttable presumption was viewed as a translation into "guilty until proven
innocent, because to rebut the presumption storeowners must produce
"evidence such as inspection reports, surveillance video[s], or testimony" on
what precautions it took to ensure the safe condition of its floors.23"
Now armed with the court's ruling, Owens was ready to go back to
235
court. Envious attorneys only wished this decision came sooner, because
prior to Owens, attorneys were forced to reject roughly "nine out of ten slip-
and-fall cases" solely because the burden of proof was so hard to meet.236
One recent commentator stated that the Owens decision "strained an
already tense relationship between" the Supreme Court of Florida and
Florida's "republican leadership and business community. 237 As such, a
"lobbying battle... over legislation to protect the owners of [business]
premises" was a possibility in the very near future.23 8 Defense attorneys
believed the Owens decision "set a dangerous precedent [by opening the]
floodgates to frivolous lawsuits. 239  While, on the other end, plaintiffs'
attorneys argued that Florida's old law prevented cases from going to the
jury due to the unclear guidelines set in Florida's precedent. 2  As a result of
this decision, plaintiffs' attorneys believed Florida's new rule provided
clearer guidelines with the burden of proof fairly allocated. 24  As one
attorney stated, "'the real significant difference... is that... [plaintiffs
will] never.., get a directed verdict anymore. ' ' '242  However, business
defense attorneys argued that the "ruling undermine[d] the fundamental
principle that plaintiffs bear the burden of proof in negligence actions.
24 3
Puzzled and shocked by the court's flip-flop of Florida law, accusations of
financial motivation were made where one attorney stated, "'[t]his is just
another example of shifting financial responsibility to those that the judicial
232. Id.
233. Banana Peel Coalition Legislation Passes Committee, at http://www.flchamber.
con/home/FBAR_020222.asp (last visited July 05, 2002).
234. Miller I, supra note 1.
235. Kennedy, supra note 10.
236. Miller I, supra note 1.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Miller I, supra note 1.
242. Id.
243. Id.
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system perceives can afford to pay.'244 Thus, the court is viewed by some
as just "another government mechanism for the redistribution of wealth. 245
Moreover, to avoid the risk of large jury awards, storeowners will be forced
to settle.2 6
Because of Owens, storeowners will not only be forced to better
maintain their floors but must also develop better inspection methods that
will enable them to prove the precautionary safety measures implemented so
247as to avoid, allegations of negligence. The exercise of reasonable care in
maintaining premises in a safe condition is not a new duty but one
248traditionally imposed on premises owners. What this duty entails, as the
Owens decision reflects, is that supermarkets must do more than declare that
a floor maintenance system exists. Rather, the maintenance system must be
implemented and religiously carried out if a supermarket wishes to avoid
liability.249 Some supermarkets, like B & B Grocery in Soriano, theoreti-
cally had inspection and maintenance methods for the purpose of fulfilling
its duty as a premises owner.250 However, as the store manager of B & B
Grocery testified, the inspections were not carried out as scheduled and
required by store policy. 25' Further, the inspection reports were all
completed at one time, by one person, and were falsified. 52 Based on these
facts, it is fair to say that B & B Grocery is the poster supermarket for failing
to fulfill its legal duty to exercise reasonable care toward its shoppers in the
maintenance of its floors in a safe condition.
Conversely, supermarkets that do implement and carry out a floor
maintenance system have still been accused of negligence by shoppers that
alleged they slipped and fell.253 However, some allegedly injured shoppers
were arrested in South Florida because they were "staging falls in supermar-
244. Id.
245. Law: Case on a Peel, THE FLA. TIMES-UNION (Jacksonville) Feb. 5, 2002, 2002
WL 5956771.
246. Meg Major, Slipping Beneath a Heavy Burden: Until They Can Get Some
Legislative Help, Florida Retailers Have a Lot More to Worry about When Customers File
Slip-and-Fall Suits, PROGRESSIVE GROCER, Feb. 1, 2002, at 10, 2002 WL 11887712.
247. Miller I, supra note 1.
248. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Marcotte, 553 So. 2d 213, 214 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1989).
249. Major, supra note 246.
250. Brief on Merits of Petitioners at 3, Soriano v. B & B Cash Grocery Stores, Inc.,
757 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (No. 96, 235).
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Law: Case on a Peel, supra note 245.
[Vol. 27:191
218
Nova Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 1 [2002], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol27/iss1/1
Zilieris
kets to collect awards and settlements. 254 Thus, the ruling in Owens could
also shield a supermarket by compelling it to implement better precautionary
protective measures because those measures will prove the supermarket is
free from liability in instances where the shopper is faking to make a buck.
However, a National Floor Safety Institute representative stated that even
though supermarkets spend $1.5 billion each year in the maintenance of their
premises, they have been inattentive toward slip-and-fall incidents because
supermarkets have traditionally had an upper hand under the old Florida
255law. Supermarkets did not have to implement better preventive methods
because supermarkets had a "history of winning these types of [cases]."
256
In other words, no supermarket would improve a faulty system when the
lower and higher courts had traditionally protected it from liability. , Now
that supermarkets have to perfect their systems and, for some, implement a
system to avoid the likeliness of a jury trial, supermarkets will be forced to
actually train employees,257 conduct regular scheduled floor walks, and
maintain accurate and detailed records, such as sweep logs.2 9 Or will
they?
V. EVERYONE BUT THE PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO OWENS: NO WAY!
A. Florida Retail Federation Takes Immediate Action
In response to Owens, the Florida Retail Federation ("Federation")
immediately took action to reduce the damage caused by what it called an
errant decision" and formed the Banana Peel Coalition. It believed the
Supreme Court of Florida created a "new profit center for trial lawyer
industry," by increasing the number of slip-and-fall cases to go before the
261jury. With nowhere else to turn, the Federation worked on legislative
approaches stating that "'[1]egislation is the only thing you have left when
the Supreme Court [of Florida] dumps you out the front door."' 26 2 Thus, a
two-page bill was drafted in an attempt to undo the Owens decision by
254. Id.
255. Miller I, supra note 1.
256. Id.
257. A Slippery Slope, supra note 11.
258. Major, supra note 246.
259. A Slippery Slope, supra note 11.
260. Susan R. Miller, Slip and Fall into Spring, BROWARD DALY Bus. REv., Feb. 8,
2002, at 3 [hereinafter Miller III].
261. Major, supra note 246.
262. Miller I, supra note 1.
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shifting the burden back to the plaintiff.263 The Federation's vice-president
of governmental affairs and political action, Bill Herrle, stated that the bill
was not an attempt to overrule the decision in Owens but only an "effort to
exert the [1]egislature's prerogative in writing statutes, ' 264 that included
returning back to the common law standard implemented under Florida
law.
265
After negotiations between the Federation and the Academy of Florida
Trial Lawyers, a joint letter was sent to the Florida Senate in attempt to have
the bill passed in 2002.266 The joint letter expressed that Senate Bill 1946
was a "compromise to both sides... [that would] avoid a protracted
legislative battle., 267 While the Federation's attempts were threatening to
plaintiffs, the general counsel for the Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers was
not too worried when he stated that the Florida Legislature would be too
268busy to even consider the bill. Even the Federation believed that the odds
of receiving legislative redress in 2002 would be unlikely since the Florida
Legislature is "busy, distracted, and strained., 269 However, that viewpoint
proved to be wrong.
B. Florida Legislature Quickly Reacts and Unanimously Passes Senate Bill
1946 Settling the Burden of Proof
Senate Bill 1946, 27 considered the most significant litigation-related
bill, 27 was unanimously passed in Florida's 2002 legislative second session
263. Susan R. Miller, Time Slips Away as Deadline Approaches, BROWARD DAILY
Bus. REv., Jan. 15, 2002, at 1 [hereinafter Miller VI].
264. Id.
265. Miller VI, supra note 263.
266. Joint Letter from Rick McAllister, President & CEO, Florida Retail Federation
and Scott Carruthers, Executive Director, The Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers, to the
Honorable John McKay, Florida Senate (Mar. 21, 2002) (on file with the Florida Retail
Federation).
267. Id.
268. Miller VI, supra note 263.
269. Major, supra note 246.
270. Ch. 2002-285, § 1, 2002 Fla. Sess. Law Rep. 2125 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
768.0710). Senate Bill 1946 reads, in part,
An act relating to the burden of proof in negligent actions involving transitory foreign
objects or substances; creating s. 786.0710, F.S.; providing requirements with respect
to the burden of proof in claims against persons or entities in possession or control of
business premises; providing for the application of the act; providing an effective date.
WHEREAS, on November 15, 2001, the Florida Supreme Court decided the case
of Owens v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., Case No. SC95667 & SC96235, and
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and became effective as of May 30, 2002."' In response to the ruling in
Owens, the bill created section 768.0710, of the Florida Statutes, to settle
the burden of proof in transitory foreign substance cases involving business
premises owners.273 The bill is said to "reassert an equitable division of
burdens in slip-and-fall cases." 274 The bill retained the traditional rule of
imposing a legal duty on premises owners to exercise reasonable care in the
maintenance of their premises in a safe condition, including the maintenance
275of premises free from foreseeable hazards. Like the ruling in Owens, the
bill does not require the plaintiff to prove actual or constructive knowledge
and extends the negligent mode of operation to the supermarket setting.276
However, unlike the decision in Owens, the bill essentially shifts the burden
of proof back to the plaintiff who must now show
[1] The... [premises owner] owed a duty to the [plaintiff]; [2] The
[premises owner] acted negligently by failing to exercise reason-
able care in the maintenance, inspection, repair, warning, or mode
of operation of the business premises; [and] [3] The failure to exer-
cise reasonable care was the legal cause of the loss, injury, or dam-
277
age.
Thus, Senate Bill 1946 now arms the plaintiff with additional liability
theories, including the duty to exercise reasonable care in warning. This
theory was argued by the supermarket in Owens as "inviting the court to
WHEREAS, the Florida Legislature has considered the issues raised and law
surveyed in the Owens case when balancing rights and duties between possessors of
land and invitees upon the land, NOW, THEREFORE,
Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Florida.
Id.
271. Randolph Pendleton, Reprieve, For Now Busy with Budgets and Redistricting,
Lawmakers Give Bar and Courts a Pass, MiAMi DAILY Bus. REv., Apr. 12, 2002, at Al.
272. Ch. 2002-285, § 1, 2002 Fla. Sess. Law Rep. 2125 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
768.0710).
273. Id.
274. Press Release, Florida Retail Federation, Florida legislature Provides Slip and Fall
Relief to Florida Businesses (Mar. 25, 2002), at http://www.frf.org/files/p9 l.pdf.
275. Ch. 2002-285, § 1, 2002 Fla. Sess. Law Rep. 2125 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
768.0710).
276. See id. § l(2)(b), 2002 Fla. Sess. Law Rep. at 873. Although the bill does not
require the plaintiff to prove actual or constructive knowledge, evidence establishing notice,
or lack of it, may be submitted and considered by either party. Id.
277. Ch. 2002-285 § l(2)(a)(b)(c), 2002 Fla. Sess. Law Rep. at 2126.
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,,278
proceed down the path to strict liability against premises owners. Under
this theory, supermarkets would presumably have to place signs such as
"'[w]arning, it is foreseeable that food can fall to the floor. Please watch for
that possibility.' 279 However, the Florida Legislature clearly disagreed with
that argument by including it in Senate bill 1946. After all, supermarkets
post warning signs of wet floors as common practice. Thus, it is not unfair
to expect at least that same level of reasonable care for other hazardous
conditions, such as slippery grocery items.
VI. PLAINTIFF SHOPPER OR DEFENDANT SUPERMARKET: WHICH HAS THE
UPPER HAND Now?
Hence, the decision in Owens was undone, as sought by the Florida
Retail Federation. 280 Nevertheless, Senate Bill 1946 is considered a
compromise and noted "as a rare agreement between the plaintiff bar and the
business community. '28 ' For the plaintiff, the only significant compromise
is the elimination of constructive knowledge because it was this element that
"erected a roadblock to recovery." 28 2 For the defendant supermarket, the real
significant compromise is shifting the burden back to the plaintiff.283 The
new Florida burden of proof statute requires the plaintiff, who has been
acknowledged by the Supreme Court of Florida as an inferior par28 to
prove issues of care prior to even litigating the issue before a jury. As
Chief Justice Wells noted in his concurring opinion in Owens, issues of care
are based on facts not as a matter of law and should thus be left to the trier of
fact. 286 Although the statute provides a plaintiff shopper with a number of
liability claims against defendant supermarkets, the plaintiff shopper's
burden of proof remains great because the plaintiff shopper's knowledge
287remains inferior, as the Owens court and other jurisdictions have held. As
the Owens court stated, supermarkets have access to its inspection records,
and the opportunity to immediately investigate, interview witnesses, and take
278. Respondent's Brief On the Merits at 22, Owens v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 802
So. 2d 315 (Fla. 2001) (No. 95, 667).
279. Id.
280. Miller I, supra note 1.
281. Pendleton, supra note 272.
282. Miller I, supra note 1.
283. Miller H, supra note 230.
284. Owens v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 802 So. 2d 315, 330 (Fla. 2001).
285. Id.
286. Id. at 333 (Wells, C.J., concurring in result only).
287. Id. at 330 (citations omitted).
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photographs.28' Thus, the Florida Legislature did more than put business
premises owners in a "more level playing field,"289 because as it was
revealed in Soriano, it is fair to say that supermarkets are likely to have a
common practice of falsifying inspection records.290 Therefore, the Florida
Legislature, in effect, lends support to the defendant supermarket's lack of
record keeping, a sloppy habit the Supreme Court of Florida intended to
correct.
291
VII. CONCLUSION
The tug of war on who bears the burden of proof in slip-and-fall actions
is now settled law. By passing Senate Bill 1946, the Florida Legislature
shifted the burden of proof back to the slip-and-fall plaintiff. In accordance
with the Supreme Court of Florida, the plaintiff shopper is no longer
required to prove actual or constructive knowledge of the slippery substance
that caused his or her fall. Still, the plaintiff shopper does bear the burden to
prove that the defendant supermarket failed to exercise reasonable care in
maintaining the premises free from hazards, including those that are
foreseeable, through its inspection, repair, warning, or mode of operation. In
one way, the effect of Senate Bill 1946 benefits the slip-and-fall plaintiff by
eliminating the burden to prove constructive knowledge, a requirement that
once barred the case from the jury. In another way, Senate Bill 1946
benefits the defendant supermarket by shifting the burden of proof back to
the plaintiff. Whether the plaintiff shopper or the defendant supermarket is
more, less, or equally likely to prevail under Florida's new law will
ultimately be determined by the plaintiff shopper's likeliness of meeting his
or her new burden. Although the plaintiff shopper's burden of proof has
changed by extending the number of liability theories under which the
defendant supermarket may be charged, the burden remains great, as it was
in prior case law.
288. Id.
289. Miller II, supra note 230.
290. Brief on Merits of Petitioners at 4, Soriano v. B & B Cash Grocery Stores, Inc.,
757 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (No. 96, 235). Store manager testified that he
and other managers knew that B & B Grocery stores falsified reports. Id.
291. Owens, 802 So. 2d at 330.
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